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THE WORK (AS DEFINED BELOW) IS PROVIDED UNDER THE 
TERMS OF THIS CREATIVE COMMONS PUBLIC LICENSE (“CCPL” 
OR “LICENSE”). THE WORK IS PROTECTED BY COPYRIGHT 
AND/OR OTHER APPLICABLE LAW. ANY USE OF THE WORK 
OTHER THAN AS AUTHORIZED UNDER THIS LICENSE OR 
COPYRIGHT LAW IS PROHIBITED. 
BY EXERCISING ANY RIGHTS TO THE WORK PROVIDED HERE, 
YOU ACCEPT AND AGREE TO BE BOUND BY THE TERMS OF THIS 
LICENSE. TO THE EXTENT THIS LICENSE MAY BE CONSIDERED 
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OF SUCH TERMS AND CONDITIONS. 
 
1. Definitions 
a. “Adaptation” means a work based upon the Work, or upon the Work 
and other pre-existing works, such as a translation, adaptation, 
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derivative work, arrangement of music or other alterations of a 
literary or artistic work, or phonogram or performance and includes 
cinematographic adaptations or any other form in which the Work 
may be recast, transformed, or adapted including in any form 
recognizably derived from the original, except that a work that 
constitutes a Collection will not be considered an Adaptation for the 
purpose of this License. For the avoidance of doubt, where the Work 
is a musical work, performance or phonogram, the synchronization of 
the Work in timed-relation with a moving image (“synching”) will be 
considered an Adaptation for the purpose of this License. 
b. “Collection” means a collection of literary or artistic works, such as 
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broadcasts, or other works or subject matter other than works listed in 
Section 1(f) below, which, by reason of the selection and arrangement 
of their contents, constitute intellectual creations, in which the Work 
is included in its entirety in unmodified form along with one or more 
other contributions, each constituting separate and independent works 
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A work that constitutes a Collection will not be considered an 
Adaptation (as defined above) for the purposes of this License. 
c. “Distribute” means to make available to the public the original and 
copies of the Work through sale or other transfer of ownership. 
d. “Licensor” means the individual, individuals, entity or entities that 
offer(s) the Work under the terms of this License. 
e. “Original Author” means, in the case of a literary or artistic work, 
the individual, individuals, entity or entities who created the Work or 
if no individual or entity can be identified, the publisher; and in 
addition (i) in the case of a performance the actors, singers, 
musicians, dancers, and other persons who act, sing, deliver, declaim, 
play in, interpret or otherwise perform literary or artistic works or 
expressions of folklore; (ii) in the case of a phonogram the producer 
being the person or legal entity who first fixes the sounds of a 
performance or other sounds; and, (iii) in the case of broadcasts, the 
organization that transmits the broadcast. 
f. “Work” means the literary and/or artistic work offered under the 
terms of this License including without limitation any production in 
the literary, scientific and artistic domain, whatever may be the mode 
or form of its expression including digital form, such as a book, 
pamphlet and other writing; a lecture, address, sermon or other work 
of the same nature; a dramatic or dramatico-musical work; a 
choreographic work or entertainment in dumb show; a musical 
composition with or without words; a cinematographic work to which 
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are assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to 
cinematography; a work of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, 
engraving or lithography; a photographic work to which are 
assimilated works expressed by a process analogous to photography; 
a work of applied art; an illustration, map, plan, sketch or three-
dimensional work relative to geography, topography, architecture or 
science; a performance; a broadcast; a phonogram; a compilation of 
data to the extent it is protected as a copyrightable work; or a work 
performed by a variety or circus performer to the extent it is not 
otherwise considered a literary or artistic work. 
g. “You” means an individual or entity exercising rights under this 
License who has not previously violated the terms of this License 
with respect to the Work, or who has received express permission 
from the Licensor to exercise rights under this License despite a 
previous violation. 
h. “Publicly Perform” means to perform public recitations of the Work 
and to communicate to the public those public recitations, by any 
means or process, including by wire or wireless means or public 
digital performances; to make available to the public Works in such a 
way that members of the public may access these Works from a place 
and at a place individually chosen by them; to perform the Work to 
the public by any means or process and the communication to the 
public of the performances of the Work, including by public digital 
performance; to broadcast and rebroadcast the Work by any means 
including signs, sounds or images. 
i. “Reproduce” means to make copies of the Work by any means 
including without limitation by sound or visual recordings and the 
right of fixation and reproducing fixations of the Work, including 
storage of a protected performance or phonogram in digital form or 
other electronic medium. 
 
2. Fair Dealing Rights.  
Nothing in this License is intended to reduce, limit, or restrict any uses free 
from copyright or rights arising from limitations or exceptions that are 
provided for in connection with the copyright protection under copyright law 
or other applicable laws. 
 
3. License Grant.  
Subject to the terms and conditions of this License, Licensor hereby grants 
You a worldwide, royalty-free, non-exclusive, perpetual (for the duration of 
the applicable copyright) license to exercise the rights in the Work as stated 
below: 
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1. to Reproduce the Work, to incorporate the Work into one or more 
Collections, and to Reproduce the Work as incorporated in the 
Collections; and, 
2. to Distribute and Publicly Perform the Work including as 
incorporated in Collections. 
The above rights may be exercised in all media and formats whether now 
known or hereafter devised. The above rights include the right to make such 
modifications as are technically necessary to exercise the rights in other 
media and formats, but otherwise you have no rights to make Adaptations. 
Subject to 8(f), all rights not expressly granted by Licensor are hereby 
reserved, including but not limited to the rights set forth in Section 4(d). 
 
4. Restrictions.  
The license granted in Section 3 above is expressly made subject to and 
limited by the following restrictions: 
1. You may Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work only under the 
terms of this License. You must include a copy of, or the Uniform 
Resource Identifier (URI) for, this License with every copy of the 
Work You Distribute or Publicly Perform. You may not offer or 
impose any terms on the Work that restrict the terms of this License 
or the ability of the recipient of the Work to exercise the rights 
granted to that recipient under the terms of the License. You may not 
sublicense the Work. You must keep intact all notices that refer to this 
License and to the disclaimer of warranties with every copy of the 
Work You Distribute or Publicly Perform. When You Distribute or 
Publicly Perform the Work, You may not impose any effective 
technological measures on the Work that restrict the ability of a 
recipient of the Work from You to exercise the rights granted to that 
recipient under the terms of the License. This Section 4(a) applies to 
the Work as incorporated in a Collection, but this does not require the 
Collection apart from the Work itself to be made subject to the terms 
of this License. If You create a Collection, upon notice from any 
Licensor You must, to the extent practicable, remove from the 
Collection any credit as required by Section 4(c), as requested. 
2. You may not exercise any of the rights granted to You in Section 3 
above in any manner that is primarily intended for or directed toward 
commercial advantage or private monetary compensation. The 
exchange of the Work for other copyrighted works by means of 
digital file-sharing or otherwise shall not be considered to be intended 
for or directed toward commercial advantage or private monetary 
compensation, provided there is no payment of any monetary 
compensation in connection with the exchange of copyrighted works. 
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3. If You Distribute, or Publicly Perform the Work or Collections, You 
must, unless a request has been made pursuant to Section 4(a), keep 
intact all copyright notices for the Work and provide, reasonable to 
the medium or means You are utilizing: (i) the name of the Original 
Author (or pseudonym, if applicable) if supplied, and/or if the 
Original Author and/or Licensor designate another party or parties 
(e.g., a sponsor institute, publishing entity, journal) for attribution 
(“Attribution Parties”) in Licensor’s copyright notice, terms of service 
or by other reasonable means, the name of such party or parties; (ii) 
the title of the Work if supplied; (iii) to the extent reasonably 
practicable, the URI, if any, that Licensor specifies to be associated 
with the Work, unless such URI does not refer to the copyright notice 
or licensing information for the Work. The credit required by this 
Section 4(c) may be implemented in any reasonable manner; 
provided, however, that in the case of a Collection, at a minimum 
such credit will appear, if a credit for all contributing authors of 
Collection appears, then as part of these credits and in a manner at 
least as prominent as the credits for the other contributing authors. For 
the avoidance of doubt, You may only use the credit required by this 
Section for the purpose of attribution in the manner set out above and, 
by exercising Your rights under this License, You may not implicitly 
or explicitly assert or imply any connection with, sponsorship or 
endorsement by the Original Author, Licensor and/or Attribution 
Parties, as appropriate, of You or Your use of the Work, without the 
separate, express prior written permission of the Original Author, 
Licensor and/or Attribution Parties. 
4. For the avoidance of doubt: 
a. Non-waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those 
jurisdictions in which the right to collect royalties through 
any statutory or compulsory licensing scheme cannot be 
waived, the Licensor reserves the exclusive right to collect 
such royalties for any exercise by You of the rights granted 
under this License; 
b. Waivable Compulsory License Schemes. In those 
jurisdictions in which the right to collect royalties through 
any statutory or compulsory licensing scheme can be 
waived, the Licensor reserves the exclusive right to collect 
such royalties for any exercise by You of the rights granted 
under this License if Your exercise of such rights is for a 
purpose or use which is otherwise than noncommercial as 
permitted under Section 4(b) and otherwise waives the right 
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to collect royalties through any statutory or compulsory 
licensing scheme; and, 
c. Voluntary License Schemes. The Licensor reserves the 
right to collect royalties, whether individually or, in the 
event that the Licensor is a member of a collecting society 
that administers voluntary licensing schemes, via that 
society, from any exercise by You of the rights granted 
under this License that is for a purpose or use which is 
otherwise than noncommercial as permitted under Section 
4(b). 
5. Except as otherwise agreed in writing by the Licensor or as may be 
otherwise permitted by applicable law, if You Reproduce, Distribute 
or Publicly Perform the Work either by itself or as part of any 
Collections, You must not distort, mutilate, modify or take other 
derogatory action in relation to the Work which would be prejudicial 
to the Original Author’s honor or reputation. 
 
5. Representations, Warranties and Disclaimer.  
UNLESS OTHERWISE MUTUALLY AGREED BY THE PARTIES IN 
WRITING, LICENSOR OFFERS THE WORK AS-IS AND MAKES NO 
REPRESENTATIONS OR WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND 
CONCERNING THE WORK, EXPRESS, IMPLIED, STATUTORY OR 
OTHERWISE, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, WARRANTIES 
OF TITLE, MERCHANTIBILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, NONINFRINGEMENT, OR THE ABSENCE OF LATENT OR 
OTHER DEFECTS, ACCURACY, OR THE PRESENCE OF ABSENCE 
OF ERRORS, WHETHER OR NOT DISCOVERABLE. SOME 
JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES, SO SUCH EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. 
 
6. Limitation on Liability.  
EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW, IN NO 
EVENT WILL LICENSOR BE LIABLE TO YOU ON ANY LEGAL 
THEORY FOR ANY SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, CONSEQUENTIAL, 
PUNITIVE OR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THIS 
LICENSE OR THE USE OF THE WORK, EVEN IF LICENSOR HAS 
BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES. 
 
7. Termination 
a. This License and the rights granted hereunder will terminate 
automatically upon any breach by You of the terms of this License. 
Individuals or entities who have received Collections from You under 
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this License, however, will not have their licenses terminated 
provided such individuals or entities remain in full compliance with 
those licenses. Sections 1, 2, 5, 6, 7, and 8 will survive any 
termination of this License. 
b. Subject to the above terms and conditions, the license granted here is 
perpetual (for the duration of the applicable copyright in the Work). 
Notwithstanding the above, Licensor reserves the right to release the 
Work under different license terms or to stop distributing the Work at 
any time; provided, however that any such election will not serve to 
withdraw this License (or any other license that has been, or is 
required to be, granted under the terms of this License), and this 
License will continue in full force and effect unless terminated as 
stated above. 
 
8. Miscellaneous 
a. Each time You Distribute or Publicly Perform the Work or a 
Collection, the Licensor offers to the recipient a license to the Work 
on the same terms and conditions as the license granted to You under 
this License. 
b. If any provision of this License is invalid or unenforceable under 
applicable law, it shall not affect the validity or enforceability of the 
remainder of the terms of this License, and without further action by 
the parties to this agreement, such provision shall be reformed to the 
minimum extent necessary to make such provision valid and 
enforceable. 
c. No term or provision of this License shall be deemed waived and no 
breach consented to unless such waiver or consent shall be in writing 
and signed by the party to be charged with such waiver or consent. 
d. This License constitutes the entire agreement between the parties with 
respect to the Work licensed here. There are no understandings, 
agreements or representations with respect to the Work not specified 
here. Licensor shall not be bound by any additional provisions that 
may appear in any communication from You. This License may not 
be modified without the mutual written agreement of the Licensor and 
You. 
e. The rights granted under, and the subject matter referenced, in this 
License were drafted utilizing the terminology of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (as 
amended on September 28, 1979), the Rome Convention of 1961, the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, the WIPO Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty of 1996 and the Universal Copyright Convention 
(as revised on July 24, 1971). These rights and subject matter take 
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1. Introduction  
 
 
PSYCHOHISTORY - … Gaal Dornick, using non-mathematical concepts, has 
defined psychohistory to be that branch of mathematics which deals with the 
reactions of human conglomerates to fixed and social stimuli… 
Isaac Asimov, Foundation1 
 
Isaac Asimov is usually placed at or near the top of any listing of the most 
important science fiction writers. His works have introduced a number of 
concepts that have captivated the imagination of the public and, perhaps 
more importantly, inspired scientists, to the extent that some of his ideas have 
been the subject of academic consideration. The Three Laws of Robotics, for 
example, introduced in his short story, Runaround, have informed research 
and debate in the fields of artificial intelligence, robotics and information 
technology.2 Psychohistory, another important concept explored in Asimov’s 
novels, could be described as the scientific prediction of the behaviour of 
large human conglomerates acting in large numbers. In his Foundation series, 
Asimov recounts the way in which this mathematical modelling of a large 
Galactic society is performed, and the problems that ultimately arise from 
trusting such mechanisms. Psychohistory is based on three postulates: 
 
1. The population under study must be unaware that the predictions are 
taking place. 
2. The predictions must be conducted over periods of three consecutive 
generations. 
3. To ensure the accuracy of statistical probability, the population in 
question must number in the billions.  
 
One of the main plots in the Foundation novels is that a hidden cabal is 
dedicated to making sure that history continues along the path predicted by 
its inventor, mathematician Hari Seldon. Asimov seems to imply that the 
predictive science of psychohistory is doomed to eventual failure because it 
can only foresee large events, and it does not (and cannot) take into account 
                                                          
1. Asimov I, Foundation, London: Octopus Books (1983), p.17.   
2. See for example: Clarke R, “Asimov’s Laws Of Robotics: Implications for Information 
Technology” 26:12-27:1 IEEE Computer (1993-1994). 
 2    Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation  
 
 
the actions of remarkable individuals. He suggests that human and robotic 
intervention is necessary for the accuracy of psychohistory, which can be 
taken as a satisfying compromise between determinism and free will, 
mechanism and individuality.  
Despite this apparent indictment, the predictive capacity of psychohistory 
remains a powerful ideal for some. Nobel Prize winning economist Paul 
Krugman cites psychohistory as one of the reasons he studied economics: 
 
Those who read [science fiction] may be aware of the classic Foundation trilogy 
by Isaac Asimov. It is one of the few science fiction series that deals with social 
scientists – the ‘psychohistorians’, who use their understanding of the mathematics 
of society to save civilization as the Galactic Empire collapses. I loved 
Foundation, and in my early teens my secret fantasy was to become a 
psychohistorian. Unfortunately, there’s no such thing (yet). […] As for social 
sciences other than economics, I am interested in their subjects but cannot get 
excited about their methods – the power of economic models to show how 
plausible assumptions yield surprising conclusions, to distil clear insights from 
seemingly murky issues, has no counterpart yet in political science or sociology. 
Someday there will exist a unified social science of the kind that Asimov 
imagined, but for the time being economics is as close to psychohistory as you can 
get.3 
 
The present work does not assume to be a study in psychohistory. I am 
using the concept to illustrate a vital concept that will be proposed 
throughout the following pages. This book is concerned with a narrow and 
specific area of legal study, that of Internet regulation. Psychohistory cannot 
be written in this way, but the idea behind it remains. The underlying 
assumption in this work is that there are analytical and descriptive tools that 
are more comfortable in the realm of mathematics than in the social sciences. 
Before describing the objective and reach of this work, I will try to explain 
the background to the idea that one can bring both together.  
 
 
A SHORT HISTORY OF PSYCHOHISTORY 
 
One of the presuppositions of the study of human interaction is that human 
behaviour is too complex and chaotic to allow anything even remotely like 
psychohistory to take shape. This seemingly insurmountable stumbling block 
is at the heart of the stark methodological division that exists between the 
natural and social sciences, a split that has become an almost unshakeable 
feature of modern academia, and that is played out on a daily basis in 
university campuses around the world. It is perhaps important to point out 
                                                          
3. Krugman P, Incidents from my Career, http://web.mit.edu/krugman/www/incidents.html.  
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that although we have grown accustomed to the separation of the hard 
sciences and social disciplines, this division is a relatively recent 
development. While social sciences may be seen as the poor relative of 
scientific endeavour, they have, over extended periods of time, aspired to 
adopt methodological approaches used in the study of natural phenomena.4 It 
was the work of authors such as Habermas, Bernstein and Marcuse that 
defined and expanded the gap and promoted the idea that the social sciences 
are an entirely separate set of disciplines, with their own methodology and 
approach to empirical research.5 Since then, social science has become 
involved in critical theory, and increasingly split from the ideals of what 
Habermas calls materialistic science, becoming something else entirely.  
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Fields of science according to purity6 
 
The critical theory that has characterised many social sciences since the 
latter part of the 20th century can be seen as a reaction to the hierarchical and 
structured view of the world that had dominated Western thought since the 
Enlightenment. As a reaction to this materialist world, the social sciences 
adopted a non-hierarchical and unstructured way of looking at reality.7 In 
certain extreme versions of critical theory a form of relativism rules, in which 
it is possible to deconstruct almost anything –including natural science– into 
its cultural origins. This trend further reinforced the schism between the 
natural and the social sciences, resulting in an acrimonious divorce and 
eventually to the Sokal hoax. Physicist Alan Sokal published an article in the 
prestigious social science journal Social Text, claiming to establish a critical 
                                                          
4. Bernstein RJ, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory, Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press (1978), p.xvi.  
5. Particularly relevant to this debate is: Habermas J, Knowledge and Human Interests, 2nd 
[English] ed, London: Heinemann Educational (1978), Chapter 3.  
6. Xkcd, Purity, http://xkcd.com/435/ (released under a Creative Commons licence).  
7. Hart K, Postmodernism: A Beginner’s Guide, Oxford: Oneworld (2004).  
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theory of quantum gravity,8 a spoof that served to polarise opinions in both 
areas of study. On the one hand, some natural scientists could not disguise 
their contempt and glee at the comeuppance of disciplines that some consider 
little more than gibberish.9 The response of cultural theorists, on the other 
hand, ranged from the meek recognition that something might be wrong, to a 
barrage of invective directed at Sokal.10  
An interesting introspection arose, however, out of the Sokal affair, and 
there seems to be genuine willingness to try to get past the science wars.11 
There is a legitimate argument to be made about the uselessness of furthering 
the current state of affairs. Should science remain split between the 
seemingly objective physical sciences and the presumably subjective social 
sciences? Is there room for philosophers to have a say about natural 
phenomena, and for mathematicians to comment on social issues? As has 
been hinted at already, the scientific split is relatively recent, and there is 
growing interest in reverting to a more interdisciplinary approach to the 
relationship between the natural and social sciences. Philip Ball calls it the 
physical modelling of human social systems,12 which can be described as the 
use of methodological and empirical tools prevalent in the physical sciences 
to describe social interaction. In other words, the science of psychohistory is 
born.  
The creation of a branch of study that employs tools used in the study of 
mould, gases and sub-atomic particles, and applies them to complex human 
behaviour, is the logical result of a line of thought that has been growing in 
credence since the Enlightenment: that social sciences have the capacity for 
more predictive precision, much like the so-called hard sciences of 
chemistry, physics and biology. Such a powerful idea may seem counter-
intuitive to those in the academic world who have come to rely and thrive on 
the clear separation of disciplines described above. The idea that societies 
might respond along deterministic paths, and that their behaviour could be 
charted by physics and mathematics contradicts the concepts of agency and 
free will that have dominated much of philosophical thought in the last 
centuries. This modern idea that human affairs are akin to the exact sciences 
                                                          
8. Sokal AD, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of 
Quantum Gravity”, 14:1-2 Social Text 217 (1996).  
9. With varying degree of animosity. For some reactions, see: Koertge N, A House Built on 
Sand: Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
(1998).  
10. See for example: Newman F, “One dogma of dialectical materialism”, 1 Annual Review of 
Critical Psychology 83 (1999).  
11. Two thoughtful pieces in the journal Physics Today can be highlighted as offering a balance 
view of the affair: Gottfried K, “Opinion – Was Sokal’s Hoax Justified?”, 50:1 Physics 
Today 5 (1997); and Beller M, “The Sokal Hoax: At Whom Are We Laughing?”, 51:9 
Physics Today 7 (1998). 
12. Ball P, “The Physical Modelling of Human Social Systems”, 1 Complexus 190 (2003).   
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can, however, be traced back to the 17th century, when several philosophers 
sought to address both natural and human philosophy. Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz is perhaps one of the best examples of a man who was comfortable 
talking about the nature of matter13 and comparative history,14 and in whose 
works one may find in the same paragraph mathematical equations and 
musings about human freedom.15  
One could argue that such overlap of magisteria was the logical result of 
the nature of human progress at that time, as philosophers dealt 
interchangeably with the natural world, theological discourse and social 
phenomena. One could also say that the eventual schism between social and 
physical sciences became necessary once the number of subjects of study 
became too vast for any one person to handle, preventing furtherance of 
knowledge in their field of study. The Renaissance Man has become a figure 
of times past, and specialisation is the norm. I answer these hypothetical 
objections with two questions. Were our predecessors wrong to try to look at 
human endeavours with the same analytical tools that informed their 
scientific thinking? Has this apparent divorce between mathematics and 
society been for the best?    
At a time when the secrets of the universe were being unlocked, and 
during which nature displayed astonishing exactitude, it must have been 
tempting to assume that the mysteries of the inner workings of society would 
also eventually be uncovered to show similar clockwork precision.16 
Seventeenth century philosopher Thomas Hobbes is often referred to as the 
father of the mechanistic view of society.17 Although he is better known for 
his political philosophy, Hobbes was clearly inspired by his mentor Francis 
Bacon, the father of natural philosophy. In his works we encounter a strong 
adherence to rationality and the stricture of social systems that is the 
precursor of political thought in the following centuries. In the Leviathan, he 
wrote:  
 
To conclude, the light of humane minds is perspicuous words, but by exact 
definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; reason is the pace; increase 
of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind, the end. And, on the contrary, 
metaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words are like ignes fatui; and reasoning 
                                                          
13. Leibniz GWF, Monadology and Other Philosophical Essays, Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-
Merrill Company (1965).  
14. Perkins F, Leibniz and China: A Commerce of Light, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press (2004).  
15. Leibniz GWF, “Freedom and Possibility”, in Philosophical Essays, Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing (1989), pp.19–22.  
16. Vinnicombe T, “Thomas Hobbes and the Displacement of Political Philosophy”, 32:8 
International Journal of Social Economics 667 (2005), p.668. 
17. For example, Ball P, Critical Mass: How One Thing Leads to Another, London: Arrow 
Books (2004), pp.7–37.  
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upon them is wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, 
contention and sedition, or contempt.18 
 
Although Hobbes predates the work of Isaac Newton, his words herald a 
world in which it is the precision of science that presents us with the first 
glimpse of the attainability of objective truth. It is the clockwork universe 
unveiled by Newton that seems to have unleashed a new generation of 
philosophers intent on marrying the Hobbesian ideals of society and the 
exactitude of mathematics. Philip Ball comments that: 
 
A political scientist taking a chronological approach would track the trajectory of 
Hobbes’s thought via Locke to later thinkers that believed there could be a 
‘calculus of society’. Along this path we would uncover Jeremy Bentham’s 
utilitarianism in the late eighteenth century, an attempt to harmonize the 
individual’s personal happiness with the interests of society. […] Bentham and the 
Philosophical Radicals, who included John Stuart Mill, paved the way for the 
socialism of Karl Marx.19  
 
It is also in the 17th century that another vital relationship between 
mathematics and social sciences starts to appear: that of finance and 
economics. The foundations of a theory of supply and demand were, for 
example, famously laid by John Locke in a letter to the Members of 
Parliament in 1691.20 Similarly, an often overlooked fact is that a few years 
later, in 1696, Sir Isaac Newton took on the role of Warden of the Mint, and 
in 1699 became Master of the Mint. He is credited (or discredited depending 
on your point of view) with having moved Britain from the silver to the gold 
standard21 during this crucial period, thereby shaping an English monetary 
policy that was to endure into the 20th century. It is no coincidence that these 
two figures, more famous for their political and scientific works, were united 
in their interest in monetary policy. After all, the mystery of the markets may 
have seemed like just another area of potential discovery for the soundest 
minds of the time.  
Given this background, it should come as little surprise that Adam Smith, 
the father of free market economics, was also a philosopher. Smith’s earlier 
academic life was spent teaching logic and moral philosophy at Glasgow 
University, and it was only later that he turned his attention to law and 
                                                          
18. Hobbes T, Leviathan, New York: Barnes & Noble Publishing (2004), p.30.  
19. Ball, supra note 17, p.34.  
20. Locke J, “Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest and the 
Raising the Value of Money”, in Medema SG and Samuels WJ (eds), The History of 
Economic Thought: A Reader, London: Routledge (2003), pp.57–77.  
21. For more about this, see: Findlay-Shirras G and Craig JH, “Sir Isaac Newton and the 
Currency”, 55:218 The Economic Journal, (1945), pp.217–241.  
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economics.22 He is perhaps the best representative of the line of thinkers that 
believed in hidden forces behind social phenomena. In both The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments,23 and The Wealth of Nations,24 Smith introduces the idea 
that market actors, while pursuing self-interest, are guided by an invisible 
hand that acts to the benefit of society. While much ink has been spent on 
discussing the precise meaning of Smith’s invisible hand,25 it is clear that 
Smith believed that human endeavours were controlled by hidden currents, 
expressing what was perhaps a precursor to the ideas of complexity and 
emergence that will be subject of this book.  
At the other side of the political spectrum, philosopher and social scientist 
Friedrich Engels also dedicated considerable time to discussion of the natural 
sciences. In Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science and in his 
unfinished work, Dialectics of Nature, Engels proposes ways in which 
socialist dialectics could be applied to the latest developments in science and 
mathematics. Simply put, dialectics is a way of looking at history and society 
as opposition, negation and transformation in smooth and constant 
fluctuation. Engels believed that natural scientists could learn from the 
methodology contained in dialectics by forgetting their own preconceptions. 
He wrote:  
 
Nature is the proof of dialectics, and it must be said for modern science that it has 
furnished this proof with very rich materials increasing daily, and thus has shown 
that, in the last resort, nature works dialectically and not metaphysically. But the 
naturalists who have learned to think dialectically are few and far between, and 
this conflict of the results of discovery with preconceived modes of thinking 
explains the endless confusion now reigning in theoretical natural science, the 
despair of teachers as well as learners, of authors and readers alike.26 
 
Karl Marx was heavily inspired by Engels, yet he goes further in his ideas 
about history. In truly psychohistorian fashion, Marx believed that not only 
was history shaped by Engels’ dialectics, but that history could be read 
scientifically and that economic laws drove all markets, be they labour or 
commodities.27 Those who could understand these laws could therefore 
foresee the result of future social conflicts.  
                                                          
22. Buchan J, The Authentic Adam Smith: His Life and Ideas, New York: W.W. Norton (2006).  
23. Smith A, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, New York: A.M. Kelley (1966), IV.I.10. 
24. Smith A et al, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Indianapolis, 
IN: Liberty Press (1981), IV.2.9.  
25. For example, see: Minowitz P, “Adam Smith’s Invisible Hands” 1:3 Economy Journal 
Watch 381 (2004).  
26. Engels F and Dühring EK, Anti-Dühring: Herr Eugen Dühring’s Revolution in Science, 
London: Progress Publishers, (1954), p.4.  
27. Particularly in: Marx K, Wage Labour and Capital, Whitefish, MT:  Kessinger Publishing, 
(2004), pp.32–36. 
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These are just some illustrations of the strong philosophical tendency to 
borrow the language and methods of so-called hard sciences for use in the 
charting of social phenomena. There is an abundance of other scholars, 
scientists and thinkers who may be cited for their adoption of physical 
modelling,28 but it is not the objective of this work to provide a 
comprehensive examination of them. 
Despite the eventual divorce of the natural and the social described above, 
some of these ideas survived (and thrived) in the 20th century. The torch-
bearer of interdisciplinary studies since the writings of Adam Smith has been 
economics, and in that discipline, one of the foremost examples of the 
attempt to understand human behaviour through the language of mathematics 
can be found in the discipline of game theory. Put simply, game theory is a 
systematised way of ascribing mathematical reasoning to decisions involving 
other players, and therefore trying to analyse strategic situations in order to 
attribute potential outcomes to each decision.29  
While economics and game theory are indicative of the possibility of 
social mathematical modelling, it is perhaps the very existence of these 
disciplines that is to blame for the prevalence of the science wars. There is 
something distasteful about reducing human decisions to basic binary choices 
between favourable and unfavourable outcomes, as though human beings 
were machines with little rational choice in these decisions. Implicit in the 
physical modelling of social interactions described since the time of Hobbes 
lies the presumption that humans make predictable choices, that society is to 
an extent deterministic, and that history is nothing more than a collection of 
dialectic points and counterpoints. Looking at the science in this way, there is 
little wonder that some in the social sciences have rebelled against such a 
reductionist view of human beings. In the words of documentary maker 
Adam Curtis, game theory and other similar mathematical explanations of 
social phenomena offers us a “simplistic view of human beings as self-
seeking, almost robotic creatures”.30  
 
 
OBJECTIVES 
 
Despite objections to the idea that human affairs can be the subject of 
statistical predictive analysis, this book follows a line of thought similar to 
                                                          
28. For a more detailed history of the physical modelling of social sciences, see Ball, supra note 
17, chapters 1–4.  
29. Davis MD, Game Theory: A Nontechnical Introduction, Rev. ed, London: Dover 
Publications, Constable (1997), pp.3–9.  
30. Curtis A, The Trap – What Happened to our Dream of Freedom, BBC (2007), Episode 3, 
0:17.  
 Introduction   9 
 
 
that which inspired some of the philosophers and scientists mentioned above. 
It is one of the starting premises of the present work that several social 
phenomena follow certain predictable patterns that can be quantified and 
accurately described using mathematical tools. If such assumption is 
warranted, as I believe that it is, then such predictive and descriptive tools 
could be very useful to the law in its efforts to regulate human affairs in a 
much more efficient manner. This book, then, starts with a general statement: 
that regulators should try, wherever possible, to use the physical 
methodological tools presently available in order to draft better legislation. 
While such an assertion may be applied to the law in general, this work will 
concentrate on the much narrower area of Internet regulation and the science 
of complex networks. 
The Internet is the subject of this book not only because it is my main area 
of research, but also because –without over-emphasising the importance of 
the Internet to everyday life31– one cannot deny that the growth and 
popularisation of the global communications network has had a tremendous 
impact on the way in which we interact with one another. The Internet is, 
however, just one of many interactive networks. One way of looking at the 
complex and chaotic nature of society is to see it as a collection of different 
nodes of interaction. Humans are constantly surrounded by networks: the 
social network, the financial network, the transport network, the 
telecommunications network and even the network of our own bodies. 
Understanding how these systems operate and interact with one another has 
been the realm of physicists, economists, biologists and mathematicians. 
Until recently, the study of networks has been mainly theoretical and 
academic, because it is difficult to gather data about large and complex 
systems that is sufficiently reliable to support proper empirical application. In 
recent years, though, the Internet has given researchers the opportunity to 
study and test the mathematical descriptions of these vast complex systems. 
The growth rate and structure of cyberspace has allowed researchers to map 
and test several previously unproven theories about how links and hubs 
within networks interact with one another. The Web now provides the means 
with which to test the organisational structures, architecture and growth of 
networks, and even permits some limited prediction about their behaviour, 
strengths and vulnerabilities.  
The main objective of this book is first and foremost to serve as an 
introduction to the wider legal audience to some of the theories of complexity 
and networks. The second objective is more ambitious. By looking at the 
application of complexity theory and network science in various areas of 
                                                          
31. What I call the “Internet has Changed Everything” fallacy. 
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Internet regulation, it is hoped that there will be enough evidence to postulate 
a theory of Internet regulation based on network science.   
To achieve these two goals, Chapter 2 will look in detail at the science of 
complex networks to set the stage for the legal and regulatory arguments to 
follow. With the increase in reliability of the descriptive (and sometimes 
predictive) nature of network science, a logical next step for legal scholars is 
to look at the legal implications of the characteristics of networks. Chapter 3 
highlights the efforts of academics and practitioners who have started to find 
potential uses for network science tools. Chapter 4 takes this idea further, and 
explores how network theory can shape Internet regulation.  
The following chapters will analyse the potential for application of the 
tools described in the previous chapters, applying complexity theory to 
specific areas of study related to Internet Law. Chapter 5 deals with the 
subject of copyright in the digital world. Chapter 6 explores the issue of peer-
production and user-generated content using network science as an analytical 
framework. Chapter 7 finishes the evidence section of the work by studying 
the impact of network architecture in the field of cybercrime, and asks 
whether the existing architecture hinders or assists efforts to tackle those 
problems.  
It is clear that these are very disparate areas of study. It is not the intention 
of this book to be overreaching in its scope, although I am mindful that it 
covers a lot of ground and attempts to study and describe some disciplines 
that fall outside of my intellectual comfort zone. While the focus of the work 
is the Internet, its applications may extend beyond mere electronic bits. 
Without trying to be over-ambitious, it is my strong belief that legal 
scholarship has been neglectful in that it has been slow to respond to the 
wealth of research into complexity. That is not to say that there has been no 
legal research on the topic, but it would seem that lawyers, legislators and 
policy-makers are reluctant to consider technical solutions to legal problems. 
It is hoped then that this work will serve as a stepping stone that will lead to 
new interest in some of the theories that I describe. 
 
 
SOME NOTES ON METHODOLOGY 
 
As stated, this book has one overriding purpose, and that is to serve as an 
introduction to legal audiences to some of the topics explored by complexity 
theory and network science. I am painfully aware that this implies a need to 
explain concepts of physics and mathematics to audiences who may have no 
training in either. When writing A Brief History of Time, Stephen Hawking 
remarked that an editor had warned him that the inclusion of any equation 
would potentially halve the number of readers. Following that advice, this 
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book will attempt to use non-mathematical explanations of the many 
concepts involved. This compromise is an attempt to inspire the legal reader 
to consider research that would otherwise be ignored because of the maths. 
The source material has in all cases been carefully cited to enable interested 
readers to access the original, replete with accompanying equations.  
As the work purports to explain interdisciplinary studies, I am also 
conscious that in some instances I may have failed to convey the theories 
adequately. In those circumstances, the fault is solely mine. 
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2. The Science of Complex Networks 
 
 
Out of intense complexities intense simplicities emerge. 
Winston Churchill1 
  
Kevin Bacon is in many ways an unremarkable movie star. From his cultural 
breakthrough in Footloose, to some of his forgettable roles in several 1990s 
romantic comedies, he has enjoyed critical success in films such as 
Frost/Nixon, Apollo 13 and JFK. Nonetheless, he became part of Internet 
history as one of the first online memes when in 1994 he became the subject 
of the “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon” game.2 The game consists of trying to 
tie any randomly chosen actor to Kevin Bacon in less than six steps; the 
fewer steps the better. The origin of the meme is disputed, it could be 
because of his prolific acting career, or it could be that his name rhymes with 
separation, but the truth is that when one Usenet post made the claim that 
Bacon was the centre of the movie universe, and went on to try to prove it,3 
the Kevin Bacon game was born. The rest, as they say, is history.  
 The interesting thing about the Kevin Bacon game is that it serves to 
demonstrate a branch of studies into networks and complexity known as the 
small world phenomenon, which will be covered in detail later. A seemingly 
anodyne Internet meme has spawned a number of papers in reputable 
publications which describe the game, and go further into describing the 
phenomenon. It is through some of this research that we find that the network 
of actors is small enough that it ensures there usually will not be more than 
four connections between any given thespian;4 we also learn that there are 
actors who are more connected than Kevin Bacon, such as Rod Steiger, 
Martin Sheen and Christopher Lee;5 or that the short paths between actors 
characteristic of the Bacon game can be seen throughout other social 
clusters.6   
                                                          
1. Churchill W, The World Crisis, 1911–1918, Nel Mentor ed, London: New English Library 
(1968), p75. 
2. A version can be found here: http://www.thekevinbacongame.com/.  
3. See the original thread at: http://tinyurl.com/bfg9mr.  
4. Adamic LA, “The Small World Web”, 1696 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 443 (1999), 
p.444.  
5. Durrett R, Random Graph Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2007), p.7.  
6. Gray E et al, “Trust Propagation in Small Worlds”, 2692 Lecture Notes in Computer Science 
239 (2003), pp.241–243. 
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 The “Six Degrees of Kevin Bacon” is just a popular culture application of 
the wealth of research going into networks and complexity that has been 
experienced in the last decade. At their most basic level, several physical and 
social systems can be viewed through the study of links, nodes and hubs that 
constitute them. Complex network theory looks at how these operate, and 
offers valuable descriptive insights into their inner workings and 
development. Be it a relatively small social network such as that made up of 
screen actors and actresses, or vast computer networks such as the Internet, 
researchers have been finding some common denominators that help to 
analyse the behaviour of clusters. This chapter describes those studies and 
theories relevant to the rest of the book.  
 
 
1. THE NETWORK SCIENCE REVOLUTION 
 
In common parlance the word “network” is used to describe all sorts of 
phenomena where there is an interconnected plurality of individual elements. 
Therefore, we have telecommunication networks, social networks, transport 
networks, power networks, broadcasting networks, etc. In its daily usage, 
networks are consequently defined as “any netlike or complex system or 
collection of interrelated things”.7 While this is an adequate description of 
what networks are, the common usage of the word acquires a more precise 
meaning when looked at from a scientific standpoint. Mark Buchanan defines 
the scientific meaning of networks thus: 
 
The study of networks is part of the general area of science known as complexity 
theory. In an abstract sense, any collection of interacting parts –from atoms and 
molecules to bacteria, pedestrians, traders on a stock market floor, and even 
nations– represents a kind of substance. Regardless of what it is made of. That 
substance satisfies certain laws of form, the discovery of which is the aim of 
complexity theory.8 
 
 The understanding of how networks operate and interact with one another 
has been studied by physicists, economists and mathematicians for centuries. 
The birth of modern network theory can be traced to what is known as graph 
theory. In 1736, mathematician Leonard Euler published a classic paper 
answering what was known as the Königsberg bridge problem, which 
answered negatively the question of whether one could cross across the seven 
bridges of the Prussian city of Königsberg without having to cross the same 
                                                          
7. Oxford English Dictionary, “Network”, 2nd Edition (1989).   
8. Buchanan M, Small World: Uncovering Nature’s Hidden Networks, London: Phoenix 
(2003), p.10.  
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bridge twice (Figure 2.1).9 By applying a mathematical solution to this 
seemingly mundane problem, Euler established the methodological basis for 
the study of networks. The basis of the systematic study of networks is that at 
their basest form, they consist of individual elements known as nodes (or 
vertices), which connect to one another through links (or edges), typically in 
pairwise fashion, but they can also be unidirectional.10 Graph theory can be 
used to chart paths through edges and vertices within any given network in 
similar fashion to that explained by Euler. Graph theory also provides the 
common convention to represent networks.11     
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Graphical representation of the Königsberg bridge problem12 
 
 While the descriptive power of graph theory offered a powerful tool for 
mathematicians, its adoption to describe other networks was slow because its 
application was limited to static events. Eventually, scientists in other areas 
started to realise that one could look at several types of complex interactions 
                                                          
9. Euler L, “Seven Bridges of Königsberg”, in Newman JR (ed), The World of Mathematics, 
Vol. 1, Mineola, NY: Courier Dover Publications, (2000), pp.573–580.  
10. Newman MEJ, Barabási A-L and Watts DJ, The Structure and Dynamics of Networks, 
Princeton, NJ, Oxford: Princeton University Press (2006), pp.2–3.  
11. Ibid.  
12. The seven bridges of Königsberg with superimposed graph solution to the problem. Created 
by the author from: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Image-Koenigsberg 
_Map_by_Merian-Erben_1652.jpg (original in the public domain).   
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using graph theory. One way of looking at it is to take the graphical 
representation of a travel across bridges, and replace it with the way in which 
information spreads through a social group, and then one can begin to see 
how graph theory describes other sorts of other interactive systems consisting 
of individual elements.13  
 However, charting static networks such as transportation hubs is one thing, 
but trying to chart random and dynamic networks involved levels of 
complexity that required a new frame of reference because the nodes and 
links are in constant movement. Using Euler’s bridges again, it is relatively 
easy to create graphs that represent the possible paths through static 
landmarks. But what happens if one is trying to create a graph that represents 
how information travels through dynamic networks? Take, for example, how 
a piece of gossip travels through a dinner party. Using each person as a node 
in the network, and linking who spoke with whom, one could construct a 
graph, but how would it be possible to chart whether or not the information 
was passed during any given exchange? If in this party A and B do not talk to 
each other, but the gossip eventually travels to B, is it possible to determine 
the path that the information took? (Figure 2.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2  Random spread of information 
 
 In 1951 biophysicists Ray Solomonoff and Anatol Rapoport noticed the 
problem presented by dynamic networks when trying to chart data in 
                                                          
13. Newman, supra note 10.  
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biological systems, such as neurons and epidemics.14 They found that these 
networks require a different set of analysis, but they just postulated the 
problem, they did not formulate solutions. By 1960, Hungarian 
mathematicians Paul Erdős and Alfréd Rényi had established a mathematical 
solution that accounted for some dynamic interactions by assigning random 
paths to the information;15 this means that they would assign random number 
of connections to the nodes in a network. Going back to our gossip example, 
it does not really matter how the information gets from A to B as long as we 
know that the information goes through some of the intervening connectors; 
for explanatory purposes it is possible to assign a random path to the 
information, even if this is neither precise nor accurate – what matters is the 
end result. Erdős and Rényi’s solution allowed the study of large-scale 
complex and dynamic networks, and it facilitated the further spread of graph 
theory as a useful model to analyse networks that had remained outside the 
grasp of graph theory. For example, models were presented that could try to 
chart information in social networks, or attempted to model social 
interactions.16 For example, a study in 1978 tried to answer the question of 
how many people exert influence over others with whom they are in contact, 
and while the authors complained that they had generated more questions 
than they answered, they were able to produce valuable models of influence 
networks.17 Thanks to the analytical tools provided by random graphs, 
network theory had grown into a veritable branch of economics and 
sociology, and had come of age.  
 It would be easy to overestimate the importance of network theory in the 
real world, but its importance has been continuously increasing. Once it 
migrated from the realm of mere mathematics to that of social studies, the 
application of graph theory to random networks had revolutionised the 
potential study of several dissimilar disciplines. The work of researchers like 
Erdős and Rényi had allowed the creation of a new branch of study that 
would cement theoretical principles for what was to become the modern 
discipline of network theory.  
 It is possible to imagine that if things had remained as they were, network 
theory may have remained an academic oddity. However, recent years have 
seen an explosion of research in the topic, prompting the creation of what 
some call the “new” science of networks. The aim of this field of study is 
explained thus: 
                                                          
14. Solomonoff R and Rapoport A, “Connectivity of Random Nets”, 13 Bulletin of 
Mathematical Biophysics 107 (1951).  
15. Erdós P and Rényi A, “On the Evolution of Random Graphs”, 6 Bulletin of the Institute of 
International Statistics 261 (1961).  
16. Rapoport A and Horvarth V, “A Study of a Large Sociogram” 6 Behavioral Science 279 
(1961).  
17. Sola-Pool I and Kochen M, “Contacts and Influence”, 1 Social Networks 5 (1978).  
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We argue that the science of networks that has been taking shape in the last few 
years is distinguished from preceding work on network in three important ways: 
(1) by focusing on the properties of real-world networks, it is concerned with 
empirical as well as theoretical questions; (2) it frequently takes the view that 
networks are not static, but evolve in time according to various dynamic rules; and 
(3) it aims, ultimately at least, to understand networks into just as topological 
objects, but also as the framework upon which distributed dynamical systems are 
built.18  
 
 This is a crucial point. Network science is not only a theoretical approach 
to complex systems, but it is concerned with practical application of the 
theory. One of the main events that have prompted the explosion of research 
into networks is the advent of the World Wide Web (WWW). There is little 
doubt that the Internet has given scientists the opportunity to study and test 
several of the pre-existing mathematical models of complex networks.19 
Although the Web is composed of billions of pages, its fast growth-rate and 
international reach allows researchers to map and examine several ideas 
about how networks interact. With a combination of the characteristics of 
online hyper-linking, and the help of spiders and web crawlers,20 researchers 
have the means to test the organisational structures of the architecture and 
behaviour of networks. 
 Much of the current interest in networks can be traced back to a series of 
popular science books dedicated to publicising the latest developments in this 
area of research. Titles of note are Linked by Albert-Laszlo Barabási,21 The 
Tipping Point by Malcom Gladwell,22 Critical Mass by Philip Ball23 and Six 
Degrees by Duncan J Watts.24 These “pop science” credentials could make 
those unfamiliar with the literature suspicious about the validity and 
reliability of network theories,25 but this scepticism would be misplaced, as 
                                                          
18. Newman, supra note 10, p.4.  
19. See for example: Broder A et al, “Graph Structure in the Web”, 33 Computer Networks 30 
(2000); Faloutsos M, Faloutsos P and Faloutsos C, “On Power-Law Relationships of the 
Internet Topology”, 29 Computer Communications Review 251 (1999).  
20. A web crawler is a computer program that browses the Internet in an automated and 
predetermined manner. See: Brin S and Page L, “The Anatomy of a Large-Scale 
Hypertextual Web Search Engine”, 30(1) Computer Networks and ISDN Systems 107 
(1998).   
21. Barabási A-L, Linked: The New Science of Networks, Cambridge MA: Perseus Pub. (2002).   
22. Gladwell M, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, London: 
Abacus (2002).  
23. Ball P, Critical Mass: How One Thing Leads to Another, London: Arrow Books (2004).  
24. Watts DJ, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, London: Vintage (2004).  
25. It should be noted that network theory should not be confused with actor-network theory, 
see: Latour B, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press (2005). McLuhan also has something to say about networks, and is 
often cited as the father of network theory. See: Levinson P, Digital McLuhan: A Guide to 
the Information Millennium, London: Routledge (2001), pp.187–200. This work does not 
deal with these approaches. 
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most of these books have sound peer-reviewed research behind them, and in 
most instances they have been written by the primary investigators 
themselves.  
 Network theory makes several conclusions and predictions that arise from 
empirical research and theoretical analysis. Some of these are more relevant 
to the present book than others; the ones that will be covered in one form or 
another later on will be described in more detail in the following sections.    
 
 
2. NETWORK SCIENCE 
 
2.1 Power laws 
The modern understanding of networks begins with the study of statistical 
phenomena called power laws. A power law is a mathematical expression 
that happens “when the probability of measuring a particular value of some 
quantity varies inversely as a power of that value”.26 In other words, power 
laws are a mathematical concept that describes the divergence in the 
predictable and average value of an observable fact.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.3 A selection of normal distribution probability curves27 
                                                          
26. See: Newman MEJ, “Power Laws, Pareto Distributions and Zipf’s Law”, 46:5 
Contemporary Physics 323 (2005), p.323.   
27. From Wikipedia (released under public domain dedication), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
File:Normal_Distribution_PDF.svg.  
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 In statistics, the normal distribution (also known as Gaussian distribution) 
is one where variables tend to concentrate along the average.28 When plotting 
the number of occurrences along an X Y graph, this clustering towards the 
middle tends to produce a distinctive bell-shaped form because in normal 
distributions the largest number of instances is average (Figure 2.3). Most 
people are average height, although there are small numbers of both very 
short and very tall people; charting such distribution will provide a bell-
shaped curve.29 Power law distributions do not follow the normal trend; in 
them we find that there are a few remarkable occurrences that account for a 
very large number of instances of the studied event. Because of this, a power 
law distribution does not have a peak in the middle; a small number of 
occurrences account for a large part of the overall area of the chart, while 
given instances of an event tend to drop off sharply, which indicates the 
increased likelihood of extreme occurrences.30  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Power law distribution of city populations31 
 
 An example of power law distributions can be found in city populations. If 
we are counting all of the people living in cities around the world, we will 
soon discover that megalopolis like Tokyo, Mexico City, New York and Sao 
Paulo account for a disproportionate amount of the total city inhabitants. 
                                                          
28. Weisstein EW, “Normal Distribution”, MathWorld (2007), 
http://mathworld.wolfram.com/NormalDistribution.html.  
29. Stigler SM, Statistics on the Table, Boston: Harvard University Press (1999), chapter 22.  
30. Ball, supra note 23, p.295  
31. Wikipedia, “List of Urban Agglomerations by Population”, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World%27s_largest_urban_agglomerations.  
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These cities generate tell-tale spikes in the data, accompanied by a long tail 
of smaller populations (Figure 2.4). 
 Power laws are useful statistical tools because not only do they serve to 
display distributions using a chart as displayed above, but they also provide 
the exponential factor with which the next given occurrence in a series either 
grows or decreases. Let us go back to city sizes in order to illustrate. In the 
United States there is a wide divergence in city size from the largest to the 
smallest; for example, Newman calculates that New York is 150,000 times 
larger than the smallest city.32 A chart of city sizes would produce the 
characteristic graph displayed above. However, a power law also displays a 
constant exponential increase (or decrease depending on how you look at it) 
of one city to the next. This means that there is a constant rate in the way city 
sizes are distributed, so if you knew the size of a city, you could make 
estimates of the size of the ones above and underneath it in a chart. When this 
is displayed as a logarithmic histogram, the end result is roughly a straight 
line, which is also characteristic of power laws (Figure 2.5).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.5 Logarithmic representation of power law in US cities33 
 
                                                          
32. Newman, supra note 26, p.324.  
33. Ibid.  
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 It may be surprising that power laws seem to be found in all sorts of 
situations, from biological systems34 to human mobility patterns.35 Other 
places where these networks have been found are, according to Newman:  
 
In addition to city populations, the sizes of earthquakes, moon craters, solar flares, 
computer files  and wars, the frequency of use of words in any human language, 
the frequency of occurrence of personal names in most cultures, the numbers of 
papers scientists write, the number of citations received by papers, the number of 
hits on web pages, the sales of books, music recordings and almost every other 
branded commodity, the numbers of species in biological taxa, people’s annual 
incomes and a host of other variables all follow power-law distributions.36 
 
 While power laws are remarkable on their own merit, their presence is 
usually a good indication that we are faced with a specific type of complex 
system. As there is no law of nature that requires such an astounding 
correlation between completely disparate phenomena as earthquakes and web 
pages, power laws tell us that the systems that display them are responding to 
similar stimuli that shape them into predictable distribution curves. The 
apparent determinism occurs because of similar structural circumstances in 
all of the studied cases that display power laws. In other words, a power law 
distribution can tell us a lot about a specific system, because to display a 
power law, the system must behave in certain ways for it to appear. Average 
human height is not a power law; the number of connections in our brains is 
not a power law. But the distribution of proteins in some species display 
power laws,37 as well as the protein interactions with viruses,38 as well as the 
statistical significance of gene expressions.39 This hints at a significant 
element in the study of power laws: if we understand how they work, we may 
be able to predict their appearance. 
 
2.2 Scale-free networks 
When applied to complex systems, power law distributions result in what is 
known as scale-free networks. In a normal distribution, there is little or no 
room for results that are considerably above and below the norm. To reuse 
the previous example regarding human average height, in any chart that 
                                                          
34. Jeong H et al, “The Large-Scale Organization of Metabolic Networks”, 407 Nature 651–654 
(2000).  
35. González MC, Hidalgo CA and Barabási A-L, “Understanding Individual Human Mobility 
Patterns”, 453 Nature 779 (2008).  
36. Newman, supra note 26, p.325.  
37. Giot L et al, “A Protein Interaction Map of Drosophila Melanogaster”, 302:5651 Science 
1727 (2003).  
38. Uetz P et al, “Herpesviral Protein Networks and Their Interaction with the Human 
Proteome”, 311:5758 Science 239 (2006). 
39. Ueda HR et al, “Universality and Flexibility in Gene Expression from Bacteria to Human”, 
101:11 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 3765 (2004).  
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displays people’s heights in any given population one will expect to find that 
most people are average, with deviations towards both ends, thus forming a 
bell-shaped histogram. However, if heights behaved in a scale-free manner, 
most people would be average height, while there would be some 30–50 
metre giants walking around, and from time to time you could even 
encounter a person measuring hundreds of metres.40  
 It is called scale-free because the same distribution of relationships exists 
at any scale (forming a power law). If one was to look at some of the node 
and link structure in a scale-free network, then one would find the same 
degree of distribution of links and nodes. If we look at any random network 
and plot the links between nodes, and we isolate a small part of the network, 
no discernible pattern would be present. However, scale-free networks 
maintain the distribution of nodes and links at whatever level we want to look 
at. So, if the network is organised around hubs with certain number of 
connections, then it does not matter if we look at a few or at many nodes, this 
same degree of distribution will be present throughout.41 This is akin to the 
concept of self-similarity where the system is exactly or approximately 
similar to a part of itself. This occurs in Mandelbrot sets42 and other fractal 
topographies. 
 Power laws and scale-free topologies apply to large-scale complex 
systems in general, and networks specifically.43 As stated earlier, networks 
are composed of nodes (vertices) and links (edges). Large-scale networks 
also have a third element, hubs, which are collections or clusters of nodes.44 
In a normal network distribution which displays a random topology, we 
would expect to find that nodes are distributed in an average manner, some 
with more links, and some with fewer links, which can be described through 
a typical random histogram. In a scale-free network, the vast majority of 
nodes and hubs have an average or small number of links, while very few 
hubs will have an exceptionally large number of links, forming super-nodes, 
or even super-hubs (Figure 2.6).45 When one reproduces these networks using 
graph theory representations, they also display very characteristic features. 
Random graphs tend to be chaotic, while scale-free graphs are organised 
around the hubs.   
                                                          
40. Barabási, supra note 21, pp.67–69.  
41. Newman, supra note 10, p.335.  
42. Mandelbrot B, “How Long Is the Coast of Britain? Statistical Self-Similarity and Fractional 
Dimension”, 156:3775 Science 636 (1967). 
43. Ravasz E and Barabási A-L, “Hierarchical Organization in Complex Networks”, 67 
Physical Review E 026112 (2003), p.1.  
44. Ibid.  
45. Barabási, supra note 21, p.69–72.  
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Figure 2.6 Random (left) and scale-free network (right)46 
 
 This way of looking at networks is particularly useful when analysing a 
large system such as the Internet. As mentioned earlier, the Web lends itself 
to the study of networks because of the potential ease with which it is 
possible to analyse link structure through search engines and autonomous 
agents. It is hardly surprising then that the Internet has been at the forefront 
of the resurgence in interest in graph theory and complex networks. There 
has been a wealth of innovative and informative research into the way in 
which the Internet works,47 and its architecture is now understood enough to 
claim that it represents many of the inherent characteristics of scale-free 
networks and, as a result, it can be said that it responds to power laws. The 
topology of the Internet lends itself easily as a ready-made tool for measuring 
connectedness. Spiders and other autonomous agents can be programmed to 
trawl the Web in order to gather information about its constituent pages, sites 
and links. This has allowed researchers to confirm the features of the Internet 
and understand its underlying architecture with an amazing degree of 
certainty.48 Some of these features will be revisited later. 
 One would expect that a large network such as the Internet might exhibit 
random features instead of power laws. However, looking at how the Internet 
                                                          
46. Albert R, Jeong H and Barabási A-L, “Error and Attack Tolerance in Complex Networks”, 
406 Nature 378 (2000). Reproduced with permission.  
47. For example, see: Dezso Z et al, “General Methods of Statistical Physics – Dynamics of 
Information Access on the Web”, 73:6 Physical Review. E 69 (2006); Yook S-H, Jeong H 
and Barabási A-L, “Modelling the Internet’s Large-Scale Topology”, 99:21 Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences 5 (2002).  
48. For more about this, see: Huberman BA, The Laws of the Web: Patterns in the Ecology of 
Information, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (2001), p.30.  
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is organised, researchers have found that it exhibits scale-free characteristics 
in all of its components – namely page visits, incoming links, number of 
pages viewed on each visit, time spent on a site, popularity and architectural 
structure.49 This predictability means that power laws are experienced and 
expected at all levels of granularity, whether one is looking at tens of 
thousands of pages, or just a hundred. Huberman comments that: 
 
The fact that the number of pages per site, and also the number of links per site, is 
distributed according to a power law is a universal feature of the Web. It holds 
throughout the World Wide Web, irrespective of the type of sites that one 
considers, from the smallest to the largest, and regardless of the nature of the site. 
The appearance of such a strong regularity out of a seeming random process is 
quite striking, and point to some kind of universal mechanism that not only 
underlies the growth of the Web, but also produces a power law distribution of its 
characteristics.50  
 
 This has allowed the charting of certain laws of the Internet: amidst the 
seemingly chaotic nature of the Internet, a hidden regularity emerges in every 
studied pattern. For example, websites under a domain seem to respond to 
power laws in the way in which pages are visited. The hub tends to be the 
home page, and subsequent links from the main site tend to decrease 
markedly into a power law distribution.51 Similarly, web site popularity 
displays considerably few highly visible pages, with sharp drop-offs into a 
long tail of less visited sites.52 The resulting clustering tends to produce an 
ecology dominated by hubs and super-hubs that act as the glue that binds and 
controls web traffic. This is why the Internet is not a random space, as the 
likelihood for an average user to visit a website responds to power laws.53  
 One of the main features of the Internet is that its growth responds to the 
expected accumulation of links, which is one of the trademarks of scale-free 
networks. Few websites accumulate staggering numbers of links, while the 
vast majority of sites have fewer links, which constitute a textbook example 
of a power law.54 Not only is there a power law at work in Cyberspace, but 
the rate of accumulation of sites responds to how long they have been 
accumulating links, which serves to confirm its scale-free architecture.55 This 
can be seen in the manner in which websites like Google, Bing and Yahoo 
act as hubs in the Web landscape.  
                                                          
49. Ibid, p.25.  
50. Ibid, pp.29–30.  
51. Ibid, p.30.  
52. Ibid, pp.47–49.  
53. Ibid, pp.23–25.  
54. Albert R, Jeong H and Barabási A-L, “Diameter of the World Wide Web”, 401 Nature 130–
131 (1999).  
55. Yook, supra note 47.  
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2.3 Pareto distributions and Zipf laws 
Another relevant feature of network science, and in particular with regards to 
power laws, is the existence of what is known as Pareto distributions,56 which 
is a term used to describe large inequalities in data where most of the 
distribution is concentrated in a relatively small portion of a graph (Figure 
2.7).  
 
 
 
Figure 2.7 A typical Pareto distribution57 
 
 Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto was the first to establish this 
characteristic of power laws while studying property ownership. In 1906 he 
remarked that land ownership in Italy followed an 80/20 rule, that is, that 20 
percent of the population owned 80 percent of the land.58 Later, he made a 
similar discovery with regards to income distribution inequalities, remarking 
that roughly 2/3 of the wealth in Italy was concentrated in 1/3 of earners,59 
and also remarking that the number of top earners follow a power law. The 
                                                          
56. Reed WJ, “The Pareto, Zipf and Other Power Laws”, 74(1) Economics Letters 15 (2001).  
57. Source: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Pareto_distributionPDF.png.   
58. Pareto V, Manual of Political Economy, New York: Augustus M. Kelly Publishers (1971), 
p.45.  
59. Mandelbrot B, “The Pareto-Lévy Law and the Distribution of Income”, 1:2 International 
Economic Review 79 (1960). 
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80/20 rule is remarkable because it has filtered through popular perception, 
so it is common to hear that 80 percent of the work is performed by 20 
percent of the employees; or that 80 percent of the wealth is held by 20 
percent of the population.60  
 In a strict economic sense, Pareto distributions are also known as the 
Pareto Principle, or Pareto’s Law, and it is a function of size and rank, where 
the size is measured, for example, by sales or wealth. The rank would be the 
percentage of the overall market share held by an individual. Pareto’s Law 
predicts that in certain markets there will be a noticeable concentration of 
size and rank – in other words, fewer individuals will account for larger 
numbers of sales.61 It is important to point out two things before continuing. 
Firstly, Pareto did not directly come up with this phenomenon, the name 
Pareto Law was first attributed to John Juran, a quality control engineer who 
first observed that Pareto’s work on wealth applied to several other fields, 
and he is the one who described the Pareto Principle as the “vital few and 
trivial many”.62 Secondly, as Juran found out, Pareto’s Law seems to be a 
universal law that is common to distribution of incomes, city sizes, prize 
returns on stock indices, meteor impacts and word frequencies.63 
 The implication of the existence of such regularity should be evident. 
There must be some self-organising principle in which certain disparate 
phenomena become organised in order to produce a large skew at the head of 
the chart. This cannot only be explained by selection bias or methodological 
similarity, there are just too many events that share these characteristics. Is 
nature deterministic at some basic level? We still do not know, although 
various economists have presented theories as to why such distributions are 
nearly universal.64 What seems to be at work, however, is that whenever a 
network displays power laws, it will probably result in a plethora of other 
characteristics shared by scale-free topologies, of which Pareto inequalities 
seem to be one. 
 Zipf’s law is a variation of Pareto distributions, named in honour of 
linguist George K. Zipf. While Pareto found a power law in income for top 
earners, he did not establish a specific rate for the invariance, but Zipf’s law 
does this. Zipf was trying to put forward a specific view of society which 
stated that in any given social interaction people would act in a manner that 
required minimal effort.65 In order to support this observation, he made 
                                                          
60. Barabási, supra note 21, p.66.  
61. Giles DE, “Increasing Returns to Information in the US Popular Music Industry”, 14:4 
Applied Economics Letters 327 (2007). 
62. Juran JM, “The Non-Pareto Principle: Mea Culpa”, Quality Progress (1975), p.4. 
63. Reed, supra note 56. 
64. Ibid. 
65. Zipf GK, Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort, Cambridge MA: Addison-
Wesley, (1949).  
 The Science of Complex Networks     27 
 
 
several empirical studies into various phenomena. In his most famous study, 
he found a power law in language when he discovered that in any given text 
corpus, a word’s frequency is inversely proportional to the one next in rank.66 
So for example, in most English language texts the word “the” is most 
commonly used. Zipf provided evidence that in a studied corpus, “the” 
accounted for roughly 7 percent of the words, while the next in rank, “of”, 
occurred half of that, and so on. In fact, only 135 words accounted for half of 
the studied corpus.67 This is consistent with power laws.  
 There are two remarkable features of Zipf’s law. One is that it is replicated 
in all sorts of other power law distributions, such as city sizes.68 The other 
one is that Zipf’s law is a common denominator of self-organised systems, 
where a chaotic environment becomes spontaneously ordered, a feature that 
will be dealt with in more detail in the last section.69    
 One possible explanation for the existence of Zipf’s laws and Pareto 
distributions in large networks is what some researchers have termed “the 
rich get richer” effect.70 As a network grows, popular nodes and hubs will 
continue to gather more links as time goes by; an effect that takes place 
because of the cumulative effect of the interaction between pre-existing links. 
The older a node is, the more likely it will be to have established links and to 
have been communicated to other nodes, while newer nodes will lack this 
advantage. This is caused by what is known as preferential attachment. The 
concept of preferential attachment in networks is a way to explain the way in 
which scale-free networks grow, where nodes with previous connections are 
more likely to accumulate more links than newer nodes that do not have this 
advantage. For example, Newman71 looked at two different scholarly 
collaboration networks, and measured the probability of a node acquiring 
new links as a function of its previous acquaintances and the number of 
previous collaborations. He found that there was a strong probability of the 
node acquiring links if it had both. Research into the development of the 
Internet bears out this effect; a study into the accumulation of links on any 
given site found that new nodes in the system were more likely to be attached 
                                                          
66. Ibid.  
67. Wikipedia, “Zipf’s Law”, (2009), http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zipf%27s_law  
68. Ioannides Y and Overman HG, “Zipf’s Law for Cities: An Empirical Examination”, 33:2 
Regional Science and Urban Economics 127 (2003). Another study replicating these 
findings is Rosen K and Resnick M, “The Size Distribution of Cities: An Examination of the 
Pareto Law and Primacy”, 8:2 Journal of Urban Economics 165 (1980).  
69. Ball, supra note 23, pp.305–307.  
70. Durham Y, Hirshleifer J and Smith VL, “Do the Rich Get Richer and the Poor Poorer? 
Experimental Tests of a Model of Power”, 88:4 The American Economic Review 14 (1998).  
71. Newman MEJ, “Clustering and Preferential Attachment in Growing Networks”, 64:2 
Physical Review E 025102 (2001).  
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to pre-existing nodes at a rate that responded to a power law.72 Anyone 
familiar with web publishing will recognise this as anecdotally true.  
 However, the accumulation of links can lead to a collapse of node 
competition, where one node becomes the sole super-hub, a phenomenon 
known as the “winner-takes-all”.73 While this effect is rare, it responds to 
how similar complex systems act generally in physics, and specifically in 
gases, a phenomenon known as Einstein–Bose condensation. At normal 
temperatures gas atoms move and collide with one another at different speeds 
– the hotter the gas, the faster the atoms move, and vice versa. It is 
theoretically possible that at very low temperatures gases would stop moving 
completely, but this theoretical temperature is too low to happen naturally. 
Albert Einstein and Satyendranath Bose contributed separately to a 
framework that would allow gas condensation at higher temperatures, hence 
the name.74 A very interesting finding from network theory is that the 
equations used to describe Einstein-Bose condensation in gases can be used 
to describe link accumulation in the World Wide Web,75 which could serve 
as an explanation of the seemingly random runaway success of certain 
websites.  
 Pareto distributions and Zipf’s laws are perhaps some of the most 
remarkable effects of the emergence of the science of networks, but they 
could even be taken as the precursors of psychohistory. Not only do they 
apply to widely diverging phenomena, they seem to be a set law as far as the 
Internet is concerned. Once these patterns about the World Wide Web are 
noticed, it becomes difficult to view complex networks in any other light.  
 
2.4 Small worlds and social networks     
The clustering of nodes present in scale-free networks described above 
explains one of the most publicised insights arising from the research into 
networks, and that is the phenomenon of small worlds, or the so-called six 
degrees of separation expounded by the Kevin Bacon game. This is the 
commonly-held knowledge that all of the people in the world are separated 
only by six connections from one another.  
 This belief originates from a study by psychologist Stanley Milgram, who 
tried to measure how many links there were between people in Kansas, 
Nebraska and one target in Massachusetts, which resulted in a surprisingly 
small number of intervening connectors.76 While many letters did not reach 
                                                          
72. Krapivsky PL, Rodgers GJ and Redner S, “Degree Distributions of Growing Networks” 
86(23) Physical Review Letters 5401–5404 (2001). 
73. Barabási, supra note 21, pp.102.   
74. Ibid, pp.97–100.  
75. Bianconi G and Barabási A-L, “Bose–Einstein Condensation in Complex Networks”, 86(24) 
Physical Review Letters 5632-5635 (2001).   
76. See: Milgram S, “The Small World Problem”, 2 Psychology Today 60–67 (1967).   
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their final destination, a total of 64 did, with an average number of 5.5 
intervening links, hence the name “six degrees”. Milgram had been inspired 
by some of the graph theory research conducted by Erdős and Rényi,77 but 
his research was particularly informed by Sola-Pool and Kochen’s 
aforementioned research into influence, which had left some unanswered 
questions about the length of social networks.78  
 While Milgram’s experiment was limited both in execution and scope, it 
showcased one of the characteristics of social networks, and that is the 
importance of hubs to any complex system. The reason why there is a 
correlation between this hypothesis and scale-free systems is evident if one 
considers that there are certain hubs in social networks that acquire more 
links than others. These hubs act as “connectors”79 and, once a message has 
reached one of those, the chances are that it will offer a large number of links 
to other nodes in the system. This is highlighted in smaller social networks, 
such as the actor network in the Kevin Bacon game, or the scientific 
collaboration network. A lot of studies have been undertaken on the latter as 
it is easy to try to link two scientists using co-authored publications in 
scientific journals as a measure of connectedness.80 An example involves 
Paul Erdős himself; in 1969 a paper suggested that Erdős had been so prolific 
that he could be used as a measure of academic author connectivity, hence 
establishing the Erdős number, which is the number of collaborators between 
any author and Erdős.81  
 The study of small worlds has been resurgent in recent years, which has 
coincided for obvious reasons with the growing interest in scale-free 
networks. Traditionally, small worlds can be defined as networks where the 
component vertices are clustered as to allow short paths between nodes.82 
Strogatz and Watts wanted to expand on this definition by testing whether 
other types of networks exhibited small world clustering between its 
components.83 They first looked at the two most common graph models that 
were prevalent in literature at the time, a regular network with a steady 
number of connections, and a random network exhibiting complete disorder. 
They proposed that highly-clustered networks fell somewhere in between 
these two extremes (Figure 2.8).  
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Figure 2.8 Small world network as compared to normal and random ones84 
 
 Watts and Strogatz set out to prove the model by testing it on three 
seemingly dissimilar networks. Firstly, they obtained information from the 
Internet Movie Database and assigned each actor as a node, then they looked 
at collaborations as links. Secondly, they looked at the Western power grid of 
the United States, the nodes in this network were the power stations and sub-
stations, and the links the transmission lines. Thirdly, they looked at the 
neural network of the nematode worm C. elgans, the nodes were the neurons 
and the links were the synaptic connections between them. In each of these 
networks, they found that while the distance between nodes was similar to 
that encountered in random networks, the clustering coefficient was 
considerably higher than that which would be expected from any random 
number of connections, therefore proving the existence of small world 
networks.85 This expanded the definition of a small world network as one 
where the distance between nodes expands logarithmically depending on the 
number of vertices in the system.86 In other words, small worlds also display 
power laws.    
 While the study of small worlds may be interesting from an academic and 
social perspective, the question must be asked of whether they tell us 
anything about the real world. One critical reminder when looking at small 
world clustering in networks is that it is always important to know exactly 
what is being charted. While tenuous connections between collaborators can 
display interesting clusters between academic writers, the relevance of 
connectedness and clustering can be unearthed by first asking why it is that 
we study the connectivity between nodes in a network. The answer to this is 
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that there are several circumstances where it is essential to learn the length of 
a pathway interconnecting individual vertices in a complex system. For 
example, biological networks such as food chains are very important to an 
organism’s survival. What happens when we remove a species from the food 
chain? With anthropogenic extinction becoming a key issue at present, one 
team of researchers analysed what were the connecting paths between 
species, and surprisingly found that in nature most species are connected to 
one another by an average two degrees of separation, hinting at a more 
interconnected biological web than previously expected.87 Similarly, research 
into food chains in the North Atlantic found that a catastrophic reduction of 
cod populations had a knock-on effect in 150 other marine species.88 Small 
world clustering also serves to explain viral infections, and are being talked 
about as potential models of the spreading rate of highly-contagious 
epidemics.89  
 It is vital here to make a distinction about the type of analysis that is 
conducted within social networks, of which the small-world phenomenon is 
but one element. When we look at social networks from a network theory 
perspective, we are looking at two types of data, what Scott helpfully calls 
relational data and attribute data.90 Social networks consist of individuals that 
interact with one another responding to social occasions, social meaning, 
individual motives, and cultural determinants. Relational data consists of the 
links themselves, “the contacts, ties and connections, the group attachments 
and meetings, which relate one agent to another and so cannot be reduced to 
the properties of the individual agents themselves”.91 The analysis of these 
relations is not concerned with motives and other cultural and social systems, 
and thus they lend themselves to study via network theory. Attribute data 
consists of the “attitudes, opinions and behaviour of agents”,92 and so lend 
itself to more traditional social science studies, such as economics, sociology, 
anthropology, etc. It is imperative to stress this point, because it must be 
remarked that the study of complexity in networks does not immediately 
erase the relevance of other areas of study. The study of links, pathways, the 
distribution of hubs in a social environment, and the number of intervening 
nodes required for information to travel from one node to another tell us 
some vital things about how social systems operate, but it does not erase the 
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need of knowing why these things happen, or how the societies are organised 
one way or another.   
 It would be tempting to try to draw too many conclusions based on small 
world clustering in social networks. However useful the data is, it must be 
remembered that when looked at directly, social networks seem to be starkly 
divided by economic and ethnic sub-networks.93 Nonetheless, there are 
several focal features of small worlds that make it potentially important for 
the subject of this book, namely that of Internet regulation. Firstly, small 
worlds are useful in measuring average path lengths in social networks, and 
particularly useful in charting the spread of information. This is significant to 
the analysis of online viral infections. Secondly, small worlds offer excellent 
tools with which one can analyse network architecture, which is a key feature 
of the regulation of the global network. Thirdly, small worlds could help 
explain the workings of vast networks within the Internet environment, such 
as criminal webs, copyright infringement applications, and other online 
features with a social component. All of these will be covered in detail in 
later chapters.  
 
2.5 Network resilience 
There are two final characteristics of scale-free networks that are relevant to 
this work; those of robustness and cascading failures. First, scale-free 
networks are remarkably resilient and stable; that is, they tend to remain 
intact regardless of the removal of a node.94 Strogatz explains that: 
 
…scale-free networks are resistant to random failures because a few hubs 
dominate their topology. Any node that fails probably has small degree (like most 
nodes) and so is expendable. The flip side is that such networks are vulnerable to 
deliberate attacks on the hubs. These intuitive ideas have been confirmed 
numerically, and analytically, by examining how the average path length and size 
of the giant component depend on the number and degree of the nodes removed.95 
 
 In other words, if one tries to attack a scale-free network randomly, the 
result will be that the attacked node will be unlikely to play any essential part 
in the way in which the network stays together. This is because hubs tend to 
be few, so the chances of hitting one randomly are very high. The Internet 
has proved to have inherited such robustness,96 as virus attacks, and even 
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Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)97 have not managed to bring down the 
entire network.  
 However, Strogatz also uncovers a potential vulnerability present in scale-
free networks, which is that they are strong but not invulnerable. There are 
documented circumstances where scale-free systems have collapsed in 
spectacular fashion due to cascading failures. In 1996, a large blackout 
affected eleven states in the US and two Canadian provinces, which 
originated from the failure of one single line in Oregon.98 Energy grids are 
typical examples of scale-free networks because they rely on a few key hubs 
in order to maintain distribution loads. If one of those hubs is removed, the 
entire system may collapse; an effect that spells the vulnerability of networks 
to random occurrences in hubs,99 or even to targeted attacks against one.100 
This effect is often referred to as a cascading failure, because the removal of 
a hub will have knock-on effects on the nodes connected to it, and on the 
nodes connected to those, etc. 
 The relevance of robustness will become clearer later, but for now it is of 
great consequence to remark that this dual feature of scale-free networks 
offers one of the most interesting potentials for regulatory studies. 
Particularly, it could provide strategies for tackling illegal scale-free 
networks, such as P2P sharing sites. It could also provide tools to guard 
against large-scale hacking attacks against the Web’s infrastructure.  
 
 
3. COMPLEXITY AND SELF-ORGANISATION 
 
3.1 Complexity  
So far we have discussed some of the features of graph theory and network 
science to establish the framework for the later discussion into Internet 
regulation. There is a final branch of research that will be relevant, and while 
it can have a direct effect on networks and power laws, it can be classed as a 
different branch of study altogether, and these are the areas of complexity 
and self-organisation.  
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 From reading some of the features of power laws and complex networks 
highlighted above, one cannot help but marvel at the order beneath the 
apparent complexity. This is noteworthy because there is clear evidence of a 
hidden order to seemingly random events, one that structures populations, 
websites, incomes, linguistics, biological organisms and all sort of unrelated 
complex systems. The fact that these events respond to a set of laws and 
principles cannot be a coincidence. One is perhaps tempted to re-examine 
Smith’s Invisible Hand, and other such explanatory mechanisms to attempt to 
make sense of these findings. It is no coincidence that some have proposed 
Adam Smith as the first person who started the study of complexity in social 
phenomena.101 
 The systematic study of complexity, also known as complexity theory,102 
is a wide-ranging field encompassing mathematics, physics, chemistry, 
biology, economics, computer science and sociology.103 Complexity can be 
defined as a large number of parts that interact to make up a whole which is 
independent of its environment.104 Complexity theory consequently is the 
systematised study of such complex systems that attempts to find patterns in 
this complex behaviour. Anderson comments that: 
 
Modern complexity theory suggests that some systems with many interactions 
among highly differentiated parts can produce surprisingly simple predictable 
behaviour that is impossible to forecast though they feature simple laws and fewer 
actors. […] [N]ormal science shows how complex effects can be understood from 
simple laws; chaos theory demonstrate that simple laws have complicated, 
unpredictable consequences; and complex theory describes how complex causes 
can produce simple effects.105    
 
 Arguably, one of the most influential figures in modern complexity theory 
is biologist Stuart Kauffman, who can be credited as not only organising a 
revolution in biology with his study into self-organisation, but also is 
responsible for the manner in which his ideas have been transferred to the 
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social sciences.106 Kauffman initiated his study into complex systems while 
looking at genetic networks, and marvelled at the organising interaction of 
genes. He asked a simple question, whether the organisation present in the 
genetic network was the result of spontaneous ordering, as opposed to the 
more gradual approach favoured until then.107 When answering this question, 
Kauffman managed to revolutionise the study of complex systems.  
 Kauffman’s theories explain organisation and complexity by looking at 
the way in which entities in a network respond to changes in neighbouring 
entities; changes that are eventually translated into spontaneous ordering of 
the overall system. Kauffman was puzzled by the way in which genes were 
able to influence one another within a dynamic network. Interestingly, this is 
a similar question to that posed by researchers into small worlds, who first 
noticed that there were patterns in the way in which people influence one 
another. Faced with nightmarishly complex dynamic systems where genetic 
interaction was not evident at first glance, he decided to make an assumption 
in order to study interactions; he postulated that genes would be regulated by 
two other random genes in the system.108 While this is an artificial solution, it 
allows researchers to study interaction within a complex network much in the 
same way as one would study pathways of information in dynamic graphs, 
thus opening the door to the study of large complex systems. By assigning 
real numbers to large levels of complexity, Kauffman was able to measure 
fitness levels within networks. Fitness here should be understood in the strict 
biological sense, that is, it describes an organism’s capability to reproduce. 
Kauffman proposed what is known as the NK model of fitness, where an 
organism has N number of genes, each with only two connections to 
randomly assigned genes, where K describes the level of complexity in a 
system.109       
 Kauffman’s NK model allows the study of the reproductive success of 
genotypes by thinking of optimal reproductive states as mountains in a 
landscape. Imagining that any given genome is a landscape, Kauffman’s 
model allocates fitness levels to different states. Evolving organisms “climb” 
the mountain until they reach highly-stable points at the peak of the 
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mountain; these stable environments allow faster reproduction of the genes, 
and produces what is known as fitness landscapes (Figure 2.9).110  
 
 
 
Figure 2.9 Fitness landscapes, where A, B and C describe fitness peaks111 
 
 By using fitness within a system as a measure of complexity and order, it 
is possible to extend the study of complexity to other fields. The idea of 
fitness levels and fitness landscapes has been influential with the examination 
of other networks. For example, Barabási uses a similar concept to analyse 
the interaction of nodes within complex networks such as the Internet. Using 
fitness as an analogy of an organism’s capability to reproduce, he assigns 
fitness levels to web pages, therefore measuring a site’s relative possibility to 
attract links.112  
 Another relevant area of study into complex systems is what is known as 
complex adaptive systems (CAS). Modern complexity theory studies two 
types of complex systems, predetermined systems, such as transport 
networks, and emergent systems, such as biological systems. In 
predetermined systems, there are steady connections between the elements in 
the system (much like Euler’s bridges of Königsberg); whereas emergent 
systems consist of constantly interchanging pathways and interconnections. 
Complex adaptive systems fall into the former category, and can be defined 
thus: 
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A Complex Adaptive System (CAS) is a dynamic network of many agents (which 
may represent cells, species, individuals, firms, nations) acting in parallel, 
constantly acting and reacting to what the other agents are doing. The control of a 
CAS tends to be highly dispersed and decentralized. If there is to be any coherent 
behavior in the system, it has to arise from competition and cooperation among the 
agents themselves. The overall behavior of the system is the result of a huge 
number of decisions made every moment by many individual agents.113 
 
 This is an important distinction to those systems that we have seen 
already. For example, scale-free networks are also decentralised and 
dynamic, but they tend to be more resilient and less responsive to patterns 
emerging from individual nodes. A telling characteristic of the presence of 
CAS is that while collective behaviour is crucial, small individual decisions 
may have a large effect on the overall system, what is usually illustrated in 
popular culture as the “butterfly effect”.114  
 A good demonstration of CAS research within the social sciences is that of 
the standing ovation. Standing ovations are great ways to model complex 
adaptive systems, as they originate spontaneously in crowds of people. At 
some point one or two people get up, and there is an awkward moment where 
the crowd either follows, or it does not. Were one to make a mathematical 
model of standing ovations, one would have to take many things into 
consideration, such as the quality of the performance being such that it 
prompts people to get up and clap, the number of people who follow the lead, 
the topology of the auditorium, and similar considerations.115 However one 
would like to make such a model, it would not really tell us much about how 
crowds behave, and what the possibilities of getting a standing ovation are. 
However, by looking at the model using complexity models, it is more likely 
that one can reach a more accurate and useful description (and possibly even 
a prediction). Much in the same manner in which Kauffman assigns a value 
to gene connections, we can assign values to a random crowd. For example, 
by considering whether any friends of the performer are in the audience, and 
whether those have friends, and whether they are seated towards the front of 
the auditorium, one could begin to draw strong possibilities as these factors 
determine strongly whether one could turn an audience from one state 
(sitting) into another (standing). Think about your average opening night. 
People in the front seats are more likely to be friends of the performer 
because they have been allocated there; and the behaviour of the front row is 
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more influential because they are more visible to the rest of the audience, so 
one could probably expect a standing ovation to be more likely during an 
opening night. A model of standing ovations that takes these factors into 
consideration will be more likely to produce accurate predictions of crowd 
management if one wanted to initiate a standing ovation. By following 
simple calculations into the shape of the auditorium, lines of sight, and 
number of people who react to one another, complexity modelling of social 
systems becomes a valuable analytical tool.116 Similar research into crowd 
behaviour applies to other group phenomena, such as the Mexican wave.117  
 So, complex adaptive systems are a way to describe order, but also offer 
specific tools to predict the likelihood of a seemingly self-organising effect to 
occur out of complex situations.     
 
3.2 Self-organisation 
Self-organisation is a subset of complexity theory, just like graph theory and 
network science. While the science of self-organisation is relatively new, 
self-organisation itself has been written about by economists and 
philosophers for centuries, from Friedrich Engels118 to John Stuart Mill.119 
Nonetheless, there have been several converging branches of study that have 
helped to shape our current understanding of complex systems.  
 Firstly, mathematician Claude Shannon developed what is known as 
information theory, which is a systematised method to quantify 
information.120 Shannon was particularly interested in communication, and 
how information gets from one place to the other. He remarked that there 
needed to be a minimal unit to identify meaningful information, which he 
named a bit. Being able to measure information is useful, because Shannon 
was interested in finding the minimum number of bits required to transmit 
any given message. Shannon’s information theory, together with other 
advances into the mathematical study of vast information, such as 
Kolmogorov complexity 121 and Turing’s computational theory,122 provide a 
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strong analytical framework with which to analyse complex systems 
involving information.   
 Secondly, biologists have been at the forefront of the study of self-
organisation due to the way in which biological systems organise 
themselves.123 For example, ant colonies and beehives have been studied as 
some of the perfect examples of ordered complex systems; ant colonies’ 
cemeteries and rubbish heaps are organised in a manner that optimises the 
distance from both the colony and each heap.124 It is behaviour such as this 
that provides us with a working definition for self-organisation, not only in 
biological systems, but that applies to other disciplines as well. Camazine et 
al define self-organisation as: 
 
…a process in which pattern at the global level of a system emerges solely from 
numerous interactions among the lower level components of the system. Moreover 
the rules specifying interactions among the system’s components are executed 
using only local information, without reference to the global pattern. In short 
pattern is an emergent property of the system rather than being imposed on the 
system by an external ordering influence.125 
 
 In other words, self-organisation can be defined as any system that 
undergoes an organisation process due to internal elements present in the 
system, instead of responding to external output. In nature, Dynamic Systems 
(DS) theory is just another effort to explain self-organising behaviours.126 In 
DS terms, self-organisation simply describes open systems that maintain 
themselves through the constant flow and dissipation of energy; chaotic 
systems where energy flows sometimes can adapt internally to form patterns 
that can be described as stable, yet not static.127 Self-organisation as a result 
deals with ordering from within, and the order is a function of stability. This 
is where concepts such as Kauffman’s fitness landscapes become useful. 
 The third branch that has been providing input into the understanding of 
self-organisation is the idea of emergent systems, which also forms part of 
complexity theory. Emergent systems display several characteristics 
attributed to the definition of self-organisation described above, but it is more 
a specific type of self-organisation that displays a qualitative distinction from 
the components that make up the whole. According to Goldstein:  
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Emergence [...] refers to the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns, and 
properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems. Emergent 
phenomena are conceptualized as occurring on the macro level, in contrast to the 
micro-level components and processes out of which they arise.128  
 
 It must be pointed out that not all self-organising systems display 
emergence. As Corning points out, consciousness is emergent, but steam is 
not.129  
 How is it possible for a seemingly chaotic system to become organised 
and display behaviour that can be predicted? It seems counterintuitive to 
expect a complex environment to display self-organisation when one would 
expect the contrary. The answers can be found in several physical 
explanations that apply similarly to biological and physical phenomena. To 
understand this area of study first one needs to define what constitutes an 
ordered and a disordered system, a task that is not as easy as one may think. 
At the core of the idea of order, there is the concept of entropy, which in 
thermodynamics is the measure of the disorder within a system.130 A system 
with high entropy is said to be more disordered than one with lower entropy. 
High entropic complex systems can be said to display stability; e.g. a pile of 
junk is a stable pile of junk, and something needs to happen for it to become 
something else. Normally, energy is one way in which a system can become 
ordered; e.g. a person going through a pile of junk may find usable parts to 
build a bicycle. Disordered systems become ordered all the time because of 
the application of energy; flowers grow due to the sun’s energy; gases 
become less entropic by losing heat; computers use electricity to make 
computations. However, these systems are not self-organised according to the 
definitions used above. How does self-organisation emerge, if you pardon the 
play of words?  
 One common characteristic of self-organisation and emergence is that it 
can occur through the very interaction of the system’s elements without 
outside influence. At the core of most research into self-organisation is how 
individual components somehow influence their neighbours, causing a chain 
reaction that will eventually result in the entire system becoming ordered.131 
There is a moment of change between the ordered and disordered system 
called phase transition, which takes place when a disordered system enters a 
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period of criticality (known also as a meta-stable transitional period) after 
which the system becomes ordered rapidly (Figure 2.10). 132  
 
 
 
Figure 2.10   Phase transition of colloids in space133 
 
 An interesting feature of self-organisation has been discovered by 
conducting experiments into criticality of systems such as pendulums and 
sand piles. Researchers found that a stable system such as a pile of sand 
could undergo a critical transition at a stage when some more grains were 
added, creating an avalanche that released pressure.134 While the event itself 
is not remarkable, as it is logical to assume that avalanches will happen if you 
add too much sand to a pile, the researchers found that the frequency with 
which this happened responded to a power law. In other words, the system 
organised itself into a state of criticality where avalanches could be expected 
at certain frequencies. This offers an interesting insight into self-organisation 
because if offers evidence that some systems will organise themselves into a 
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state where phase transitions will occur, and that this organisation is 
somehow linked to power laws.135  
 Power laws, and particularly Zipf laws, are characteristic of self-organised 
criticality.136 There could be a reason why this is so. Looking at scale-free 
networks, one could expect that hubs would have tremendous power to move 
a system in a given direction, causing self-ordering of the system.  
 There is a growing body of research into the way in which large groups of 
people make self-organising decisions in a seemingly spontaneous manner, 
particularly within game theory.137 We see this type of spontaneous 
coordination in nature all the time, where flocks of birds move in one 
direction and another in coordinated fashion, but also responding as a whole 
to threats and sources of food.138 Crowds of people tend to act in similar 
manner, any person familiar with crowd movements will notice inefficiencies 
in their behaviour, but also that at some point certain order emerges, 
particularly over time in what Surowiecki calls this “the wisdom of 
crowds”.139 But how does this self-organisation work?  
 The answer is surprisingly that crowds seem to behave just like gases. 
Henderson set out to study the way in which a crowd flows when walking 
through along a footpath.140 He discovered that plotting the speeds of people 
walking followed closely models used to describe the speed of gas particles 
in what is known as a Maxwell–Boltzmann curve. Further studies have 
managed to uncover more about crowd behaviour, discovering that crowds 
also display phase transitions from one state into another, just like the 
standing ovation described earlier.141 The explanation for the emergence in 
the behaviour of crowds tells us a lot about the way in which social 
behaviour exhibits self-organisation characteristics. Apparently, people in 
crowds follow two simple rules, getting from A to B, but also doing so by 
keeping some personal space apart from other people in the crowd. By 
plotting these two rules into computer simulations, it is possible not only to 
get a very good idea of how crowds flow, but it is also possible to simulate 
                                                          
135. Ball, supra note 23, pp.296–302.  
136. Ibid. 
137. A typical and often cited example is El Farol Bar problem, where bar attendance is used to 
model uncoordinated behaviour, see: Arthur WB, “Inductive Reasoning and Bounded 
Rationality” 84 American Economic Review 406 (1994).  
138. There are several computational models describing such behaviour, see: Reynolds C, 
“Flocks, Herds and Schools: A Distributed Behavioral Model”, Proceedings of the 14th 
Annual Conference on Computer Graphics and Interactive Techniques 25 (1987).  
139. Surowiecki J, The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the Many Are Smarter Than the Few, London: 
Abacus (2005).  
140. Henderson LF, “The Statistics of Crowd Fluids”, 229 Nature 331 (1971).  
141. Ball, supra note 23, pp.162–165. 
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how people react to obstacles along the way.142 This gives us a hint of the 
self-organising power of elements in a complex system. By introducing a few 
rules, it is possible to explain and predict some kinds of human behaviour.   
 Perhaps the most common question asked whenever I talk to people about 
concepts of power laws and complex theory is “so what?” To point out that 
any given phenomenon occurs more frequently than any other is surely an 
exercise in stating the obvious, is it not? City sizes follow a power law, and 
so do avalanches, earthquakes and income distributions. So what? The 
answer to this question is that power laws do not only state that a city is 
bigger than another one, but that the frequency of occurrences follow specific 
and predictable ratios that hint at underlying causes that require an 
explanation. There is no reason why the letters in a corpus or the number of 
citations should follow a power law, but they do. Explanatory solutions such 
as emergence, self-organised criticality and phase transitions offer some 
explanations to why these things occur.  
 
                                                          
142. Helbing D et al, “How individuals learn to take turns: Emergence of alternating cooperation 
in a congestion game and the prisoner’s dilemma”, 8 Advances in Complex Systems 871 
(2005). 
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3. Complexity and the Law 
 
 
It turns out that an eerie type of chaos can lurk just behind a facade of order---and 
yet, deep inside the chaos lurks an even eerier type of order. 
Douglas Hofstadter1 
  
In 1970, popular science writer Martin Gardner published a column in 
Scientific American showcasing a game created by mathematician John 
Conway.2 The game is called “The Game of Life”, and it is played in a 
rectangular grid divided into squares. Each square can inhabit two states, 
alive or dead, and it replicates following four simple rules for each 
generation: 
 
1. Each populated cell with one or no neighbours dies (isolation).  
2. Each populated cell with four or more neighbours dies 
(overpopulation).  
3. Each populated cell with two or three neighbours survives (survival).  
4. Each empty cell with three neighbours becomes populated 
(reproduction).3 
 
 These rules allow for autonomous patterns to emerge from a limited set of 
starting variables. The player only needs to set the initial conditions, and each 
turn the cells undertake an automated game of life, death and births that is 
both chaotic and yet completely dependent on its initial conditions (Figure 
3.1).   
 Conway’s Game of Life has become famous in the study of complexity 
because it serves as a graphical representation of self-organising systems at 
work, where simple initial conditions can create ordered, dynamic and 
autonomous states.4 It is no coincidence that the game has also been 
                                                          
1. Hofstadter DR, Metamagical Themas: Questing for the Essence of Mind and Pattern, 
London: Penguin (1986). 
2. Gardner M, “Mathematical Games: The Fantastic Combinations of John Conway’s New 
Solitaire Game ‘Life’”, 223 Scientific American 120 (1970).  
3. You can see an implementation of the game in Java here: http://www.bitstorm.org/ 
gameoflife/.  
4. Schulman LS and Seiden PE, “Statistical Mechanics of a Dynamical System Based on 
Conway’s Game of Life”, 19:3 Journal of Statistical Physics 293 (1978).  
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showcased in works dealing with evolutionary biology, as it also provides 
clear computational evidence of the power of self-reproducing automata, 
which offer obvious analogies to living organisms.5 The reason for such 
interest should be evident when one looks at some of the complex and often 
beautiful designs that can arise from simple initial conditions. The basic set 
of rules, and the ease with which it can be converted into a computer 
program, means that the simplified model allows anyone to play with any 
given set of initial conditions. A lot of variations will die out quickly, while 
others will become stationary by reaching fitness peaks. Under certain 
circumstances, very complicated fractal effects can also emerge.6   
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Conway’s Game of Life.  
   
 The Game of Life, and other biological simulations describing complex 
adaptive systems, offers us interesting insights into the world of complexity 
described in the second chapter. The use of self-organising cellular automata 
serves as an illustration of precisely how phase transitions can occur in 
complex systems with very little initial input. However, what may be 
surprising is that applications of the game can be used to simulate social 
phenomena such as phase transitions in small world networks.7 While it is 
clear that human beings do not operate in minimalistic conditions such as the 
rules in the Game of Life, the present work postulates that by studying such 
                                                          
5. Dennett DC, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, London: 
Penguin (1996), pp.167–171.  
6. See this page for some animated patterns: http://radicaleye.com/lifepage/patterns/ 
javalife.html.   
7. Huang S-Y et al, “Network-Induced Nonequilibrium Phase Transition in the ‘Game Of 
Life’”, 67:2 Physical Review E 026107 (2003).  
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complex systems, it is possible to learn something about how larger networks 
operate.  
 The legal reader who has managed to wade through the previous chapter 
may be forgiven for asking the question of what it all means for the legal 
profession and research. Networks obeying certain rules and presenting 
specific architectures may be interesting to physicists, not to lawyers. 
Paraphrasing Leonard McCoy in Star Trek, “I’m a lawyer Jim, not a 
physicist”. Nonetheless, this chapter will try to place the subject of 
complexity theory described in the last chapter in a legal context, attempting 
to prove that there is indeed something to be learned from the wealth of 
research into graph theory and networks.   
 
 
1. NETWORK THEORY AND THE LAW 
 
Before attempting to sketch a potential legal theory of complex systems, it is 
vital to understand whether there are any practical, philosophical and 
theoretical applications to network theory that may fit within a legal context. 
 At the time of writing, legal scholarship regarding the interaction between 
network theory and the law has been relatively scarce, but there is a growing 
body of literature on the subject.8 This was perhaps inevitable as ideas of 
self-organisation that are tackled by the various sub-themes in complexity 
theory offer powerful tools for social science as well as physical disciplines. 
In particular, economics has been the social science that has adopted such 
concepts the fastest, as evidenced by the existence of Pareto inequalities in all 
sorts of financial phenomena.9 Sociologists have also been at the forefront of 
adopting several theories arising from the application of network theory, 
particularly its interest in small worlds in society.10 Without meaning to 
sound too critical of my own profession, the law is just catching up, as is 
often the case.  
 Nonetheless, the number of legal scholars interested in the topic seems 
comparatively small given its prevalence in other social sciences. It is 
possible that the pervasiveness of mathematics and the technical nature of 
                                                          
8. Besides the works that will be showcased later, some works on the subject are: Hayes AW, 
“An Introduction to Chaos and Law”, 60 University of Missouri at Kansas City Law Review 
751 (1992); Matwyshyn AM, “Organizational Code: A Complexity Theory Perspective on 
Technology and Intellectual Property Regulation”, 11 Journal of Technology Law & Policy 
13 (2006); and LoPucki LM, “The Systems Approach to Law”, 82 Cornell Law Review 479, 
480-82 (1997).  
9. See for example: Simon HA and Bonini CP, “The Size Distribution of Business Firms” 48:4 
The American Economic Review 607 (1958). 
10. A notable example dealing with small worlds in the Broadway social scene is: Uzzi B and 
Spiro J, “Collaboration and Creativity: The Small World Problem”, 111:2 The American 
Journal of Sociology 58 (2005).  
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some of the papers may have dissuaded more attention to the topic. It is also 
possible that this is just part of the dichotomy between the physical and the 
social sciences that was highlighted in the Introduction. Network theory may 
be seen as nothing more than a formalistic and seemingly reductionist view 
of human society, an outlook that appears to erase complex social and 
political interactions, and replaces them with dots and lines on a chart. 
Nevertheless, if some better understanding of large systems has been made 
possible by complexity theory, then the law should take note and try to 
ascertain if there may be some legal issues worth exploring.  
 The possibility of following links and clusters of nodes and hubs means 
that the descriptive power of network theory can be easily tested in fields 
with pre-existing network-like characteristics. In the wider network research, 
a popular experimentation tool has been to chart citations between authors, or 
to discover small world characteristics of academic co-authorship networks.11 
It should come as no surprise then that a significant amount of existing 
literature charting the interaction between legal subjects and network theory 
is that of legal citation due to the availability of large datasets involving legal 
scholarship and case law, creating what Thomas Smith calls “the web of 
law”.12 Case law presents a valuable network subject matter because cases 
often cite existing precedent, the cases would be the nodes in the network, 
and the citations would be the links. Concentrating only on this network of 
cases and citations, Smith looked at the data from nearly four million US 
Federal rulings, and found a strong power law in the way in which cases cite 
one another. His study found that the vast majority of cases received few 
citations, while a significantly small number were cited a disproportionate 
number of times in a manner that clearly responded to power law exponential 
curves. If we recall some of the features of power law graphs, the mere 
appearance of inequality in occurrences is not enough to demonstrate the 
existence of power laws, but the difference between a case’s rank in the chart 
will be inversely proportional to the following or preceding case. By charting 
these in logarithmic scale, the resulting histogram should be a straight line, 
which is precisely what happens with case citations (Figure 3.2). A similar 
power law was found when looking at legal scholarship citations, US Courts 
of Appeals, and the US Supreme Court cases.13  
 
                                                          
11. See: Redner S, “How Popular Is Your Paper? An Empirical Study of the Citation 
Distribution”, 4:2 The European Physical Journal B 131 (1998); and Barabási A-L, Jeong 
H, Ravasz R, Néda Z, Vicsek T and Schubert A, “On The Topology Of The Scientific 
Collaboration Networks” 311 Physica A 590-614 (2002).  
12. Smith TA, “The Web of Law”, 44 San Diego Law Review 309 (2007).  
13. Ibid, pp.331–335.  
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Figure 3.2: Power law distribution of US Federal cases14  
 
 Smith’s results have been replicated in other studies looking at the 
network of cross-citations in US judicial decisions. Chandler conducted a 
study looking specifically at the way in which US Supreme Court decisions 
cite one other.15 The study found that there is a scale-free topology at work as 
there are some decisions that are cited with disproportionate frequency. 
According to Chandler’s research, the cases that act as the most cited hubs in 
this network of citations are older decisions regarding US Federal 
jurisdiction,16 which may seem logical as this would be a legal area where 
precedent does not change that much, so the importance of precedent is 
transposed into more citations. It could be said that such a study may not be 
particularly enlightening, as it does not really say much about the actual 
nature of the rulings, but similar exercises could be of use for constitutional 
lawyers in different jurisdictions in order to recognise which cases are more 
likely to be encountered in future decisions, and also to determine the 
centrality of a case within the case law network.  
 The clustering characteristic of legal scholarship and case law is just one 
area of potential usefulness to network theory to legal research. The cross-
citation power laws discovered in legal citation could be extremely useful in 
patent law, where a tool that analyses the cross-citation of previously issued 
                                                          
14. Ibid, p.327. The x axis counts number of citing references, and the y axis counts the number 
of cases in log scale of nodes.  
15. Chandler S, “The Network Structure of Supreme Court Jurisprudence”, International 
Mathematica Symposium 2005, The University of Western Australia, Perth (August 2005).  
16. The top two are McCulloch v. Maryland 17 U.S. 316; and Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1.  
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patents could prove to be an invaluable tool for patent examiners, attorneys 
and inventors. Strandburg17 has conducted an excellent study looking at the 
clustering of citations in patents issued by the United States Patent and 
Trademarks Office (USPTO), which has demonstrated, amongst other things, 
that there seems to be increasing stratification in patent citeability since the 
1980s. This means that a few patents are being cited with more frequency 
than in the past. Strandburg argues that this could be correlated with 
decreasing patent quality18 experienced in the corresponding period. Another 
very interesting avenue of research explored in this paper is the possibility of 
an improved manner in which to classify patent claims. Currently, patent 
subject matter is assigned by examiners in an ad hoc fashion. Strandburg 
suggests that citation of previous patents may help in assigning the claim to a 
cluster, which would make its identification much easier. Citation clusters 
can be easily identified using network analytical tools as belonging to a small 
world community of patents, and so would be a better indication of whether 
it has been properly classified.  
 To illustrate Strandburg’s findings, I took the liberty of downloading 
another patent citation dataset consisting of almost 3 million US patents 
granted between 1963 and 1999.19 The links in the network are provided as 
citations made to those patents between 1975 and 1999, totalling over 16 
million patents. I took the cross-citation by patent class, and applied small 
word modelling using a network analysis tool20 to the data21 and visualising it 
using small world graph software.22 By doing this it became clear that there is 
high-clustering of patent class cross-citation very much in accordance with 
Strandburg’s findings (Figure 3.3).  
 I will be the first person to admit that the aforementioned corroboration 
has to be taken with a large pinch of salt, but the experiment was done with 
one clear purpose in mind. The datasets are publicly available, and if one 
follows the methodology outlined in the cited works, it is possible even for 
someone without formal graph theory training to produce a graphic 
representation of any given dataset, particularly one that displays high 
clustering. The idea behind this experiment, unscientific as it may be, is that 
                                                          
17. Strandburg KJ, “Law and the Science of Networks: An Overview and an Application to the 
‘Patent Explosion’”, 21 Berkeley Technology Law Journal 1293 (2007).  
18. For more about patent quality, see: Jaffe A and Lerner J, Innovation and Its Discontents, 
Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press (2004), pp.61–69.  
19. The dataset comes from: Hall BH, Jaffe AB and Tratjenberg M,  The NBER Patent Citation 
Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools, NBER Working Paper 8498 (2001); 
it can be downloaded from: http://vlado.fmf.uni-lj.si/pub/networks/data/patents/Patents.htm.  
20. Network Workbench Tool, http://nwb.slis.indiana.edu/.  
21. Watts DJ and Strogatz SH, “Collective Dynamics of ‘Small-World’ Networks”, 393 Nature 
440 (1998). 
22. Ham F and van Wijk J, “Interactive Visualization of Small World Graphs”, Proceedings of 
the IEEE Symposium on Information Visualization (2004). 
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some of the basic tools for network analysis are available even for the 
uninitiated. All one needs is a healthy sense of curiosity and an unhealthy 
amount of time to test out the tools oneself. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Small-world clustering in patent class citations23 
 
  Outside of citation, empirical application of network theory has been 
scarce, but again there are notable exceptions. Perhaps one of the most 
evident areas of study with regards to networks may very well be the 
regulatory arena. If we can understand a specific network that has given 
problems to regulators, then the potential for empirically-based research on 
how the network operates could provide clues as to how to regulate the 
troublesome area. A study has already attempted to look into the application 
of specific network theories to the telecommunications field.24 Recognising 
that telecommunication networks operate as complex systems,25 Spulber and 
                                                          
23. Only the largest clusters show up in the visualisation. 
24. Spulber D and Yoo CS, “On the Regulation of Networks as Complex Systems: A Graph 
Theory Approach”, 99 Northwestern University Law Review 1687–1722 (2005).  
25. The paper describes a complex system as “a system in which its elements interact in ways 
that transcend any organizing principles being applied to the network, allowing the network 
to evolve and adapt to environmental changes”. Ibid, p.1694.  
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Yoo hypothesise that the specific graphical representation of networks into 
hubs and nodes may be of use in trying to regulate emerging technologies 
such as access to broadband services and Voice-over-IP (VoIP) 
communications. This study has a narrow objective, as it relies only on the 
descriptive power of network science in order to provide regulators with the 
basis for charging for communications in complex telecoms networks. Is 
there room for a wider area of application?  
 Strahilevitz offers another empirical application to network theory by 
researching the legal implications of power laws and scale-free topographies 
in a ground-breaking analysis of the potential use of network science to the 
protection of privacy.26 He uses the specific application of social network 
theories, such as small world distributions, to conclude that the scale-free 
nature of some social networks may provide us with tools with which we can 
measure the number of acquaintances that a member of the social system is 
likely to have. Then he proposes the fact that an individual involved in tort 
disputes about personal privacy may have the evidentiary means to measure 
the potential damage to his/her reputation and, therefore, a judge would be 
able to discern if there has been some actual damage done. He comments 
that: 
 
In a tort suit, courts are always called upon to examine causation: would the 
plaintiff have been harmed in the absence of the defendant’s actions? Social 
networks theory provides a basis for evaluating that question when the plaintiff’s 
injury stems from dissemination of previously private information. Courts simply 
need to ask themselves: was the widespread dissemination of this information 
inevitable, or did the defendant’s actions materially affect the extent of subsequent 
disclosure?27 
 
This is an elegant use of existing theories in order to provide a direct causal 
relationship to establish damages. However, one may be wary of establishing 
the causal link in the first place. If there is one thing that we have learned it is 
that scale-free networks predict that there will be super-connected nodes in a 
social network,28 and we can easily expect individuals whose social 
interaction exceeds the average by various degrees. The person involved in 
the dispute could very well be one of those, and the calculation of actual 
damage could prove to be uncertain.    
 Another potentially valuable use of network theories in the law is in 
environmental policy-making. The life-sciences have had extensive 
                                                          
26. Strahilevitz LJ, “A Social Networks Theory of Privacy”, 72 University of Chicago Law 
Review 919–988 (2005). 
27. Ibid, p.975.  
28. See for example: Kochen M, The Small World, Norwood, NJ:Ablex Publishing (1989), 
pp.147–158.   
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experience in the use of empirical data in order to design policy in 
environmental and public health fields. The better understanding of complex 
environmental systems brought by some of the literature could be used in 
assessing risks posed by environmental threats, real or imagined.29 Farber 
explains the use of power laws to design methods for assessing risks: 
 
The presence of statistical power laws supports the use of conservative methods of 
assessing risk. To be more specific, suppose that we are designing a procedure to 
identify any proposal posing a significant risk, with significance defined as some 
specific risk level such as one in ten thousand. [...] The only assumption is that 
among the relevant set of proposals, harmful effects follow a power-law 
distribution. If so, conservative test procedures may be warranted.30 
 
 In other words, in a scale-free environment we may expect harmful effects 
to occur, which are considerably higher than the average witnessed 
occurrences. If empirical research points towards the existence of power law 
distributions in a phenomenon that requires regulation, then conservative 
policies should be followed. This could certainly be useful if one considers 
that hurricanes appear to display scale-free characteristics.31 Similar 
precautionary approaches could be taken in other life-science fields, 
particularly in public health policy. Pandemics like AIDS seem to follow 
scale-free behaviours,32 where a few individuals can infect large numbers of 
people in a community by their role as connectors.33 Public policy towards 
social pandemics like sexually transmitted diseases could be designed to look 
for these hubs and attempt to treat them first.34  
 These are just some examples of the growing body of legal scholarship 
tackling issues related to network theory, and hint at the potential that so far 
has been under-used, in my humble opinion. The current emphasis on the 
study of citation networks is probably caused by the fact that these are 
usually areas that are easy to data-mine, as there is an existing infrastructure 
                                                          
29. Farber DA, “Probabilities Behaving Badly: Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Uncertainty” 37 U.C. Davis Law Review 145 (2003), pp.156–161. For a less successful yet 
interesting attempt at marrying biotechnology and network science, see: Chen J, “Webs of 
Life: Biodiversity Conservation as a Species of Information Policy”, 89 Iowa Law Review 
495–608 (2003).  
30. Ibid, p.160.  
31. Dessai S and Walter M, Self-Organised Criticality and the Atmospheric Sciences: Selected 
Review, New Findings and Future Directions, NCAR Extreme Events workshop, Boulder, 
CO (June 2000).   
32. Dezso Z and Barabási A-L, “Halting viruses in scale-free networks”, 65 Physical Review E 
055103 (2002).  
33. An example of this is the so-called patient-zero of the AIDS pandemic. See: Shilts R, And 
the Band Played On: Politics, People, and the Aids Epidemic, New York, NY: Penguin 
Books (1989).  
34. Ayres I and Baker KK, “A Separate Crime of Reckless Sex”, 72 University of Chicago Law 
Review 599 (2005), pp.610–614. 
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to ascertain scholar impact and citeability. Nonetheless, as some of the 
empirical studies above demonstrate, this is a fertile ground for future 
research. Perhaps what is missing is a more widespread recognition of 
network theory’s potential by existing legal theories. The following sections 
will attempt to continue making the case for doing just that.   
 
 
2. SELF-ORGANISATION AND THE LAW 
 
2.1 Theoretical approaches  
Besides the empirical applications to network theory described above, the 
study of emergent systems and self-organisation offer one of the most 
interesting areas of study to legal scholarship. Before trying to make a 
connection, we should revisit the concept of self-organisation studied in the 
previous chapter. For a system to be self-organised, it must contain an 
internal ordering process which does not respond to exogenous influences.35 
One way of looking at the law is to view it as an exercise in self-organisation 
within the complex system of society. The law fulfils one essential self-
organising function, and it is to attempt to exercise order and control in 
society by various means. If we think of society as an emergent system, then 
the law in the shape of legislation, norms, regulation, case law and doctrine 
would constitute one of the internal sub-systems exerting an organising force.  
Nonetheless, it is critical to distinguish what we are talking about when 
dealing with self-organisation in a legal context because there is room for 
confusion about the role of theories of emergence in legal context. Firstly, 
complexity theories of self-organisation can be used to explain how the law 
comes about and how it organises itself. This would be an internal theory of 
emergence of the law, and it would be concerned with the forces that shape 
the genesis and evolution of legal systems within its own system. Secondly, 
self-organisation can also be used to explain how the law works to shape 
other systems in self-organising fashion. As a result, the law itself is just 
another element in the wider complex societal system, and as such it helps to 
organise it. This would then be a meta-theory of the law as a self-organising 
element.   
 The father of self-organisation studies in social systems is Niklas 
Luhmann with his influential theory of autopoiesis,36 literally meaning self-
creation. In its broadest sense, Luhmann’s theory of autopoiesis follows the 
definition of self-organisation that has been used above so far as it describes 
                                                          
35. See Chapter 2, section 3.  
36. While he did not coin the term, he is credited with using it to describe social systems. 
Autopoiesis first appeared in a discussion on biological self-creation: Maturana HR and 
Varela FJ, Autopoiesis and Cognition: The Realization of the Living, London: Reidel (1980).   
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social systems that respond to internal stimuli instead of relying on external 
elements.37 Luhmann’s autopoiesis theory rests on two significant 
assumptions with regards to social systems. First, he claims that social 
systems are real and not mere analytical abstractions; second, he postulates 
that social systems are self-referential as they produce their own meaning, or 
as he puts it, “everything that is used as a unit by the system is produced by 
the system itself”.38 According to Luhmann, highly ordered systems are not 
necessarily more complex than less ordered systems because the internal 
emergent factors need not be complex, and consequently the self-organising 
process can be a function of the interaction between these elements, and not a 
function of the complexity of the system.39 This is undoubtedly consistent 
with Kauffman’s theory of fitness landscapes;40 the process needs only to 
produce fitness peaks for it to be ordered.  
 Luhmann himself saw the law as an autopoietic system part of the wider 
social network, but still differentiated and autonomous in its own merit. 
While it is informed by other sub-systems within society –such as politics, 
economics, religion, and education– it is self-referential, and for that reason 
self-organising. He comments that: 
 
[L]ike every autopoietic system, [the law] is and remains to a high degree 
dependent on its environment, and the artificiality of the functional differentiation 
of the social system as a whole only increases this dependency. And yet, as a 
closed system, the law is completely autonomous at the level of its own 
operations. Only the law can say what is lawful and what is unlawful, and in 
deciding this question it must always refer to the results of its own operations and 
to the consequences for the system’s future operations. In each of its own 
operations it has to reproduce its own operational capacity. It achieves its 
structural stability through this recursivity and not, as one might suppose, through 
favorable input or worthy output.41 
 
This is a very useful distinction between the two meanings of self-
organisation described in previous paragraphs. Being part of the larger 
complex system of society, the law acts as one of its shaping elements in 
conjunction with other elements. However, the law is also its own autopoietic 
system, and thus one can study its own internal organising elements.   
                                                          
37. Luhmann N, Social Systems, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (1995), p.22.  
38. Luhmann N, Essays on Self-Reference, New York: Columbia University Press (1990), p.3.  
39. Luhmann supra note 31, pp.34–36.  
40. Kauffman S, At Home in the Universe: The Search for Laws of Self-Organization and 
Complexity, Oxford: Oxford University Press (1995).  
41. Luhmann N, “Law as a Social System”, 83 Northwestern University Law Review 136 
(1988), p.139. 
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 Autopoiesis has had tremendous influence in some legal theory circles.42 It 
is not the role of this work to go into a detail description of the many works 
that it has inspired, even within the field of Internet regulation.43 Relevant to 
this work, however, is the growing understanding of the regulatory power of 
self-organisation. Regulation itself is one of those tricky words that may 
mean different things in various contexts. In the strict legal usage, regulation 
can be defined as some form of external control that either restricts 
undesirable activities, or enables and facilitates others.44 It is easy to see how 
the concept of autopoiesis is useful from a regulatory perspective, as it helps 
to explain how regulatory processes emerge, evolve and act as self-
organising agents in society. Autopoietic regulation could be seen as an 
internal ordering force; organic, dynamic, and self-organising. This would 
contrast a more structured and hierarchical view of regulation known as 
“command and control” regulation,45 where governmental bodies serve as the 
organising force exerting control in a top-down manner.  
 There is growing understanding of the role of self-organising complexity 
within the regulatory arena. Many authors have embraced Luhmann’s 
autopoietic explanation of the law as a self-referential system and have 
adopted it as an explanation for self-regulating strategies where each element 
in the regulatory system is able to react within its environment and self-
generate and reproduce internal solutions.46 As it will be seen in more detail 
later, new technologies such as the Internet have provided particularly focal 
ground for the exploration of autopoietic regulation as it offers a clear 
contrast between command and control and self-regulation.47  
 Having said this, it is essential to note that there appears to be a clear split 
between the understanding of autopoiesis in legal systems and the concepts 
of self-organisation and emergence studied in the previous chapter. While 
Luhmann repeatedly uses examples from biology to describe autopoiesis, and 
his concept of self-organisation matches that used in the physical sciences, it 
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is clear that autopoiesis is very much a social theory. With few exceptions,48 
the theoretical study of autopoiesis is devoid of the mathematical treatment 
and the wealth of evidence into self-organisation involving information 
theory, phase transitions and emergence described in Chapter 2. It is almost 
as if the social sciences and the physical sciences arrived at the same 
conclusion following entirely different paths. This could be caused yet again 
by the pervasive split between the social and physical sciences that is the 
common theme that runs through academia. This is unfortunate because both 
fields could use with some cross-pollination. Unfortunately, post-Sokal 
tendencies in the physical sciences appear to look at sociology with decided 
distrust.  
 That is not to say that there have been no attempts at bringing both worlds 
together, particularly in the existence of studies that not only offer an insight 
into the presence of self-organisation in the law, but that are also aware of –
and embrace – complexity theory.  
 Post and Johnson,49 amongst others, have been at the forefront in bringing 
ideas of complex adaptive systems to the law. Some of the work on this area 
follows Kauffman’s studies into complexity theory in biological systems 
outlined in the second chapter. According to the view, the law is an 
interconnected system which spontaneously arrives at a highly-ordered states. 
Post and Johnson use the idea of patching in complex systems to make both a 
descriptive and normative comment about the emergent faculties of the law. 
Patching is, according to Kauffman, a method of looking at the interaction of 
complex systems where its constituent elements are divided into quilt 
squares, or patches. Each patch tries to achieve optimal fitness regardless of 
what the other elements are doing, but in doing so they influence the overall 
state of the system as each patch encourages co-evolution into more ordered 
and efficient states.50 Post and Johnson propose that the law can be seen in 
similar light by saying that: 
  
Legal institutions are (or should be) designed to solve problems defined over 
complex systems [...]. If we are to have effective problem-solving in this complex 
policy space, a central goal for the design of legal institutions is the formation of 
congruent, independently optimizing decision-making sub-groups.51 
 
                                                          
48. Most notably: Mingers J, Self-Producing Systems: Implications and Applications of 
Autopoiesis, London: Plenum Press (1995).    
49. Post D and Johnson D, “Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent”: A New Theory of 
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(1999). 
50. Ibid, p.262.  
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 This is an interesting use of self-organisation, one that provides a useful 
theoretical framework to look at the way in which legal decision-making is 
achieved. The institutional self-organisation of legal networks seen is this 
light would perhaps provide answers about how certain legal decisions are 
made, but also about how the web of law, to use Smith’s term, comes 
together into a coherent whole.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Social network structure of the US Federal judiciary52 
 
 Social network and small world theories may provide some help to try to 
determine the self-organising elements of the law. Following the patch 
example, self-organisation occurs when constituent nodes in the network 
come together and affect one another, consequently shaping the whole. If we 
think of the interaction between actors within the network, particularly from 
a social network perspective, then we could try to see how the legal web 
displays emergent features. For example, Katz and Stafford53 collected data 
for 20,000 clerks working in the US Federal judiciary, and tried to paint a 
picture of the social structure within that vast network. They found high 
levels of clustering amongst clerks, which responded to scale-free topologies. 
Drawing from the complex systems literature, the authors found that the high 
clustering was in no way a directed phenomenon, and it displayed some form 
of self-organisation of the actors in the network that was dependent on the 
initial conditions of the network, suggesting that federal judicial actors self-
organize at positions of criticality. Apparently, clerks who knew each other 
tended to cluster together at later stages of their careers, shaping the way in 
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which the network organised. Unsurprisingly, some of the actors had more 
connections, and these tended to become essential parts of the whole. When 
visualising the links of acquaintance and publication of the nodes, a familiar 
scale-free topology emerged (Figure 3.4). 
 
2.2 Finding self-organisation in legal systems 
From a theoretical perspective, autopoiesis and emergence in legal systems 
make a lot of sense. Nonetheless, there real usefulness of the theory exists if 
we can identify self-organising systems in the law.   
 Emison provides us with an invaluable test to recognise self-organising 
adaptive systems in a policy context.54 In order to potentially make use of 
complexity theory in environmental policy, he set out to discover whether the 
subject of environmental regulation featured self-organisation. This is an key 
step, as he believed that environmental policy until then had been ineffective 
because it was attempting to regulate self-organising subject matter. 
However, Emison’s concern may have been misplaced – as self-organisation 
and regulation are not exclusive, one just needs to think of the way in which 
crowds flow to realise that often architectural decisions may direct emergent 
forces in one direction, a subject that will be dealt with in more detail in the 
next chapter. Nonetheless, assuming that self-organisation is problematic, 
Emison argued that there are several characteristics of self-emergence for 
regulatory purposes: 
 
1. Systems’ components have a common purpose; the system’s elements 
work together to move the whole to a different condition. 
2. These systems are indeterminately complicated; the large number of 
interactions in a self-organising system means that it contains levels 
of complexity that cannot be pre-determined.  
3. The systems are non-linear and dynamic; constant change in self-
organising systems means that interactions and effects do not follow 
linear causality.  
4. As systems change, new conditions emerge.  
5. The new conditions emerge towards patterns.  
6. The patterns are self-similar; in other words, the system is exactly or 
approximately similar to a part of itself. 
 
 If the system under study exhibits these characteristics, then traditional 
“command and control” regulation will simply not suffice, and new 
approaches should be sought. This is a useful and tangible application of self-
organisation for legal purposes.  
                                                          
54. Emison GA, “The Potential for Unconventional Progress: Complex Adaptive Systems and 
Environmental Quality Policy”, 7 Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 167 (1996). 
 Complexity and the Law    59 
 
 
 Arguably, one of the most concise empirical applications of complexity 
theory and emergence in the legal field has been Trujillo’s study on 
bankruptcy.55 In this ground-breaking analysis, he took all of the bankruptcy 
corporate cramdown valuation decisions from 1970 to 199856 to try to discern 
patterns in valuation procedures at court level. One would expect that in any 
normal valuation process of bankrupt corporate assets would either follow no 
pattern, or there would be a split in valuation between what is being asked by 
the debtor and the creditor. However, Trujillo found that this was not the 
case, and he uncovered patterns in valuation that responded to “winner-takes-
all” scenarios described by Bose–Einstein condensation.57 He took this 
amazing finding, and other similar data, and showed that there was a pattern 
of self-organisation in legal decisions. He states that: 
 
The data offer preliminary support for the conclusion that some aspects of the U.S. 
bankruptcy legal system show a tendency to self-organize. Conclusive evidence of 
self-organizing dynamics in a legal system could have substantial jurisprudential 
significance. We know that simple deterministic dynamics do not explain the data 
we observe in legal systems. Since the decline of legal formalism, the dominant 
mode of explanation has been to attribute a randomness, or nondeterminism, to 
legal system dynamics and to suggest that any observable patterns are due to 
exogenous ordering—such as decisionmaker bias—that affect legal ordering 
intersystemically. Evidence of self-organizing dynamics suggests the possibility 
that at least some of the patterns we observe are generated by deterministic 
dynamics operating intrasystemically. 
 
Trujillo’s research and analysis throws an interesting challenge to 
jurisprudential thought. Here we are presented with clear examples of self-
organisation in legal contexts. As it will be made evident later in the book, 
his example is not the only one by far. If there is some form of self-
organisation at the heart of legal decisions, what does that have to say about 
legal theory? Is there room for a complexity school of legal thought?  
 
 
3. COMPLEXITY AND EXISTING LEGAL THEORIES 
 
Writing about the possible application of complexity theory in discrimination 
cases, Di Lorenzo complained that judicial decisions and legislation in the 
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United States had remained blind to the issue of complexity.58 His grievance 
could be extended to the subject of legal doctrine and jurisprudence; although 
legal philosophy has been adopting an interdisciplinary approach involving 
economics and sociology, theories of complexity still do not fit easily into 
existing legal theories. As Trujillo remarked above, a deterministic outlook 
of legal processes may not fit well with prevalent doctrines more interested in 
randomness than in complexity. That is not to say that the subject has gone 
unnoticed,59 and there are several attempts at placing the idea of complexity 
theory at the heart of jurisprudence.  
 The holdout on the recognition of the role of complex theory in law is 
twofold. Firstly, there is understandable reluctance to adopt seemingly 
mechanistic descriptive theories into complex social phenomena. Secondly, 
there is the fact that current legal theory tends to favour more socially 
oriented and less formalistic approaches to legal thought.  
 At first glance, the legal theory that could accommodate and explain some 
of the research highlighted in the previous sections is that of Formalism, 
which can be roughly described as a strict adherence to the letter of the law, 
without taking into account interpretation, or the social, political and 
anthropological circumstances that serve to understand legal decisions. 60  
Perhaps unjustifiably, Formalism in legal theory has become equivalent with 
ideas of strict logical construction of legal decisions that are anathema to 
realism, utilitarianism and critical legal studies.61 Complexity theory would 
appear to be formalistic as it offers descriptive tools that appear 
deterministic, suggesting the existence of pre-determined, unmovable and 
unavoidable rules of legal formation. However, a closer look at the basic 
components of complexity theory as it might apply to the law would serve to 
dispel this concern.  
 Take, for example, the ideas of self-organisation covered in the previous 
section. Emergent systems display a self-organising structure embedded in 
their own elements, the overall emergent system is dependent on the complex 
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interaction of its component parts. If we look at the judicial system as an 
emergent system, then we are not making any comment about the actual 
decisions, but we could gain insight into how the decisions are made. Katz, 
Safford and Provins make this point by stating that: 
 
[J]udicial decision-making is decision-making in a judicial hierarchy. Agents 
across the institution consistently interact and those interactions undoubtedly 
consequence aggregate outputs. An important precursor to gaining leverage on the 
empirical implications of this revelation is an effort to develop a positive theory of 
judicial social structure. Much like the study of the pixels or the understanding of 
traffic systems, existing theories could benefit from modeling both direct and 
indirect interactions between judicial agents. Along with factors identified by 
behavioral and strategic institutional scholars, we believe that a holistic model of 
judicial decision-making should account for the institution’s self-organized social 
topology and its role in structuring the emergent and convergent outputs produced 
by the aggregate institution.62 
 
 Therefore, complexity and self-organisation could not be classed under 
Formalism as it is usually understood because the interactions of the 
components in the system are vital to the emergent patterns in doctrine, case 
law and legislation. But if complexity theory is not Formalism, then what is 
it?  
 A logical home for complexity theory would be one of the most 
interdisciplinary legal theories in existence, Law and Economics, which is 
the legal theory concerned with the application of economic analysis to legal 
systems.63 As has been mentioned already, economists have been the quickest 
social science to adopt several complexity theory tools.64 In particular, 
economists have seen in complexity theory potential explanatory tools for 
economic phenomena that have been a feature of the field since Adam Smith. 
The idea of complex adaptive systems and emergence fit well with economic 
themes such as the self-organising power of markets, the interaction between 
agents and the dynamic organisation of networks within the economy.65 As is 
the case with other theories of self-organisation such as autopoiesis, Law and 
Economics has been greatly influenced by the biological sciences, in 
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particular evolutionary theory.66 In a ground-breaking article on the subject, 
Roe uses several chaos and complexity features of evolutionary biology to 
explain corporate organisation and self-regulation.67 Nonetheless, while it is 
tempting to try to shoehorn complexity theory within the wider field of Law 
and Economics, there could be several problems with this approach. Chiefly 
amongst those, Law and Economics has been a central feature of the Chicago 
School of Economics68 where it could be seen as an ideologically-driven field 
of study concerned with the supremacy of the market, which explains its 
interest in evolutionary biology and the prevalence of the use of the idea of 
survival of the fittest. While complexity theory has strong implications for 
self-organisation, it would be wrong to allocate an ideological explanation to 
such undertakings.  
 In a similar vein to that of Law and Economics, Ruhl offers an interesting 
attempt to draw analogies between competing legal theories and Darwinian 
evolutionary theory by making one-on-one comparisons between legal 
theories and their “equivalent” in evolutionary biology. According to his 
novel take on the subject, Formalism is akin to the more discredited forms of 
Social Darwinism, Realism is equated to punctuated equilibrium,69 Critical 
Legal Studies are equivalent to ecosystem nonequilibrium70 and so forth.71 
While this exercise feels rather forced at times, Ruhl’s contribution serves to 
further disentangle the jurisprudential web of complexity by making it clear 
that issues such as fitness, emergence and self-organisation do not fall easily 
into existing legal theories, particularly in theories such as Realism and 
Critical Legal Studies.    
 There appears to be an overarching feature in most of the literature dealing 
with jurisprudential thought of complexity theory. Many authors are clearly 
aware that there is something of great consequence happening in the physical 
sciences, so they attempt to tie in some of the ideas of chaos, complexity and 
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networks into legal phenomena.72 There is a clear danger then that the study 
of potential application of complexity in legal phenomena could be regarded 
as simply a fad initiated by scholars who have read a couple of books on 
chaos theory or graph theory and decided to apply it to their research. 
However, as evidenced by the growing body of relevant and informative 
research into networks highlighted in the first section, there is definitely a 
tangible role of complexity theory in legal scholarship. The existence of 
power laws in legal doctrine and case law should give us a hint as to the 
presence of an emergent feature embedded in legal systems. However, this 
feature does not fit well into existing legal theories. Is it perhaps time for a 
new legal theory?  
 
 
4. A NEW LEGAL THEORY OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS? 
 
Assuming that complex theory cannot be housed in existing legal theories, it 
could be time to formulate a new theory. While it is not the remit of the 
present work to undertake such a task, this could be a good opportunity to 
sketch what a legal theory of complex systems should look like.  
 The first task is to try to set the bar high as to what constitutes a valuable 
and viable application of complexity theory to the law. Complexity theory in 
general and network theory specifically, are broad fields of study that 
encompass a large range of sub-theories and practical applications. So if one 
is to seek a valuable contribution from these fields to jurisprudence, one has 
to initially try to filter what constitutes viable input from these fields. Just 
because a set of data displays a power law, it does not mean that it should be 
immediately worthy of study. The first rule of a potential theory should be 
relevance; in order to be of interest to legal theory, the application of 
complexity theory should tell us something crucial about the law. As stated 
by Geu, the role of a new theory of legal complexity does not need to have 
immediate practical application, but it could serve to arrive to an adequate 
level of confidence about the predictive power of the application of complex 
theory to legal problems.73  
 The second element that needs to go into a new legal theory of complexity 
is to determine exactly what is being studied. Legal theory is generally 
concerned with endogenous and exogenous elements of study. Amongst the 
exogenous topics one can find the study of how the law operates within 
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society, and what the external elements that shape it are. Endogenous topics 
include theories that study the interaction of law formation, regulation, 
decision-making processes, legislative power, case law, policymaking and 
enforcement. Exogenous topics include the role of law in the economy, the 
political process and society as a whole; but also cover external influences 
into the endogenous processes.   
 Complexity theory can serve to explain both endogenous and exogenous 
topics. A couple of examples can serve to illustrate this. Looking at 
exogenous elements that shape legal processes, Luhmann has commented 
that the study of self-organisation in legal systems is being shaped by the 
application of extraneous disciplines such as computing, information theory, 
robotics and autopoiesis.74 On the endogenous side, Di Lorenzo has been 
looking at the analytical power of complexity theory in order to study the 
dynamics of the legislative process with emphasis on the indeterminacy 
created by competing and dynamic elements present in the legislative 
decision making.75 In both instances, we have scholars interested in bringing 
in tools that are more easily found in biology and physics textbooks, and 
applying them to legal topics both at internal and external levels.  
 It is the endogenous aspects of interaction that are more relevant to legal 
theory as a whole. When we look at legal processes through the eyes of 
complexity theory we see a vast networks of norms: networks of legislators 
interacting with lobbyists and stakeholders; networks of case law interacting 
at different hierarchical levels; networks of legal citation; networks of 
interpretation of norms; networks of enforcement and networks of regulation. 
Just looking at each one of those elements we see emergent features that hint 
at underlying ordering rules. Paraphrasing Geu, the law “oozes 
complexity”.76 
 This could of course be completely irrelevant to legal theory as a whole, 
but if the patterns tell us something about how decisions are made, and how 
policies are adopted and enforced, then complexity and network theories 
have a valid place in jurisprudence. Traditionally, we like to think of the law 
not as a chaotic system, but as the result of decisions by players according to 
established constitutional and legislative rules. Those norms are set in place 
by legislative powers that are also not considered to be chaotic. However, 
some aspects of complexity theory do account for individual actions and their 
subsequent effects in complex systems, particularly in the theories of self-
organisation. Would it be useful to look at the law much in the same way as 
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we look at the phenomenon of standing ovations covered in the second 
chapter? Complex adaptive systems in particular are modelled to take into 
account the action of prime movers, and to measure the effect these have in 
the system as a whole. Understanding the law as an autopoietic system allows 
actors to make decisions that will shape the network as a whole.  
 Under this light, it might be possible to establish a nested hierarchy of 
decisions that generate phase transitions in the legal sphere. Think for 
example of the most basic type of legal sources, that of social norms. 
Sunstein has remarked how many social norms do not seem to originate from 
rational behaviour, and often respond to arbitrary, inefficient and irrational 
choices by people that eventually get turned into generally accepted social 
precepts.77 This behaviour could be viewed from strictly sociological and 
economic perspectives, but it could also be seen under the eyes of complexity 
theory. If we assign fitness levels to norms, one could say that under some 
circumstances some decisions enter a phase transition that eventually 
becomes widely accepted, hence reaching a peak in fitness landscapes and 
solidifying its wide adoption. In fact, these become so widely accepted that it 
becomes very difficult to shift social behaviour, even if the norm is shown to 
be irrational.  
 To illustrate this point, we need only look at the way in which norms are 
created and enforced in society. Milgram78 conducted several social 
experiments in New York by getting some of his students to challenge deeply 
ingrained social norms, such as jumping queues and asking people for their 
seat in public transport; he found that while people seemed discomforted by 
the blatant breaking of rules, they were more likely to acquiesce if the person 
was firm and assumed an air of authority. In some instances, Milgram found 
that when someone blatantly violates a social norm such as jumping a queue, 
very few people protested vocally; and about half of the people asked to give 
up their seat actually did so. But perhaps one of the most interesting parts of 
the experiment was just how reluctant his students were to actually undertake 
the braking of established social norms. One could say that these norms have 
reached a peak in fitness landscapes, and moving the behaviour towards 
different norms could prove akin to the act of speciation in evolutionary 
biology.  
 Similar considerations can be undertaken in the hierarchy of norms, and 
the role of a legal theory of complex systems could be to establish more 
examples amongst legal sub-systems, just like many scholars have been 
doing.  
 As stated in the first section, one of the most useful roles of a legal theory 
of complexity could be its application in the area of regulation and 
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policymaking. Take Baldwin and Cave’s definition of regulation as the 
sustained and focused application of control over social activities, be this 
governmental, market-driven or social norm.79  Given this definition, theories 
of complexity can prove useful when trying to determine and exercise 
regulatory control, as better understanding of group behaviour can elucidate 
regulatory puzzles.  
 To illustrate this, let us look at crowd flow again. Under the more 
inclusive definitions of regulation, the attempt to direct pedestrian or 
vehicular traffic is indeed a type of regulation inasmuch as a public authority 
is trying to exercise control over a human activity. This is an area where 
complexity theory has become invaluable as the use of computer simulations 
based on complexity principles can be used to devise better, safer and more 
efficient manners of traffic control. A notable example of this has been the 
building of pedestrian bridges in Saudi Arabia to control the flow of pilgrims 
at the Hajj. We are all familiar with the news stories of hundreds of people 
dying due to trampling and overcrowding of poorly designed pathways; the 
worst of these took place in 1990, where 1426 people died in a tunnel leading 
out from Mecca.80 After two serious incidents in 2004 and 2006,81 plans went 
underway to redesign the access bridges to the stoning pillars where most 
incidents took place, but this time taking into account simulations based on 
complexity theory. Particularly, researchers from the Swiss Federal Institute 
of Technology looked at footage from previous disasters, and were able to 
come up with a model that not only accurately described and replicated what 
happened, but also would be used in the building of the new access ramp to 
avoid future incidents.82  
 Traffic control is not only a significant empirical regulatory application of 
complexity theory, but it also provides a valuable analogy for regulatory 
approaches as a whole. Often, regulatory power is exercised without taking 
into account how people actually behave in any given situation. When I have 
presented in conferences about this topic, I usually finish my slides with a 
picture of a footpath located at the University of Stuttgart (Figure 3.5). In it, 
one can clearly see a designed pathway in an open park connecting several 
buildings. However, it is clear from the picture which is the preferred route 
taken by pedestrians, which is unsurprisingly the shortest and most efficient 
route across the park, clearly ignoring the beautifully designed walkway. 
Would-be regulators may be well served by keeping images such as this in 
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mind when trying to deploy regulatory solutions dealing with complex 
human behaviour.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 Regulatory failure83 
 
 With these starting points in mind, I propose that a legal theory of 
complex systems should recognise at least a couple of corollaries arising 
from network and complexity theory.   
 
1. The law is a self-organising system. If we take for granted the both 
the definition of both self-organising systems and of autopoiesis 
covered already, then it becomes evident that the law is a complex 
system that contains endogenous elements which function towards the 
emergence of self-organising characteristics. Out of seemingly 
chaotic elements, an ordered and coherent system seems to arrive, 
seemingly out of nowhere.   
2. The law is a dynamic network. Taking also the definition of network 
described in the last chapter, the law can be seen as a network 
consisting of interactive nodes. These interactions are more akin to 
the dynamic and rapidly changing environment found in biological 
systems, instead of steady networks such as Euhler’s bridges. As a 
result, the law as a network can be charted using graph theory, and 
                                                          
83. Ball P, Critical Mass: How One Thing Leads to Another, London: Arrow Books (2004), 
p.169. 
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these interactions will display either random behaviour, or scale-free 
topologies.  
 
 What to call this legal theory? Professor Jim Chen and other scholars have 
started a blog called Jurisdynamics, which “describes the interplay between 
legal responses to exogenous change and the law’s own endogenous capacity 
for adaptation”.84 This is a catchy name, and could perfectly describe the 
interaction between the law and complexity theory.  
 Hopefully, this chapter has served to make the case that there are potential 
legal applications to network theory. The next chapters will look at the 
specific case of Internet regulation and cyberspace law in order to describe in 
more detail some of the issues that can be explored using complexity theory.  
 
                                                          
84. Chen J, “Introducing Jurisdynamics, a New Blog on Law”, Jurisdynamics Blog (July 14, 
2004), http://jurisdynamics.blogspot.com/2006/07/introducing-jurisdynamics-new-blog-
on.html.  
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4. Internet Architecture and Regulation 
 
 
Every other medium is somewhat responsibly regulated. The Internet is the only 
one that is being left alone in the name of informational freedom. People say that 
they want the Internet to be free and they want to make sure that no one controls it. 
The idea that no one controls the Internet is laughable. Whoever controls the 
delivery systems controls the Internet. And these people aren’t doing it out of 
philosophical enlightenment or out of charity; their intention is to have control 
over the market. They’re really sucking people in with this thing. They’re making 
intelligent people believe that the Internet is a force for freedom and democracy. 
But it can be used for anything.  
Caleb Carr1 
  
In 1993 author Julian Dibbell published a remarkable article entitled “A Rape 
in Cyberspace”.2 In it he recounts the happenings of a virtual world called 
LambdaMOO,3 a text-based environment with roughly 100 subscribers where 
the users adopted assumed personalities (or avatars) and engaged in various 
role-playing scenarios. Dibbell tells the story of Mr Bungle, a clown avatar 
who programmed a routine into the virtual environment called a voodoo doll, 
which had the function of taking another person’s avatar and manipulating it 
to follow the controller’s orders. Mr Bungle used his voodoo doll to describe 
various unsavoury sexual encounters with other characters against their will. 
The incident became a scandal in LambdaMOO; the fact that this was not 
real was irrelevant to the affected users. They felt violated, and demanded 
some form of action from the community. What followed was a complex 
discussion regarding social norms in virtual environments, punishment and 
enforcement. The community decided that some form of penalty was 
warranted, while the designers of the space, the so-called wizards, 
proclaimed that they would implement whatever judgement was passed by 
the community. Discussion ensued, arguments and counter-arguments came, 
but in the end one of the wizards decided to “toad” the Mr Bungle character, 
that is, it was deleted from the system. Judgement had been passed and 
                                                          
1. Interviewed by: Offman C, “Fight the Future!” 8:12 Wired Magazine (2000), p.102.   
2. Dibbell J, “A Rape in Cyberspace”, The Village Voice (21 December, 1993), 
http://www.juliandibbell.com/texts/bungle_vv.html.  
3. A MOO is a recursive acronym that describes an object oriented Multi-User Dungeon 
(MUD). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MOO.   
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enforced in the most terminal way possible in virtual worlds, character 
deletion.  
 The story of LambdaMOO has become a classic in Internet regulation 
literature, and has been pondered and retold in seminal works such as 
Lessig’s Code4 and Goldsmith and Wu’s Who Controls the Internet.5 It is a 
testament to Dibbell’s powerful writing that the story of the virtual 
misconduct of an avatar during the early days of cyberspace could have such 
an effect on the body of work dealing with the regulation of the Web; at the 
time it came out, the virtual capital punishment of Mr Bungle seemed like a 
perfect example of self-regulation and governance of the online world. Since 
it was written, we have become used to much more serious online offences –
Internet trolling occurs on a daily basis – and regulation theories have much 
more to worry about than users taking their online role-playing games way 
too seriously. Nonetheless, the story of LambdaMOO still resonates because 
it brings us back to crucial questions that have been the subject of literature, 
philosophy and jurisprudence for centuries. How does a community organise 
itself? Is external action needed, or does self-regulation work? What 
constitutes regulatory dialogue? How does regulatory consensus arise? And 
most importantly, who enforces norms?  
 While this work does not pretend to answer these age-old questions, it is 
clear that new technologies have been proving fertile ground to enrich 
existing theories of regulation. The emergence of the World Wide Web, and 
the growing numbers of people who use it in critical facets of their lives, 
have served to examine some of the assumptions about how we regulate 
these spaces. When presented with previously uncharted legal issues, some of 
the assumptions of how the law responds to new challenges are being asked.  
 This chapter will serve three main purposes. Firstly, it will cover some of 
the basics about the underlying architecture of the Internet. Secondly, it will 
discuss some of the research from complexity theory, and in particular from 
network theory, about how the Web works. Lastly, the chapter will look at 
the regulation of cyberspace with emphasis on the application of network 
theory to current regulatory ideas in order to make the case for its relevance. 
This will set the stage for later chapters, where specific regulatory challenges 
will be analysed using tools learnt from complexity disciplines. It is one of 
the stated hypotheses of this work that network science is of particular 
interest to the regulation of the Internet, and it will be put forward that 
network theory may prove to be a valuable descriptive and normative tool to 
help us understand these technologies.  
                                                          
4. Lessig L, Code: and Other Laws of Cyberspace, New York, NY: Basic Books (1999), 
pp.74–78. 
5. Goldsmith JL and Wu T, Who Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2006), pp.14–17.  
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1. THE INTERNET 
 
Almost every book which deals with Internet regulation in one form or 
another contains a short history of the Internet. In danger of falling into 
redundancy, this work will not be an exception, although emphasis will be 
given to those aspects of the history of the Internet that are relevant to 
network theory.  
 In its most basic form, the Internet is a communications network made up 
of hardware and software which connects computers that fall under two 
types, hosts and routers. A host is simply any computer connected to the 
Internet via a modem, cable or a local-area network (LAN). There are two 
types of hosts, on the supply side we have servers, which are computers that 
have software designed to deliver content on demand, be it web pages, files, 
music, images, streaming video, email, etc. On the reception-side we have 
terminals and workstations; these are computers that have an Internet 
connection, but also software capable of receiving content, known as a client 
(e.g. browsers, mail clients, instant messaging). In between these types of 
hosts there is a vast array of intervening gateways (or routers), whose main 
function is to route the information from the servers to clients. Right away, 
one can see the relevance of network theory to this set-up; the computers that 
make up the network are vertices, and the intervening connections are edges. 
The presence of the classic node and link structure of networks is indeed one 
of the reasons why the Internet is such a great space for studying network 
theory.  
 It might be superfluous to define the Internet; after all, we all use it on a 
daily basis and take it almost for granted. Nonetheless, these technical 
definitions serve the purpose of framing the Internet within network theory. 
The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has defined the Internet as a 
network which contains several defining architectural characteristics.6 Chief 
amongst these is the understanding that the Internet is “a network of 
networks”, which means that it is made up of a vast array of sub-networks 
interconnected to one another through a global infrastructure, but most 
importantly, where all of these networks communicate using standard 
protocols.7 These sub-networks are known as autonomous systems (AS) 
because they are in many ways self-contained, yet interact with the wider 
network through gateways.8 Because it is a network consisting of millions of 
                                                          
6. Internet Engineering Task Force, Requirements for Internet Hosts: Communication Layers, 
RFC 1122 (1989), http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1122.  
7. Ibid, p.7.  
8. Mahadevan P et al, “The Internet AS-Level Topology: Three Data Sources and One 
Definitive Metric”, 36:1 Computer Communications Review 17 (2006).  
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computers,9 there is an inherent complexity in the way in which it is 
organised, a complexity that is managed through a system of routers. Another 
of its main characteristics is that it must tolerate network-wide variation, 
which means that it is also a dynamic network independent of changes in the 
intervening computers.  
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Central (top) and distributed (bottom) networks 
 
 This complexity has not grown overnight, and it is the result of decades of 
development. Most communication networks rely on centrality of 
communications in one form or another; for example, the telephone network 
is a good example of a system that relies on central connecting points from 
one end to another, known as exchanges. The reliance on centrality in these 
exchanges make them vulnerable to targeted attacks on the central hubs. 
During the Cold War, the US military was concerned about relying on such 
central communication networks, so researchers at the RAND Corporation 
came up with the idea of distributing intervening nodes in order to make the 
system less likely to suffer in case of a nuclear strike.10 The idea was to break 
down messages into packets of information, and send those packets through a 
                                                          
9. By December 2008, the CIA World Factbook calculates that there are more than 500 million 
Internet hosts, that is, computers that serve some form of content, see: https://www.cia.gov/ 
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2184rank.html.   
10. RAND, Paul Baran and the Origins of the Internet, http://www.rand.org/about/history/ 
baran.html.  
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distributed network that would forward them to a number of nodes in the 
system instead of going through a central node (Figure 4.1). By building 
deliberate redundancy in the system, the network would rely on protocols 
capable of putting together the packets at the receiving end. This basic 
architectural solution, known as packet switching, explains some of the 
resilience exhibited by the modern Internet. Paul Baran, one of RAND’s 
researchers, came up with most of the early ideas of packet switching and 
node distribution, and by 1962 there was a large military network in place 
which applied these principles.11  
 The next stages of the history of the Internet took place in academic 
institutions, although supported by military research funds.  The modern 
Internet had its first application in 1969 through the connection of four 
institutions into what was known as the Advanced Research Projects Agency 
Network (ARPANET).12 ARPANET had some interesting features that make 
it a direct predecessor of the global network; it used some of Baran’s ideas 
about packet switching and node distribution but, most importantly, the 
information was routed through the network using computers known as 
Interface Message Processors (IMPs), which are precursors of the Internet 
routers that act as the backbone of the modern Web.  
 By the early 1980s there were hundreds of computers connected in this 
manner, but there was still one element missing, and that was the existence of 
common communication protocols that would allow information to reach 
from one point to another. Between 1984 and 1988, the European 
Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) achieved a critical stage in the 
development of the Internet by implementing the Internet Suite, consisting of 
a collection of protocols such as the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
and the Internet Protocol (IP), known collectively as TCP/IP.13 TCP/IP is 
what makes Internet communication possible by ensuring the existence 
software packages that facilitate both network resilience and speed by 
allowing the existence of multiple paths from one point on the Web to the 
other.  
 The Internet Suite describes a number of applications, tools and layers that 
constitute what we know as the Internet, and it can be better understood as a 
collection of network layers that operate at all stages of transmission and 
reception. These layers are set out in official documents by the IETF14  and 
are: 
 
                                                          
11. Naughton J, A Brief History of the Future: The Origins of the Internet, London: Phoenix 
(2000), pp.102–105.  
12. Ibid, pp.213– 215.  
13. Ibid.  
14. IETF, supra note 6, pp.8–10.  
 74   Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation  
 
 
1. Application Layer: This is the top communication level made up of 
protocols for user applications such as sending mail (Send Mail 
Transfer Protocol SMTP), sending files (Hyper Text Transfer 
Protocol HTTP); it also includes protocols used for system support, 
such as that which identifies servers in the system (Domain Name 
System DNS).    
2. Transport Layer: This provides end-to-end protocols for 
communication between hosts in the system, such as the TCP and the 
User Datagram Protocol (UDP).  
3. Internet Layer: Because the Internet is a network of networks, every 
computer connected to it has to be able to find its components. The 
Internet Protocol fulfils this function, and is differentiated from the 
application and transport layers by the fact that it does not consist of 
instructions to reach a destination, or is used to make the actual 
communications, but it allows data packets to reach their destinations 
by allowing identification of participating computers based on their IP 
address. 
4. Link Layer: The link layer consists of protocols that allow connection 
of a host with gateways and routers within a network, usually a large 
area network (LAN) (e.g. Ethernet protocols). 
 
 Of these layers, perhaps the most central components are the Domain 
Name System and the Internet Protocol. These are what allow a computer to 
know where to go when the address “www.google.com” is entered into a 
browser.  Every computer connected to the Internet has a numerical Internet 
Protocol address. Web servers are no exception, these are computers which 
store and serve files, and have domain names assigned to that address. As 
well as connecting to an Internet service provider, a computer has access to a 
domain name server (DNS) which stores information of which domain name 
is assigned to each address, allowing people to type these domains in their 
browser.15 If you knew a server’s address, it would possible to connect 
directly without having to type its domain name, but this would make the 
entire system unwieldy. The Domain Name System allows ease of use 
because it assigns specific IP addresses to a domain name, and the DNS 
servers hold the information and route communication requests accordingly. 
There is a hierarchy of authoritative DNS servers, at the top sit a number of 
computers known the Root Nameservers, which are housed by 13 top level 
institutions which propagate all information of who is who online. At the 
next level sit the top level domain names (.com, .org, .gov); then top level 
                                                          
15. Mockapetris PV and Dunlop KJ, “Development of the Domain Name System”, 25:1 ACM 
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 112 (1988).  
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country domain names (.uk, .de, .fr), and then each internet service provider 
and sub-network usually has its own DNS servers.  
 With the adoption of the Internet Suite as the standard set of 
communications by the end of the 1980s, most of what we know today as the 
Internet infrastructure was already in place, and the only thing left was its 
wider public adoption. It is a common misconception that the Internet was 
invented by Tim Berners-Lee and Robert Cailliau at CERN in 1990,16 what 
they did was to make use of the existing infrastructure and protocols and 
suggested the creation of pages of hypertext stored and distributed in hosts, 
which would be viewed in client software called a browser. What Berners-
Lee and Cailliau invented was the World Wide Web, which is just one of the 
many Internet applications, although perhaps the most visible one. The 
WWW became extremely popular even in early days, yet it achieved 
mainstream recognition in 1994 with the launch of the Netscape graphical 
browser. The rest, as they say, is history.  
 
 
2. THE LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 
 
Having a better idea of the basic underlying architecture of the Internet only 
tells us part of the story. By reading the above description, it is easy to see 
why the Internet lends itself to analysis through graph and network theory. 
The Internet is undoubtedly a complex dynamic network, and while grasping 
how data gets from one computer to another is crucial to gain an 
understanding of the regulatory solutions that apply to it, network theory has 
the potential of uncovering much more about its inner workings.  
 One of the first tasks when analysing Internet architecture through 
network science is to define terms. As discussed in the last section, the 
Internet is made up of three basic elements: hosts, gateways and the 
communication protocols between these. Translating this structure into graph 
theory, Internet hosts and gateways would be nodes, and the communication 
protocols would be links. Under some circumstances, vital hosts and 
gateways can operate as hubs in the network; an importance that will be 
wholly dependent on whether it is a server, or a central interconnecting 
router. This basic set-up allows us to “map” the Internet by looking at the 
interconnection nature of hosts. By doing so, the Internet takes on an almost 
organic look (Figure 4.2).   
                                                          
16. Berners-Lee T and Cailliau R, WorldWideWeb: Proposal for a HyperText Project, internal 
CERN memorandum (1990), http://www.w3.org/Proposal.html.  
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Figure 4.2 Map of the Internet17 
 
 When we map the Internet in this way, some things become apparent. 
Firstly, it is clear that the Web’s architecture makes the centrality of some 
nodes crucial to the whole. Secondly, the Internet appears to be a scale-free 
network and not just a random network; this is because in a random network 
one would expect nodes to accumulate links and connections without 
apparent patterns, while in a scale-free network it is expected that some 
nodes will have considerably more links than others, as is the case in this 
picture.  
                                                          
17. The image is a partial map of the Internet using 2005 network data. Each line represents a 
link between two IP addresses, and the length of the line represents the network delay 
between those points. The images are from a visualisation program called the OPTE Project, 
by Barrett Lyon (released under a CC licence). For higher quality colour images, see: 
http://www.opte.org/maps/.   
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 Does research corroborate this superficial reading? As it has already been 
suggested in Chapter 1, the answer is yes. Physicist Albert-Lászlo Barabási 
has been at the forefront of research into this area, and has become one of the 
main exponents of the growing interest in network theory partly due to his 
observations about the Internet. In 1999 Barabási published an influential 
article in Nature with Réka Albert and Hawoon Jeong detailing some of their 
findings in charting the network structure of the World Wide Web.18 They 
programmed an autonomous agent that collected outgoing links from the 
indexed pages and reported the data back for analysis. They set out this robot 
expecting that the Web would display random distribution of links between 
nodes following the Erdős and Rényi random model of dynamic networks 
that had been prevalent until then. However, they found that the distribution 
of links followed a strong power law; in other words, the degree of 
distribution of incoming and outgoing links would be the same if one was to 
look at 20,000 pages, or just 20.19 According to them: 
 
The power-law tail indicates that the probability of finding documents with a large 
number of links is significant, as the network connectivity is dominated by highly 
connected web pages. Similarly, for incoming links, the probability of finding very 
popular addresses, to which a large number of other documents point, is 
nonnegligible, an indication of the flocking nature of the web. Furthermore, while 
the owner of each web page has complete freedom in choosing the number of links 
on a document and the addresses to which they point, the overall system obeys 
scaling laws characteristic only of highly interactive selforganized systems and 
critical phenomena.20 
 
 This was a remarkable finding because in one swoop it identified the 
Internet as a scale-free network, and also conveyed that it had self-organising 
characteristics. Something in the Internet’s architecture was organising web 
designers from around the world to link to more popular pages. They 
attribute the existence of power laws in the link structure of the Web to the 
“rich get richer” phenomenon, whereby older nodes in the network are more 
likely to accumulate links.21 Moreover, when one thinks of cyberspace using 
Kauffman’s fitness landscape theory, it becomes evident that popular nodes 
exhibit more fitness, and then we end up with fitness peaks where the more 
popular sites tend to accumulate more links, and the ones with less have 
limited growth. While other networks exhibit similar power laws, it seems 
                                                          
18. Albert R, Jeong H and Barabasi A-L, “Diameter of the World-Wide Web”, 401:6749 Nature 
130 (1999).  
19. Huberman BA, The Laws of the Web: Patterns in the Ecology of Information, Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press (2001), p.25. 
20. Albert et al, supra note 18.   
21. Barabási A-L, Linked: The New Science of Networks, Cambridge MA: Perseus Pub. (2002), 
pp.79–89.  
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like the “rich get richer” phenomenon is particularly suited for online growth, 
as link accumulation does not cost anything.22  
 In the same issue of Nature, another paper hinted at the answer of why the 
Web behaved in this way.23 Adamic and Huberman were interested in the 
Internet’s growth, and remarked that it appeared to follow power laws. 
Instead of looking at links, they looked at the number of pages at any given 
site. They remarked that one could accurately predict the number of pages in 
any random site without having to exhaustively use search engines in order to 
mine the information. Initially, they remarked that taking any random site 
and allowing for random accumulation of new pages did not produce a power 
law. However, when one entered into the equation a node’s age in the 
network, the result did follow a power law. While this seems to be evidence 
of the “rich get richer” model exhibited by scale-free networks, more 
tweaking is needed in order to explain the power laws exhibited by the 
Internet. In another article responding to Albert and Barabási’s “rich get 
richer” theory,24 Huberman and Adamic commented that age was not enough 
to predict incoming link fitness within the network, as evidenced by the 
meteoric rise of popular sites regardless of their age in the system, such as 
Google.25 This is a key point, and one that can be seen in Barabási’s own 
admission in later works that Google did not seem to obey the same power 
law model as other sites did.26 As Huberman and Adamic put it, “not all 
websites are created equal”. One could call this a modified “rich get richer 
sometimes” model, whereby older sites generally accumulate links faster, but 
growth rates are not uniform. This offers a more accurate explanation of the 
power law features of the Internet. Huberman postulates that “a simple 
assumption of random multiplicative growth, combined with the fact that 
sites appear at different times and/or grow at different rates, leads to an 
explanation of the power law behaviour so prevalent on the Web”.27  
 There is a wealth of research which seems to corroborate the scale-free 
characteristics of the Internet. Faloutsos, for example, took three snapshots of 
the Internet at router level, and uncovered scale-free characteristics between 
these central connecting nodes.28 Similarly, Vespigniagni and Peracci 
conducted a survey between 2000 and 2002 of round-trip time around nodes 
                                                          
22. Watts DJ, Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age, London: Vintage (2004), p.113.  
23. Huberman BA and Adamic LA, “Growth Dynamics of the World-Wide Web”, 401:6749 
Nature 131 (1999).  
24. Albert et al, supra note 18.   
25. Huberman BA and Adamic LA, “Power-Law Distribution of the World Wide Web”, 287 
Science 2115 (2000).  
26. Barabási, supra note 21, p.94.  
27. Huberman, supra note 19.  
28. Faloutsos M, Faloutsos P and Faloutsos C, “On Power-Law Relationships of the Internet 
Topology”, 29:4 ACM Computer Communications Review 251 (1999).  
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by using PING (Packet InterNet Groper) data, similar to sending sonar signal 
that measures average Internet distance by sending packets of information to 
a destination and measuring how long it takes for them to get back to the 
sending machine. They found scale-free behaviour of these pings, which they 
considered surprising as they were not expecting it at all levels, as they 
found.29  
In the spirit of fairness, there have been some criticisms from computer 
scientists against the emphasis on physics and mathematics in current 
network theory analysis of the Internet, with some authors claiming that the 
theoretical approaches should be followed by “real network” experiences.30 
Li et al are particularly scathing about the over-hype in scale-free modelling 
of Internet phenomena, and attribute potential methodological biases that 
produce scale-free results.31 Having said this, critics are in the minority, and 
the preponderance of evidence seems to lead us to a consensus which is 
overwhelmingly in favour of the scale-free Internet.  
 Another characteristic of the Internet is that is displays small world 
clustering. To refresh some of the concepts in Chapter 1, small world 
networks are those where any random vertices in the network can be reached 
through short intervening paths. If the Internet is a scale-free network where 
some nodes have disproportionate number of connectors, then one would 
assume that it does indeed display small world connectedness between links. 
Huberman32 conducted a series of experiments trying to obtain the average 
links from among 64,826 sites. According to his findings into node length 
online, the average path between two random websites is as small as 4.22 
links. The reason for the small path length is attributed to high clusters of 
individual websites that are connected to one another. While there are some 
websites with high-connectivity acting as hubs, once such vertices are 
reached then the paths are considerably reduced.33 Interestingly, not only 
does the Internet itself displays small world clustering, but the social actors in 
the network are also responding to such grouping behaviour. Internet tools 
such as social networking offer some insights into small world communities 
of users. For example, a study into “friend lists” in the social network site 
Myspace found that a user’s number of friends roughly responded to a power 
                                                          
29. Percacci R and Vespignani A, “Scale-Free Behavior of the Internet Global Performance”, 32 
European Physical Journal B 411 (2003).  
30. Willinger W, Alderson D and Doyle JC, “Mathematics and the Internet: A Source of 
Enormous Confusion and Great Potential”, 56:5 Notices of the American Mathematical 
Society 586 (2009). 
31. Li L et al, “Towards a Theory of Scale-Free Graphs: Definition, Properties, and 
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law.34 This seems to indicate that both the predetermined element of the 
network, such as the backbone architecture, and the emergent elements, such 
as users, display high levels of clustering.  
 A third important aspect of the Internet with regards to network theory is 
that it is resilient. Cohen et al conducted an analysis of the Internet’s 
connectivity trying to ascertain if the random removal of nodes from the 
network would have a knock-on effect and disrupt the network as a whole.35 
Because the Internet is a scale-free network, they discovered that although 
the interconnection between nodes on the Internet would become more 
diluted as nodes were randomly removed, the network would remain 
essentially connected even approaching 100 percent node breakdown. 
However, Callaway et al explored directed attacks to the network, and 
discovered that although the Internet is highly resilient to random attacks; it 
becomes very fragile with the targeted removal of the most connected 
nodes.36 These findings are perhaps straightforward when one understands 
the nature of scale-free networks and the role played by highly-connected 
hubs in the system, but they are vital for understanding the network’s 
architecture as a whole, and are of particular relevance for various legal 
subjects that will be explored later.  
 Another interesting characteristic of the Internet unearthed by network 
theory has been the way in which information travels within the distributed 
nodes, and particularly how viral infections spread and remain in the system. 
The Internet has been designed with high connectivity between nodes in 
mind, which might explain both the small world clustering and its resilience 
to random attacks. However, the high connectivity relies on the prevalence of 
hubs – as we have seen these are hosts that are at the higher-end of the curve 
and could be said to be the glue that connects the network together. 
Vespignani and Pastor-Santorras looked at computer virus epidemics for a 
period of 50 months from 1996 to 2000, looking at the spreading and the 
survivability of the most virulent infections.37 They found that the Internet is 
highly susceptible to fast viral spread because of the same high level of 
interconnectivity between nodes and, more importantly, infections are 
susceptible to a global pandemic if highly-connected hubs are infected. More 
worryingly perhaps, they found that despite the existence of antivirus 
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software and the deployment of updates designed to tackle specific 
outbreaks, viruses will remain in the network for an unlimited amount of 
time. While this model is particularly useful in describing the viral properties 
of computer viruses, the model can be applied to the spread of other types of 
information, such as viral marketing, or the existence of viral videos.38  
 Further research has been producing more relevant facts about the self-
organising nature of the Internet’s architecture. Broder et al conducted a 
massive crawl of 203 million nodes on the Internet.39 Besides finding that the 
distribution of nodes followed a power law, they also discovered that 
apparently there was a core of highly connected nodes within the network, 
that they named the “giant strongly connected component” (GSCC) of the 
World Wide Web, consisting of 56 million pages. These were pages that 
could be reached by one another using directed paths. However, the 
surprising part of their research was that the rest of the studied pages 
consisted of pages that could be reached from the SCC but not reach the 
SCC; then there were those that could not be reached from the SCC but could 
reach it; and finally there were pages that could do neither and were isolated 
from this core.40 What this tells us is that there is an inherent centrality of 
connected nodes that is of great consequence to the way in which information 
flows online, and also is relevant to some regulatory aspects of the Web.   
 All of this research gives us a better understanding of some of the 
governing laws underneath the structure of the Internet. It must be remarked 
that with the exception of the network’s resilience, these architectural 
characteristics are not the result of conscious planning on the part of the 
Web’s designers. It seems clear that the Internet exhibits self-organising 
features, but also that nodes and actors within the network are often presented 
with some unmovable and unchangeable inherent features within the system. 
Does the deterministic nature of cyberspace have regulatory repercussions?     
 
 
3. REGULATING STRATEGIES 
 
3.1 Technocracy 
Who controls the Internet? Just by looking at the output from network theory, 
one would be tempted to answer that nobody does. Yet the existence of an 
ordered cyberspace cannot be denied – there are common communication 
protocols, a vibrant exchange of information between millions of servers and 
clients, and there is a tangible infrastructure of satellite connections, phone 
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lines, fibre optics and local networks that allows computers from around to 
world to have access to a shared pool of data. While one can argue that the 
Internet has some self-organising characteristics, it would be disingenuous to 
claim that such order happens in entirely spontaneous fashion. There is a 
kernel of decision-making bodies that have shaped some of the architecture 
that is under study now.  
 At the heart of the Internet’s governance, that is, who makes decisions 
about its architecture, we find a rather haphazard assembly of standard-
setting organisations. The IETF is one such body, whose stated purpose is “to 
make the Internet work better”.41 Anyone can join the IETF, yet it operates 
through a complex network of workshops, thematic and regional working 
groups. Most of the executive technical work is performed by tighter and 
more exclusive groups of experts, amongst these are the Internet Engineering 
Steering Group (IESG),42 the Internet Architecture Board (IAB),43 the 
Internet Society (ISOC)44 and the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA).45 These groups have the collective responsibility of setting out new 
standards, tweaking and modifying existing ones, and proposing changes to 
the overall Internet architecture.  
 The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) is another standard-setting 
organisation, but it deals specifically with the WWW. The W3C is a much 
more formal institution, it is in charge of the Web’s standards, but it also 
issues technical guidelines for the management of the network. However, the 
W3C is not a legislative institution and it cannot compel members or states to 
adopt its recommendations. The W3C is a consortium of organisations, 
made-up mainly by multinational technology and telecoms corporations such 
as British Telecomm, AT&T, Adobe Systems, Microsoft and Nokia. It also 
has membership from governments and academia.46 
 The third institution with a large say over the Internet’s architecture is the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which 
controls the DNS system.47 ICANN controls and co-ordinates the domain 
name system by holding top-level control of the root nameserver system. 
ICANN is also responsible for accrediting the domain name registrars, which 
are the ones that operate each country’s top level domain name system. 
ICANN is unique amongst the Web’s governing institutions because it is 
constituted as a non-profit public-benefit corporation based in California, and 
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was initially established by the US Department of Commerce. This state of 
affairs has led to some protests from other countries about what they see as 
excessive control of one of the central Internet governing bodies by one 
country, and has led to an attempt to overhaul the system through the UN 
World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS).48 The summit failed to 
wrestle control from ICANN, but managed to set up yet another institution, 
the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), which handles mostly capacity-
building and digital divide issues in developing countries. 
 What seems to come out from the regulatory picture at the governance 
level is that the Internet is not organised in a centralised manner, and that its 
operation is determined by a complex regulatory apparatus – one could even 
call it a technocracy. Bowrey adequately comments that this structure of 
Internet governance seems more concerned with engineering and less with 
concepts such as accountability and responsibility.49 Zittrain also remarks on 
the technocratic nature of the Internet’s architecture as a result of financial 
constraints, but also as a conscious design effort built in the system to reflect 
the sensibilities of the system’s creators.50 Perhaps this is not such a bad thing 
if we believe the Internet to be simply a connection of nodes in a network, 
and perhaps the resulting governance layer that controls much of the 
network’s architecture is simply trying to provide technical solutions to 
technical problems.  
 Nonetheless, the emerging picture of technocratic regulation of the 
Internet is one that is consistent with network theory. The basic architecture 
is set by the governance groups, but these have no real control about the 
actual growth of the network, or how it operates at a basic level. So despite 
the existence of some level of control, we are then left with a self-organising 
network with emergent characteristics, where vertices and edges cluster 
together following power laws and small world topologies. Complexity 
reigns supreme, but is cyberspace really an uncontrolled technical anarchy? 
       
3.2 Cyber-libertarians 
Given its technocratic origins, some of the earliest theories on Internet 
regulation advocated low intervention by external regulators. Particularly in 
the early 1990s, regulators were slow to respond to the challenges, and were 
very much taken aback by the potential of the new technology and the 
appearance of a global communications network that was completely 
unregulated and, most importantly, seemed to be immune from regulation. In 
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an often cited work on the topic, lyricist John Perry Barlow wrote his famous 
(or perhaps infamous) Declaration of Independence of Cyberspace, in which 
he set out to attack government intervention in cyberspace, favouring a quasi-
libertarian self-regulated approach. He wrote: 
 
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed like a 
standing wave in the web of our communications. Ours is a world that is both 
everywhere and nowhere, but it is not where bodies live. [...] Our identities have 
no bodies, so, unlike you, we cannot obtain order by physical coercion. We believe 
that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the commonweal, our governance 
will emerge.51 
 
 While it was not his intention, Barlow may have been talking about self-
organisation, albeit a rather naïve version of it. He believed that Internet 
communities would be able to exercise self-regulatory control because 
governments would not be able to intervene. How wrong he was.  
 Barlow was eventually joined by other commentators and scholars who 
believed that it would be difficult to subject the Web to traditional regulatory 
methods. Other authors proposed similar theories which tried to explain that 
the Internet could not be controlled in any effective manner, and so proposed 
several models of self-regulation that would be able to organise the network 
in some coherent fashion.52 Of note amongst these theories is Post and 
Johnson’s Net Federalism.53 In it, they argue that cyberspace is a separate 
entity with clear borders from the physical world, and consequently it should 
be treated as an independent regulatory sphere for all legal purposes. Because 
the Internet would still require some form of regulation, they argued that the 
Web should be able to assemble its own legal institutions in a manner similar 
to the creation of federal states brought together under a unifying ideal. These 
self-regulated federal states would generate their own sets of rules consistent 
with practice in that part of cyberspace. The most remarkable thing about this 
theory is that it is informed greatly by the author’s work on complexity 
theory showcased in Chapter 2. Particularly, they see the emergence of self-
regulatory spheres as a prime example of fitness landscapes, where norms 
emerge in self-organising patches of order. They comment that: 
 
We have suggested elsewhere that the Internet calls for a higher degree of 
deference to rulemaking within a-geographical, decentralized, voluntary 
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associations, and we believe that [chaos theory] provides normative underpinnings 
for this view. Allowing individuals to define the boundaries of their own, a-
geographical patches by voluntary movement into, and out of, decision-making 
bodies that have little, or even no, tie to particular physical location – what we 
might call “self governance” – may allow both more rapid, and more “congruent,” 
responses to shifts in spillover patterns.54 
 
While this is a persuasive use of complexity theory to try to reach a 
comprehensive solution to the perceived problems of Internet regulation, Post 
and Johnson completely underestimated the regulatory push from 
governments and international organisations that would take place just after 
they had written their ideas.55 Even back in the late 1990s, several authors 
criticised the cyber-libertarian ideas of unregulated spaces. Boyle56 in 
particular seems to have understood that the premise behind the theories of 
the impossibility of exercising any credible governance over cyberspace were 
not only wrong-headed, but rested on completely untested hypotheses. In his 
view, cyber-libertarianism was blind to the many avenues of control available 
to public regulators.  
 Nonetheless, not all cyber-libertarian ideas were proved wrong. In 1993, 
John Gilmore, cyber-activist, programmer and one of the founders of the 
Electronic Frontiers Foundation (EFF), was quoted in Time Magazine as 
saying that “The Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it”.57 
This seemingly innocuous quote has probably been one of the most 
remarkable aspects of online information, and it still holds true to this day as 
evidenced by the existence of the so-called Streisand Effect. In 2003, actress 
Barbara Streisand sued a photographer to try to remove aerial pictures of her 
home, which resulted in more people visiting the offending site and copying 
and republishing the picture than would be normally expected had she not 
initiated legal action.58 The effect has been proved time and time again. For 
example, in December 2008 the Internet Watch Foundation (IWF)59 
blacklisted a Wikipedia article featuring the cover art for the Scorpions 1976 
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album Virgin Killer because it was flagged as child pornography. The result 
was that customers of several Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the UK 
could not properly access the online encyclopaedia. The censorship attempt 
backfired spectacularly; the Virgin Killer page averaged 500 visits during the 
months previous to the event, but at the peak of the scandal, the page had 
received 126,000 views in a single day.60  
 The reason why this piece of cyber-libertarian lore is relevant to 
complexity theory is that it is a clear example of the resilience of scale-free 
networks. Isolated attempts to bring down a node are likely to fail. However, 
there is a more crucial link to complexity, as any given node on the Internet 
has N number of incoming connections, so it is likely that the information 
contained in that node will have been replicated and spread along the 
network quickly. Moreover, concerted efforts to shut down one node may 
prompt it to acquire more links, and so the chances that the information 
contained in the node will increase exponentially as a function of the 
incoming links. There is research that supports this assumption. For example, 
Wu et al have been looking at how information spreads in scale-free 
networks, particularly in closed circles of acquaintances, and have discovered 
that there are certain thresholds after which a given link can be said to have 
gone viral and spread rapidly amongst closed groups.61 In the case of filtered 
information, any incoming link will increase the chances of that information 
being spread through the network.  
 It would then be possible to postulate a model for the Streisand Effect that 
goes something like this: any average page has an average number of 
incoming links; a specific attack on that node will prompt others to pay 
attention, increasing as a result the number of incoming links; at some point 
the number of incoming connections enters a phase transition, and the 
replication will increase following a power law.  
 
3.3 Architecture and Code 
Needless to say, other than the example of the Streisand Effect, cyber-
libertarianism seems destined to languish as an interesting footnote in the 
history of Internet regulation. By the turn of the century, new regulatory 
explanations had come up to replace the libertarian approach. At the forefront 
of many of these studies has been Lawrence Lessig. In his influential book 
Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace62 he postulates that there are four main 
types of regulation in an online world: markets, norms, law and architecture 
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(Figure 43).63 Most theories of regulation up until then accounted for the first 
three. Lessig’s breakthrough came in the way in which he rightly identified 
the prevalence of architectural regulation in technological settings. Lessig 
argued that the Internet itself is highly dependent on the technological 
architecture that sustains it, the “code” in which it is written, the connectivity 
layers between domains, the protocols used in order to distribute information 
from one computer to another, the functional layers of the said protocols, the 
domain name server system that indicates one computer’s location in the 
system, and so on.64 Whether the Internet can be subject to regulatory control 
will depend entirely on its underlying architecture. For example, some of the 
constituent code of the Internet is open, that is, it can be inspected, copied 
and modified by all sorts of people. This code could not be subject to 
government regulation. However, the protocols and communication tools that 
make up the online world are more critical than the underlying code because 
they are needed for connectivity to take place. So whoever controls the 
underlying “pipeworks”, and the protocols, controls the Internet. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Lessig’s regulatory matrix65 
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 Although he does not go into self-organisation and complexity as such, 
Lessig’s architectural regulation suggests the existence of some form of self-
ordering mechanism. He identifies that there is an invisible hand of 
cyberspace that exerts an ordering force into the architecture of the Internet: 
 
Control. Not necessarily control by government, and not necessarily control to 
some evil, fascist end. But the argument of this book is that the invisible hand of 
cyberspace is building an architecture that is quite the opposite of its architecture 
at its birth. This invisible hand, pushed by government and by commerce, is 
constructing an architecture that will perfect control and make highly efficient 
regulation possible.66 
 
 Nonetheless, Lessig’s version of the invisible hand of cyberspace is 
limited, as he believes that it is shaped by code. So, programmers, regulators 
and policymakers can make conscious decisions that shape what the 
underlying architecture will look like, hence exercising real control over the 
shape of the Web.67 This version of self-organisation is as a result limited by 
conscious decisions, and while cyberspace may reach its own efficient 
regulation, it can be subject to change.  
 It is possible to think of a modified version of Lessig’s Code that responds 
better to what we are beginning to understand about the Internet. In this 
model, programmers, regulators and policymakers do make conscious 
decisions that shape what the underlying architecture of the Internet, but 
these decisions are in turn limited by the underlying laws of the Web 
described by authors like Barabási and Huberman. In other words, 
programmers set the rules, but the web self-organises around these rules.  
 The basic structure of the Internet expressed in the Internet Suite gives us 
a clear case of a conscious architectural decision. However, the resulting 
characteristics of the Internet, such as its resilience, the existence of small 
world pathways, and the almost universal presence of power laws at all levels 
of the network are not a result of conscious decisions. They happen as a 
result of the architecture, but their existence does not stem from the will of its 
designers. The network is created, but it responds to network theory because 
of deterministic reasons.  
 
3.4 Regulating the gateways 
While Lessig’s Code is a prime example of what could be considered a 
golden age in the study of the regulation of the Internet,68 as the technology 
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matured, so did regulatory solutions. The rise of Napster in 1999, and the 
later emergence of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks,69 served as clear 
reminders of the difficulties of enforcing the law in the digital domain. The 
almost interminable source of illicit materials online, coupled with the 
widespread availability of infringing content, gave the public the impression 
that as far as the Internet was concerned, everything went. Nonetheless, 
despite the glaring failure in shutting down file-sharing networks, the early 
years of the 21st century witnessed the deployment of relatively successful 
regulatory approaches by many national governments.  
 The Internet regulatory landscape up until around 2000 was a mixture of 
cyber-libertarianism, half-hearted legislative solutions and code. The Internet 
was a global, distributed and borderless network because it had been 
designed like that. It also displayed scale-free resilient characteristics because 
its origins as a military network favoured the rerouting of damage to one 
node by distributing communication throughout its backbone. Castells 
describes this as “architecture of openness”.70 Vint Cerf, one of the fathers of 
the modern Web, went as far as stating that the Internet traffic was “totally 
unbound with respect to geography”.71 However, as Goldsmith and Wu 
rightly point out, this initial architecture was not entirely set in stone, and 
unsurprisingly, it soon became clear that national governments were 
attempting to draw borders in cyberspace.72 The most successful attempt to 
do just that is the segregation of the Internet into national intranets. While the 
Internet was supposed to be globally distributed, several countries started 
redesigning the entry points into their national networks in order to impose 
screening mechanisms that would allow them to filter out undesired content 
if necessary.  
 This state of affairs is a logical result of the manner in which the Internet 
grew. While the global architecture of the Internet as a distributed network 
still holds true because of the existence of routers and distributed protocols, 
the actual physical Internet is often centralised. In the early days of the 
Internet, a lot of information was spread through the telephone network, 
which ensured its high distribution ratio; albeit it was rather expensive.73 
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Later, a high-speed backbone had to be built to accommodate larger amounts 
of information being spread throughout the system, as the network relied on 
cables and satellite in order to operate, and later on optical cables.74 The end 
result was a more centralised Internet than was originally envisaged (Figure 
4.4), as the router distribution worked within connected nodes. This can be 
explained best using Britain as an example: the country has a large number of 
roads, but not being connected to continental Europe, it relies on ports and 
airports as communication hubs. The modern Internet looks something like 
that, with physical connections akin to ports where most of the information 
comes through, and then it is distributed using routers and hosts in the 
manner in which it was intended. What many countries have been doing is to 
reduce the number of physical entry points to their countries, sort of creating 
chokepoints on the Internet. If a government controls these gateways, then it 
will be easier to exercise control over the Internet in that particular country as 
a whole.  
 
 
  
Figure 4.4 Map of the global Internet backbone75 
 
 The best example of this is the so-called Great Firewall of China, known 
in China as the Golden Shield Project. The Great Firewall is a multi-layered 
technological solution that takes advantage of the fact that the Chinese 
government controls the few Internet gateways into the larger Chinese 
Internet. This allows them to impose effective filtering restrictions to 
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incoming Internet traffic by various means. The most crucial is the filtering 
of IP addresses originating from blacklisted services, which range from 
Blogger to Sex.com.76 While this is in no way a perfect system, it does allow 
the Chinese government a level of influence that was thought would not be 
possible with the distributed architecture. The Great Firewall works by 
deploying hardware routers at each of the entry points into the country. These 
routers are given lists of banned IP addresses, so when an Internet host within 
China makes a request to access a banned site, the router does not forward 
the request to the target host, so the site appears not to exist, and returns a 
network error message to the client.77   
 It has become clear then that the most effective regulatory solution to 
online content is to exercise control at the access points. This regulation 
model has been replicated in many other countries,78 proving that the Internet 
is decreasingly distributed, and looks more like self enclosed city states with 
some intervening connecting ports.      
 It must be pointed out that the regulation at the gateway level has a lot of 
relevance for network and complexity theories. The first interesting effect is 
that the growing balkanisation of the Web has resulted in a networked 
federation reminiscent of Post and Johnson’s Net Federalism, but this is not a 
self-regulated utopia as envisaged by them, but a tightly controlled collection 
of regulatory patches that have achieved stable fitness landscapes.  Secondly, 
these national webs tend to exhibit large clustering characteristics which 
make them more likely to exhibit small world topologies. Research seems to 
validate this idea; Zhou, Zhang and Zhang conducted a study into the 
Chinese Internet at the AS level, and discovered that the internal topology of 
the sub-network mirrored that of the wider Internet, which hints at the 
presence of a fractal or self-similar Internet where the component sub-
networks have the same characteristics as the whole.79 In fact, the study also 
found “rich get richer” characteristics, as well as small-world path lengths, 
which seem to further the idea that these laws of the Internet are universal.    
 It might be easy to miss the monumental importance of this finding. Here 
we have evidence that points towards the existence of universal rules that 
apply to the network at all levels, one of the very definitions of scale-free 
topologies. Moreover, these similarities are replicated even behind national 
firewalls. It is possible that the distributed nature of the Internet protocols 
favours the prevalence of scale-free characteristics at all levels. The 
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relevance for regulation theories is that whenever a government tries to cut-
off and/or filter the network, what it is doing is simply creating a small 
version of the wider network with the very same characteristics of the larger 
one. The Internet is indeed fractal, a fact that seems to be ignored by 
regulators all over the world.   
 
3.5 Complex regulatory networks 
It would seem that of the Internet regulatory strategies that have been 
proposed in recent years, it is the architectural solutions such as coding 
regulation at the gateways that have gained prevalence in recent years. But 
what about the regulatory bodies themselves? Is it possible that they 
constitute a complex system that could be analysed through network theory?  
 Andrew Murray has given some valuable input to the literature dealing 
with cyberspace governance by suggesting that regulation theories should 
concern themselves with the actors in the regulatory landscape. One of his 
main ideas is to draw a matrix of regulatory relationships which paint a 
picture of complex regulatory networks. Murray proposes that we look at 
how regulatory systems evolve due to internal and external forces, suggesting 
that such evolution represents a complex system.80 Starting from Lessig’s dot 
at the centre of regulation, Murray turns it around and paints the dots as the 
regulators, the actors in the system. He then draws association lines between 
each of the actors in order to illustrate the complex relationships that shape 
specific regulatory landscapes. Murray comments: 
 
Thus where regulators vie for regulatory acceptance they do not act in a regulatory 
vaccum, any action by any one member of the regulatory matrix (either as 
regulator or regulatee) has an effect on the actions of the others. This is because all 
regulators and regulates form part of an environmental system and a change in any 
one aspect of this environment affects all who participate in that environment […] 
At each point in the regulatory matrix, a regulatory intervention may be made, but 
the complexity of the matrix means that it is impossible to predict the response of 
any other point in the matrix.81 
 
Using ICANN as an example (Figure 4.5), A would be the US Department of 
Commerce, which unilaterally created ICANN. The World Intellectual 
Property Organisation (WIPO) is B, domain name owners are C, the 
European Union is D, and WSIS is E. All of the actors interact with one 
another trying to exercise influence over the regulatory matrix through 
various actions. The matrix becomes exponentially more complex as new 
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actors and new interactions are added, which paints an accurate picture of 
just how complex the regulatory system has become.82   
 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Murray’s ICANN regulatory matrix83 
 
 This regulatory complexity does not mean that regulation is not possible, 
but that it features levels of interaction that are not explained by other 
models, such as the solitary dot in Lessig’s Code. This interaction creates a 
dot community of regulators and subjects, where the actors can be one or the 
other interchangeably.  
 Something that is quite striking in Murray’s regulatory matrix is that it is 
reminiscent of similar dynamic systems that are studied both by complex and 
network theory. For example, Erdős and Rényi were faced with similar 
complex dynamic situations when looking at information paths, and 
Solomonoff and Rapoport also encountered complex systems in biological 
networks.84 More importantly, complex regulatory networks are reminiscent 
of the problems encountered by Kauffman when looking into genetic 
networks.85 In all of these situations, the solution to unravel the complexity 
arising from dynamic interactions is to make assumptions as to the number of 
connections that any given node has, as well as the level of influence exerted 
                                                          
82. Murray AD, The Regulation of Cyberspace: Control in the Online Environment, Milton 
Park, Abingdon UK; New York, NY: Routledge-Cavendish (2007), pp.23–237.  
83. Ibid, p.236 (reproduced with permission from the author).  
84. See Chapter 2.1.  
85. See Chapter 2.4. 
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by such networks. Kauffman’s NK model could be used to try to describe the 
level of complexity in any given regulatory system, where N is the number of 
actors, and K the measure of the complexity in the system. Because we do 
not know exactly what the relationship paths within the regulatory network 
are, it would be feasible to assign values to each of the nodes, hence 
describing the overall complexity of the system in numeric form.   
 There is another model dealing precisely with influence in complex 
systems, that of Sola-Pool and Kochen.86 They were trying to arrive at 
estimates of how many people are influenced by one another, and provided 
several computational solutions that eventually ended in high levels of 
clustering within social networks. The relevance to regulatory networks can 
be found in their conclusions, which describe similar network matrices than 
those theorised by Murray. For example, in a random group of 1000 people, 
they started with a small cluster of friends, A, B, C and D. Starting only with 
B, they assigned random links by assuming that B met with 100 number of 
people in f days, but including A. They repeated the operation with a number 
of people chosen from the wider pool of 1000, and discovered that there were 
few people with only one acquaintance in common with A, and that there 
were even fewer with many acquaintances in common with A. This is 
expected from later research into small worlds, but the relevance for 
regulatory networks is that while it is not possible to chart precisely how 
many contacts a regulatory entity has, it would be possible to try to determine 
the average number of interrelations within the network. By assigning 
random numbers of connections between the actors in the regulatory matrix, 
it would be possible to untangle its complexity by explaining that the actors 
will probably have fewer connections in the overall network.  
 
 
4. TOWARDS A REGULATION THEORY OF THE SELF-ORGANISING 
INTERNET 
 
One of the main hypothesis presented in this work is that the Internet is a 
complex network that displays self-organising characteristics. This seems to 
be an incontrovertible fact if one reads all of the evidence coming out of the 
existing research highlighted above, and while some of the details can be 
argued over, readers will have to forgive this categorical statement. Nobody 
set out to organise the Internet in a manner that would display small world 
pathways between the billions of pages and links that make up the Web; no 
single organisation designed the Web in a way that it would show scale-free 
characteristics. While it has been remarked that resilience was built into the 
                                                          
86. Sola-Pool I and Kochen M, “Contacts and Influence”, 1 Social Networks 5 (1978).  
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system in order to withstand attacks, this seems to be the only truly conscious 
feature of the Internet; all of its other architectural traits have been shaped by 
the invisible hand of cyberspace, as Lessig calls it. For that reason, the 
theories of regulation that have been described have to be seen in the light of 
this self-organising reality. With that in mind, one could pose a theory of 
Internet regulation, the self-organising Internet. This is hinted at by other 
theorists – Post and Johnson87 are probably some of the theorists that seem 
closer to it, but their version requires some tweaking.  
 In order to refresh some of the concepts of self-organisation studied in 
Chapters 2 and 3 relevant to the issue of Internet regulation, it should be 
pointed out that complex adaptive systems tend to become stable due to 
internal features within the system that allow organisation to occur. Self-
organisation arises as a stabilising force that turns chaos into order because 
complex systems favour stability. The Internet becomes organised because of 
the interaction of its parts favours clustering and stability in order to manage 
complexity. But what are the parts of this global telecommunications 
network? On the one hand, we have the technical components: the nodes, 
hubs and links made up of computers, servers, protocols, links and 
connections. On the other hand, we have the social part of the network: the 
actors that design pages, the decision-makers and the users. All of these come 
together into a self-organising force with human and machine elements that 
resembles a cyborg. In complex adaptive system terms, the technical network 
is the predetermined system of steady connections, while the social element 
is the emergent system consisting of interchanging and dynamic connections.  
 The social (emergent) element exhibits self-organising attributes because 
there is no centralised body that directs the eventual stability of the system. 
Granic and Lamey explain the human element of this self-organising force 
thus: 
 
Who runs the Net? Who or what organizational body is responsible for 
maintaining its various nodes and improving its efficiency? The answer to these 
questions points to one of the most interesting aspects of self-organization: 
complexity emerges spontaneously from the interactions of the simpler 
components of a system. There is no ‘central control station’. The Internet is a 
vast, coherent system not as a result of some brilliant inventor’s design or some 
governing body’s regulations, but because of the critical mass of millions of users 
who electronically interact daily, setting the conditions for the spontaneous 
creation of a higher-order complexity. This is the same decentralized, emergent 
order exhibited by flocks of birds, colonies of ants and angry mobs.88 
 
                                                          
87. Post and Johnson, supra note 53.  
88. Granic I and Lamey V, “The Self-Organization of the Internet and Changing Modes of 
Thought”, 18:1 New Ideas in Psychology 93 (2000), p.98.  
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 On the other hand, we have the technical (predetermined) element of the 
self-organising picture. In the words of Andersen, the Internet is a “technical 
autopoietic system”89 where the computerised elements consisting of links, 
servers, computers and networks replicate and organise themselves despite 
human interaction. It is, however, essential to emphasise that while this is a 
technical complex system there are imperative human elements, what Fuchs 
calls a socio-technical system where the technical nature simply enables the 
self-organising nature of human interaction.90  
 Whatever its nature, simply describing the Internet as a self-organising 
systems is of little use to theories of regulation unless we can understand 
better how this self-organisation takes place, and how it is relevant to the 
question of how to regulate the Internet. Otherwise, we are simply stating the 
obvious without adding any analytical insights into how we regulate complex 
systems.  
 This is a trickier challenge than might appear at first glance. It is tempting 
to remain descriptive when it comes to the Internet, and to assume that if it 
features self-organising characteristics, then there is little else we can do to 
change it. Whatever decisions are made about online networked 
environments, the hidden organising elements within the system will work 
against all of our efforts to regulate. Just relax, sit back and watch the 
Internet do its thing.  
 While tempting, such an approach seems both unimaginative and 
cowardly, but may prove to be realistic. When talking about autopoiesis in 
regulation and governance structures, Luhmann, for example, did not believe 
that it is possible to exercise governance in autopoietic systems. He saw such 
attempts as futile exercises because an autopoietic system organises itself in 
order to reduce internal complexity, and thus regulatory efforts are doomed 
to fail.91 However, it is also possible to take another view, one that believes 
that regulation is possible even in such systems and that self-organisation is 
simply an obstacle to work around; thus regulation can be reactive or 
proactive to the autopoietic organising force.92  
 These are what I call the deterministic and the optimistic views of self-
organisation in regulation theories. Regardless of which one of these two 
views one favours, the first step has to be taken in recognising the self-
organising nature of cyberspace, and to identify the areas that are more likely 
to display some of the characteristics of complex adaptive systems. 
                                                          
89. Andersen PB, “WWW as a Self-organizing System”, 5:2 Cybernetics & Human Knowing 5 
(1998), p.38.  
90. Fuchs C, “The Internet as a Self-Organizing Socio-Technological System”, 11:3 Cybernetics 
& Human Knowing 57 (2005), p.58.  
91. Luhmann N, Social Systems, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press (1995), p.67. 
92. Engel C, Governing the Egalitarians from Without: The Case of the Internet, Max Planck 
Preprint Paper 2003/10 (2003), p.40, http://ssrn.com/abstract=462485. 
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Therefore, the very act of describing the Internet as a self-organising system 
is in itself a principal regulatory insight. I can only hope that this step has 
been fulfilled already. So, what next?  
 Here it all depends on whether one is a determinist or an optimist. If one is 
a determinist, then there is not much more that a theory of the self-organising 
Internet can do other than to describe how the Internet operates. If one is an 
optimist, then the task is more difficult. The first step is to answer some 
simple questions about why and how we regulate cyberspace. Do we want 
complete control over the Internet? Do we want architectural control over the 
technologies and standards that make it? Or do we want to inform 
policymakers so that they can better deploy their regulatory tools? It will be 
assumed that complete control is out of the question. This is another 
categorical statement, but it is hoped that the evidence already presented, and 
that which will be explored in further chapters will serve to make this point 
stand on its own merits.  
 The answer of what constitutes a useful theory of regulation then may rest 
on informing programmers and policymakers in better ways so that they can 
deploy better architectural solutions, an informed code if one may. This 
information will allow for better legislation and more realistic policies, and 
will allow better understanding of regulatory decisions that take into account 
the complex and adaptive nature of the Internet.  
 Take digital copyright for example. Copyright in the online environments 
has become one of the hottest topics surrounding internet regulation, and 
governments have been making serious attempts to curb piracy by deploying 
legislation. Content owners have been similarly interested in developing 
technical solutions in the shape of technological protection measures that 
restrict copying of digital works.93 By knowing how copyright networks 
operate, content owners and legislators can develop better solutions, taking 
the view of course that regulation is possible. Similar solutions can be 
deployed in other areas subject to Internet regulation, such as privacy in 
social networks, the growth of user-generated content, network neutrality and 
cybercrime, just to name a few. The main task ahead is to take an optimistic 
approach and state that it is possible to regulate online environments despite 
self-organisation. The following chapters will attempt to do just that.  
 Before moving to other topics, it is important to make a quick distinction 
about what we are talking about with regards to online regulatory structures. 
The topic of self-organisation has not bypassed theorists of regulation. As 
stated above, Lessig, Post and Johnson, and Murray heavily hint at self-
                                                          
93. Westkamp G, “Digital Rights Management, Internet Governance and the Autopoiesis of 
Modern Copyright Law”, 7:4 Contemporary Issues in Law 317 (2005).  
 98   Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation  
 
 
organising features of online environments. Similarly, Benkler,94 with his 
concept of peer-production, and Zittrain,95 with his concept of generativity, 
have been providing impressive theoretical frameworks that deal with the 
very same self-organising phenomena that have been suggested in this 
chapter. While some of their ideas will be dealt with in more detail later, it is 
important to point out that some of the approaches to self-organisation have 
been dealing mostly with the description of features inherent to Internet 
content. While their importance will become relevant later, what we are 
trying to do here is to frame the regulatory aspects of the Internet from a 
network theory standpoint. 
 
                                                          
94. Benkler Y, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom, New Haven, CT ; London: Yale University Press (2006), p.256. 
95. Zittrain, supra note 50, p.7.  
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5. Copyright Networks 
 
 
You can’t shut us down! The Internet is about the free exchange and sale of other 
people’s ideas! 
Futurama1  
 
Pirates have become an unavoidable feature of popular culture. Just how cut-
throat mercenaries, thieves and scoundrels were turned into romantic 
swashbuckling heroes is hard to determine, but from Long John Silver to 
Errol Flynn and Johnny Depp, the figure of the hardened-yet-lovable rascal is 
a powerful archetype in our collective minds. How precisely piracy was 
turned into an equivalent term to describe copyright infringement is much 
easier to follow. The use of the word dates back to almost 300 years, when 
French authors began using the term to describe those pillaging their work.2 
The term was already in widespread use when Mark Twain used it to fight 
those who were copying his works, and were engaged in what he described 
“pure robbery”.3  
 Whichever its origin, copyright piracy has been at the forefront of 
copyright owner’s concerns for centuries; a worry that has spawned the wide-
ranging system of copyright enforcement that we know today. However, 
copyright has not been faring well on the Internet. As Nicolas Negroponte 
stated:  
 
In a digital world, the bits are endlessly copyable, infinitely malleable, and they 
never go out of print. Millions of people can simultaneously read any digital 
document - and they can also steal it.4 
  
The potential and reality for widespread copyright infringement online has 
been named as a cause for the alleged drop in sales experienced in some 
                                                          
1. I Dated a Robot (2001).  
2. Febvre L and Martin H-J, The Coming of the Book: The Impact of Printing, 1450–1800, 2nd 
Edition, London: Verso Classics (1997), p.293.  
3. “TWAIN’S PLAN TO BEAT THE COPYRIGHT LAW; Will Run Autobiography in New 
Editions of His Old Works TO PUT PIRATES TO ROUT His Task as a Lobbyist Finished, 
So He Will Return to New York To-day”, New York Times, (12 December, 1906), 
http://bit.ly/9bYh1G.  
4. Negroponte N, “A Bill of Writes”, Wired 3.05 (May 1995), http://web.media.mit.edu/ 
~nicholas/Wired/WIRED3-05.html.  
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content industries in recent years, particularly as claimed by the music 
industry.5 It is in response to this perceived threat that a wide-ranging 
legislative effort has been deployed in order to curb piracy.6 These have been 
comprehensive attempts at trying to regulate copyright in digital 
environments, and the reasoning behind such legislative solutions has been 
rarely challenged in policy-making circles. But despite these efforts, piracy is 
not only rife,7 but it appears to be immune to legal challenges.  
 The pervasiveness of online file-sharing can certainly be attributed to the 
fact that it is difficult to compete against free products, and many Internet 
users will prefer to obtain content by downloading from peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networks instead of purchasing works protected by copyright. But this alone 
cannot explain the astounding resilience of file-sharing networks. Over and 
over again these services are defeated in court,8 but as soon as one service 
falls another one is waiting to pick up its users. 
 Perhaps the explanation for this seemingly regulatory failure rests on some 
of the issues explored in the last chapter. As the Internet is a complex 
network, would it be possible that central elements in the system, such as 
content, copyright regulation and file-sharing networks, are actually 
responding to the self-organising nature of scale-free networks? Is the 
resilience displayed by P2P networks explained by network theory? Is it 
possible that business models in the content industries are actually designed 
with a different type of network in mind?  
 This chapter will try to answer these questions in two ways. Firstly, it will 
look at the copyright industries from a network theory perspective. Then, it 
will look at the P2P networks in the same light. It is hoped that by looking at 
the shape of the networks, some answers will begin to emerge. Particularly, 
the puzzling question of why regulators have been so unsuccessful in 
attempting to control online piracy may have an answer in network theory. 
This serves as the first in-depth case study that tries to demonstrate the 
importance of network theory for Internet regulation.  
 
 
                                                          
5. British Phonographic Industry, Impact of Illegal Downloading on Music Purchasing, BPI 
Paper, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/The-Impact-of-Illegal-Downloading.pdf.  
6. Just using treaties and laws affecting the United Kingdom, in the last years there has been 
the WIPO Copyright Treaties 1996; the Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC; The 
Copyright and Related Rights Regulations 2003 SI No. 2498 and the Digital Economy Act 
2010.  
7. Using industry figures again, the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry 
(IFPI) claims that 21 percent of people living in the top European markets (21 percent) “are 
engaged in frequent unauthorised music-sharing”. See: IFPI, IFPI Digital Music Report, 
(2010), p.19, http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/DMR2010.pdf.  
8. Most prominently in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764. 
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1. PARETO AND THE SUPER-STAR EFFECT 
 
Intellectual property law in general, and copyright law in particular, have 
been drafted, promoted and perpetuated with the idea of the creator as a 
struggling individual who requires protection in order to make a living.9 It is 
no coincidence that authors have been at the forefront of copyright policy and 
reform since its inception; Jonathan Swift10 and Mark Twain11 are just two 
names that prove this trend. In modern times, whenever there is talk of 
copyright reform, musicians are brought out to make impassioned arguments 
about their dwindling coffers in order to try to garner public support for more 
protection.12  
 Together with the narrative of the lone author, international copyright law 
has been mostly influenced by the interests of what can be known as the large 
copyright industries, namely publishing, music recording, film-making, and 
recently the software and games industry.13 To a lesser extent, more 
individual creative pursuits have had less representation, but still command 
some influence – these are artistic fields such as photography, art, sculpture, 
drama, etc. This has created an interesting chemistry in which the larger, 
more visible collective industries manage to maintain the status quo by 
relying on the “lone author” narrative, while the truly individual creative 
industries are under-represented.  
 Because the large copyright industries are profitable economic 
endeavours, it has always been easy to sell copyright reform by putting 
forward the argument that changing the law will have positive economic 
effects downstream.  However, something that is less explored is that the 
economics of the copyright industry have until recently relied on income 
distributions that are better understood under the terms of power laws. Here 
is where Pareto comes in.  
 To refresh some of the concepts explained in Chapter 2, Pareto 
distributions,14 named after economist Vilfredo Pareto, are used to describe 
                                                          
9. The case for this idyllic idea of copyright rhetoric is masterfully made here: Coombe RJ, 
The Cultural Life of Intellectual Properties: Authorship, Appropriation, and the Law, 
Durham: Duke University Press (1998); and Woodmansee M and Jaszi P, The Construction 
of Authorship: Textual Appropriation in Law and Literature, Durham; London: Duke 
University Press (1994).  
10. Deazley R, On the Origin of the Right to Copy: Charting the Movement of Copyright Law in 
Eighteenth-Century Britain (1695–1775), Oxford: Hart (2004), p.128.  
11. Litman J, Digital Copyright: Protecting Intellectual Property on the Internet, Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books (2001), pp.4–15. 
12. For an unintentionally comical piece that demonstrates this trend, see: Hucknall M, 
“Fundamental socialism”, The Guardian (23, November 2006), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
commentisfree/2006/nov/23/comment.music.  
13. Boyle J, “The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain”, 
66:1 Law and Contemporary Problems 42 (2003).  
14. Reed WJ, “The Pareto, Zipf and Other Power Laws”, 74:1 Economics Letters 15 (2001).  
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large inequalities in data, where most of the distribution is concentrated in a 
relatively small portion of overall instances. This is popularly known as the 
80/20 rule, following the perception that 80 percent of the work is performed 
by 20 percent of the employees; or that 80 percent of the wealth is held by 20 
percent of the population.15 In the content industries, the Pareto distribution 
would translate into a situation where 80 percent of the profits come from 
only 20 percent of creators.  
 It is easy to see why this is relevant to the content industries. If Pareto’s 
Law is correct, then one would expect to find similar income inequalities in 
the creative sectors protected by copyright law. Most of the sales would go to 
a small number of individuals or firms, the “vital few and trivial many” as the 
Pareto principle states. This is perhaps the first hurdle of the science of 
networks with regards to Internet regulation. If something as universal as 
Pareto distributions do not occur in copyright markets, then the potential 
usefulness of network theories would be severely diminished, as so many of 
the debates regarding regulation in recent years has been centred precisely on 
this topic. Thankfully, most evidence seems to point towards a strong 
presence of Pareto’s Law in the entertainment sectors. Most research into the 
economics of the content industries clearly displays Pareto distributions of 
wealth, exemplified by the often-commented phenomenon that most 
copyright earnings go to a comparatively small number of people.16 
 Let us look at some historic examples to get a picture of the evidence to 
support this statement. In a study of musicians’ earnings in 1981, Rosen 
established an analytical framework that described the emergence of the 
“superstar” in order to explain anecdotal evidence pointing towards a 
disproportionate skew in earnings from a few creators at the top of the best-
selling lists, followed by sharp drops in sales outside of a small number of 
artists.17 Unfortunately, Rosen seems to have emphasised quality of 
performance in his analysis, which does not really explain the popularity of 
superstars. Quality is very subjective, and while one may argue that virtuoso 
performers do relatively well in some fields, popularity is more fickle than 
that. One is tempted to name several examples of popular works that have 
dubious quality credentials.18 
                                                          
15. See Barabási A-L, Linked: The New Science of Networks, Cambridge, MA: Perseus Pub. 
(2002), p.66.  
16. See: Towse R, Creativity, Incentive and Reward: An Economic Analysis of Copyright and 
Culture in the Information Age, Cheltenham UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar (2001), 
pp.80–86; and Towse R, “Copyright Policy, Cultural Policy and Support for Artists”, in 
Gordon W and Watt R (eds), The Economics of Copyright: Developments in Research and 
Analysis, Cheltenham UK; Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar (2003), pp.66–81.  
17. Rosen S, “The Economics of Superstars”, 71 American Economic Review 845 (1981).  
18. On a very personal note, one could mention every film made by Michael Bay as evidence 
that quality and box office receipts are not correlated.  
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 Some of the most striking evidence with regards to Pareto inequalities 
comes from the music industry. Connolly and Krueger19 conducted a survey 
of ticket sales in the United States between 1981 and 2003, and found that the 
top 1 percent sellers accounted for a disproportionate amount of the overall 
market (Figure 5.1). Not only did the top 1 percent creators outperform their 
competitors, but there was a marked increase over time of the superstar 
effect, in “1982, the top 1% of artists took in 26% of concert revenue; in 
2003 that figure was 56%”. This seems to respond not only to Pareto 
distributions, but at least in ticket sales we see also the “rich get richer” effect 
taking place, which is also something to be expected in complex networks.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 Share of total ticket revenue accruing to top performers, 1982–
2003 
 
 This is a phenomenon that is encountered in other copyright works, such 
as in films. De Vany and Walls20 undertook a survey of cinema ticket sales 
during a period of 13 years in North America, and found a strong Pareto 
distribution, where 78 percent of all movies lose money, and only 22 percent 
are profitable. Not only does this seem to accommodate almost exactly the 
80/20 rule, but looking at profitable movies films produced a similar skewed 
                                                          
19. Connolly M and Krueger A, “Rockonomics: The Economics of Popular Music”, in 
Ginsburgh VA and Throsby D, Handbook on the Economics of Art and Culture, 
Amsterdam: Elsevier (2006), pp.667–719. 
20. De Vany A and Walls W, “Motion Picture Profit, the Stable Paretian Hypothesis, and The 
Curse Of The Superstar”, 28 Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 1035 (2004). 
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result; for example, just 35 percent of profitable movies earn 80 percent of 
total profit.21  
 Similarly, the publishing industry seems to exhibit comparable skewed 
results. While conducting a search on price sensitivity in the online book 
market, Chevalier and Goolsbee found that “a tiny fraction of books in print 
account for most book sales”.22 Moreover, this phenomenon is replicated in 
other intellectual property industries, particularly in research and 
innovation.23   
 The first corollary of the existence of Pareto distributions with regards to 
earnings, profits and royalties may very well be that most creators cannot 
expect to make a living from copyright, and only a minority of works will be 
successful. For example, in the UK the most effective collecting society is 
the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS), which has more than 
18,000 members; in 2004 it distributed £219 million GBP amongst them. 
Even if those profits were distributed equally, the average would be 
approximately £11,000 GBP.24 This displays staggering levels of inequality 
of distribution.  
 The evidence for the existence of Pareto’s Law in the copyright industries 
is overwhelming, but what does it tell us about copyright policy? Is this 
another example of network theories telling us things we already knew?  
 There are several reasons why Pareto distributions in this area are of the 
utmost importance. The first and obvious conclusion is that copyright policy 
must have been informed by the existence of such inequalities. The large 
copyright industries are profit-making activities, so it is to be expected that 
they are organised to respond to the Pareto principle. If that is the case, then 
legislators must also have responded to the state of affairs and must favour 
the large earners as worthy of protection. While intuitive, it is more difficult 
to determine with certainty if this has been the case. While some scholars 
have attempted to rationalise copyright law in economic terms,25 the 
exploration of the impact of Pareto’s Law in the content industries has not 
been the subject of much scrutiny.   
 There is strong evidence, albeit indirect, that copyright law favours the 
superstars. In markets with strong Pareto distributions, one would expect to 
                                                          
21. Ibid, p.1040. 
22. Chevalier J and Goolsbee A, “Measuring Prices and Price Competition Online: 
Amazon.com and BarnesandNoble.com”, 1:2 Quantitative Marketing and Economics 203 
(2003), p.208.  
23. Scherer FM, “The Size Distribution of Profits from Innovation”, 86:49/50 Annales 
d’Économie et de Statistique 495 (1998); and Scherer FM and Harhoff D, “Technology 
policy for a world of skew-distributed outcomes”, 29:4-5 Research Policy 559 (2000). 
24. See: Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society, Directors’ Report and Accounts (2004), 
http://www.mcps-prs-alliance.co.uk/aboutus/.    
25. A seminal work attempting to do just that is: Landes WM and Posner RA, “An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law”, 18:2 The Journal of Legal Studies 325 (1989).  
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find that copyright law is drafted to protect top earning industries. One only 
needs to look at the copyright history of the last couple of decades to notice 
that there has been a strong push towards maximalism and stronger 
protection enshrined in the following pro-copyright owner provisions present 
in recent copyright policy:  
 
a) Longer terms of copyright. 
b) Legal protection of technological protection measures. 
c) Criminalisation of some copyright infringement. 
d) Erosion of fair dealing and fair use provisions. 
e) Creation of new exclusive rights or expansion of existing ones (such 
as making a work available to the public).26 
 
 Some copyright legislation specifically mentions that the goal of copyright 
protection is to incentivise creativity.27 Given the prevalence of Pareto’s Law 
in the copyright industries, this goal takes a secondary role, and it seems clear 
that the objective of copyright protection is to maximise profits, which means 
maximising protection for the superstars.  
 The obvious question to ask here is whether or not the status quo of 
protecting the superstar sellers affects other people involved in the content 
industries. The answer to this question lies in another economic idea based on 
Pareto, that of Pareto efficiencies. Pareto efficiency happens when the 
reallocation of resources makes someone better-off at the expense of making 
someone worse-off,28 in other words, this happens in goods that are rivalrous 
in nature. For example, sharing a limited amount of funds would feature 
Pareto efficiency because giving more to one person would leave less money 
to be shared. Copyright works can be both rivalrous and non-rivalrous. For 
example, in the MCPS example cited above, there is a limited amount of 
money collected to distribute amongst copyright holders, which would create 
a Pareto efficient situation. On the other hand, copyright works are also non-
rivalrous because it is possible to make a copy without negatively affecting 
others. However, when talking specifically about copyright protection drafted 
to protect superstars, one should argue that this does not affect in principle 
those who do not sell that well, as in theory the market can accommodate 
more sales.  
 Even if there is an inherent unequal distribution of profits in the copyright 
industries, there is little that copyright law can do to alleviate this situation. It 
                                                          
26. For more about these, see: Boyle J, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the 
Mind, New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press (2008). 
27. Particularly, the US Constitution, Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  
28. Greenwald B and Stiglitz JE, “Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and 
Incomplete Markets”, 101 Quarterly Journal of Economics 229 (1986). 
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is easy to complain about the unfairness of it all, but there is really nothing to 
be gained bemoaning such inequalities; the law is simply responding to the 
universal presence of Pareto distributions in the creative markets. The 
superstars get more protection because they are the ones who sell more. The 
only possible way to redress this would be to create a distributive copyright 
system where profits are shared amongst a wider number of people, but this 
seems both impractical and unfair.29  
 There is, however, something to be learned from the prevalence of 
Pareto’s Law, and it is that it serves as counter-evidence against the myth of 
the lone author described above, as copyright policy is based on a system that 
benefits a small minority. This should prompt future policymakers to look 
twice at setting policies that may have larger effects on the public, as a cost–
benefit analysis of the current situation should attempt to benefit users and 
consumers, and not only a minority of stakeholders. Nonetheless, if Pareto 
distributions are almost inevitable when it comes to measuring copyright 
earnings, it is understandable that for many years policy has been skewed 
towards benefiting those who make profits from content. 
 Nonetheless, the universal prevalence of Pareto’s Law in the creative 
sector is a result of the analogue world. When we look at what has been 
happening with the advent of digital markets and the Internet, a different 
picture emerges.  
 
 
2. THE LONG TAIL    
 
2.1 The rise of the long tail 
Something interesting has been happening in recent years with regards to the 
allocation of profit in the copyright industries. As explained in the previous 
section, under classic Pareto distribution, high-earners take the larger slice of 
the profits, and sales drop off sharply. Nevertheless, a more detailed analysis 
of the copyright markets taking into consideration electronic commerce and 
new media tend to produce a different story; large amounts of sales 
accumulate at the head of the graph, and while there is a drop-off point, the 
earnings accrued by smaller participants in the market tends tail off into the 
distance (Figure 5.2). The resulting graph shows a slightly different world to 
that of Pareto, that of the increasing returns, or what is also known as a 
“long-tailed distribution”. This has turned into what is known as the theory of 
the long tail. In the word of Chris Anderson, its creator:   
 
                                                          
29. For an excellent argument against the use of distributive justice in copyright markets, see: 
Benoliel D, “Copyright Distributive Injustice”, 10 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 45 
(2007). 
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The theory of the Long Tail is that our culture and economy is increasingly 
shifting away from a focus on a relatively small number of “hits” (mainstream 
products and markets) at the head of the demand curve and toward a huge number 
of niches in the tail. As the costs of production and distribution fall, especially 
online, there is now less need to lump products and consumers into one-size-fits-
all containers.30 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Long tail versus Pareto31 
 
 While the long tail does indeed look like the traditional Pareto distribution, 
there is a surprising addendum when one looks at how sales charts behave 
when one adds into the equation Internet data. In traditional brick-and-mortar 
creative industries, the retail sector is specifically designed to respond to 
Pareto inequalities. Hits are given prevalence in shelf space all over music 
stores, bookshops or DVD rental locales.32 However, something strange is 
happening to these inequalities online. Electronic retailers still experience the 
occurrence of a few massive hits and a long tail of less fortunate sellers, but 
when you factor out the need for limited shelf space, the tail keeps going, and 
does not seem to disappear.33   
 Anderson offers several examples that help to explain this remarkable 
find. Retail giant Wal-Mart shelves an equivalent 55,000 tracks in an average 
store, while digital music service Rhapsody has 1.5 million tracks. One 
                                                          
30. Anderson C, The Long Tail FAQ, (2005) http://www.thelongtail.com/about.html.  
31. Source (released under a CC licence): http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Longtail.jpg.  
32. Anderson C, The Long Tail: The Revolution Changing Small Markets into Big Business, 
New York: Hyperion (2006), pp.38–40. 
33. Ibid, pp.19–23. 
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would normally expect to see sales figures to respond to Pareto distributions. 
This happens still in “brick-and-mortar” retailers, but the remarkable find is 
that Rhapsody’s entire inventory has sold at least one copy.34 In e-commerce 
giant Amazon, one third of total sales come from books that are outside of 
the top 100,000 list, and 57 percent of all book sales come from titles that are 
not stored in high-street book retailers.35 The long tail recognises that 
traditional media responds to power laws as profits go to a small cluster of 
entities. However, the Internet has provided a varied number of opportunities 
for those who did not have a chance to profit previously.   
 Further research into long tail economics appears to corroborate 
Anderson’s findings. For example, an empirical study on sale distribution 
between electronic and catalogue sales found that consumer maturity and 
ease of searchability of content translated into a more equal distribution of 
sales between both retail outlets.36 Similarly, digital music retailer eMusic 
has also released some of its sales data, which according to them supports the 
long tail theory. In a music catalogue of five million songs, eMusic has found 
that 75 percent of their catalogue has sold at least one copy,37 a finding 
consistent with Anderson’s own analysis of other electronic retailers.      
 Another study into Netflix, a popular online movie rental site, found that 
there is a strong long tail in this market as well. While some of the findings 
corroborate the existence of Pareto distributions of sales and the reliance of 
superstars, 15 percent of all Netflix rentals came from movies outside the top 
3,000 titles, which are not stocked by traditional retailers.38 Interestingly, the 
long tail is not only circumscribed to content markets; other electronic 
commerce industries seem to be displaying similar effects. For example, data 
shows that the popularity of online booking of air travel and the proliferation 
of small airlines produces what some are calling the “long tail of travel”, 
where smaller players see an increase in their share of the overall market.39  
 We will see some doubts about the existence of the long tail next, but it 
seems clear that at least in digital markets, there is something essential taking 
place. A picture is starting to emerge – Pareto still reigns supreme, and 
superstars still have a big chunk of the market, but the long tail has opened 
                                                          
34. Ibid.  
35. Ibid, p.23.  
36. Brynjolfsson E, Hu YJ and Simester D, Goodbye Pareto Principle, Hello Long Tail: The 
Effect of Search Costs on the Concentration of Product Sales, SSRN Research Paper Series 
(2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=953587.  
37. Nevins CH and Keeble A, Emusic Sales Data Supports “Long Tail” Concept, Press Release 
(15 January 2009), http://www.emusic.com/about/pr/PR2009115.html.  
38. Tan TF and Netessine S, Is Tom Cruise Threatened? Using Net IX Prize Data to Examine 
the Long Tail of Electronic Commerce, Wharton Working Paper (2009), 
http://opim.wharton.upenn.edu/~netessin/TanNetessine.pdf.  
39. Barnhardt S, “The Long Tail of Travel”, Travalution (19 April, 2007), 
http://www.travolution.co.uk/articles/2007/04/19/834/the-long-tail-of-travel.html.  
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opportunities for small players to take a larger share of the profits than they 
would under the Pareto distribution model. 
 As more corroborating data starts coming in, one must question how the 
long tail works. As with most markets, there are clearly two sides to the long 
tail, supply and demand.40 The reason for the existence of the long tail in the 
supply side has already been discussed, and has more to do with 
straightforward economics than with complex and network theories. Once 
electronic retailers have no need to rely merely on superstar sellers to turn a 
profit, any sale counts and niche markets can emerge. Brynjolfsson, Hu and 
Smith explain this thus: 
 
On the benefit-side, brick-and-mortar retailers sell to consumers in their local 
geographic region. Consumers with mainstream tastes will be served before 
consumers with one-in-a-million tastes. Internet retailers, on the other hand, can 
aggregate demand on a national or even global scale. With the potential Internet 
market approaching a billion consumers, even if you have one-in-a million tastes, 
there are still over a thousand like-minded consumers who share your niche 
tastes.41  
 
But supply alone does not serve to explain the long tail phenomenon. It does 
not matter how many more works are available online, people must be 
willing to purchase or rent works that are not usually available through 
traditional retail channels. This is where some network theory explanations 
may be useful. Specifically, as it has been explored in previous chapters, the 
Internet’s architecture is a positively conducive to the distribution of 
information. Small world and scale-free networks could very well explain the 
emergence of long tail markets. For example, the Internet favours small 
world networks by allowing people with common interests to communicate 
and organise in clusters.42 These networks rely on connectors who have 
disproportionate influence in the overall behaviour of the network. Therefore, 
one would expect that word-of-mouth and Internet influence (say, through 
social media or blogs) could have an effect on buying patterns. 
 There are several studies that support this hypothesis. Oestreicher-Singer 
and Sundararajan43 conducted a survey in Amazon.com of recommendation 
networks. By looking at data from 200 distinct categories, they established 
that categories whose products are influenced more by recommendations 
                                                          
40. Brynjolfsson E, Hu YJ and Smith MD, “From Niches to Riches: The Anatomy of the Long 
Tail”, 47:4 Emerald Management Reviews 67 (2006). 
41. Ibid.  
42. Vázquez A, “Growing Network with Local Rules: Preferential Attachment, Clustering 
Hierarchy, and Degree Correlations”, 67:5 Physical Review E 056104 (2003). 
43. Oestreicher-Singer G and Sundararajan A, Recommendation Networks and the Long Tail of 
Electronic  Commerce, Wharton Working Papers (2009), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1324064.  
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have significantly higher demand distribution, which supports the existence 
of a network-driven long tail effect. Giles provides further evidence in a 
study that proposes that increased information in cultural works translates 
into considerable deviation from Pareto models, and accounts for increasing 
returns. He comments that: 
 
There appear to be some similarities between the way in which particular music 
recordings gain popularity, and the ways in which this occurs for movies and 
theatrical performances. In each case, for example, word of mouth 
recommendations can play an important role. The more people who have listened 
to, and purchased, a musical recording, the more information there is available to 
other potential agents.44 
 
Perhaps more relevant to the theory of the role of small worlds to the long tail 
is a study on the influence of blogs in music sales. Dewan and Ramaprasad45 
looked at influential music blogs, which in a scale-free network such as the 
Internet could be classed as connectors, and tried to see if mention in these 
sites could be correlated with an increase in sales. Their research produced 
some very interesting results that confirm the existence of small world 
influences to long tail sales. Firstly, they found that the music blogs explored 
were not mainstream, which immediately would seem to deviate from Pareto 
distribution markets; these blogs would as a result tend to attract niche 
audiences. Secondly, they found that blog readership and membership tends 
to translate in stronger tail sales for the musicians featured by that 
community. Although the study does not talk directly about small worlds, it 
would seem that the reason for such clustering can be explained in light of 
network theory. Small world networks are more easily influenced because of 
the short pathways between actors, hence the highly skewed influence 
towards the tail.  
 
2.2 Long tail or tall tales? 
 
While there is growing evidence of the presence of the long tail effect in 
digital markets, it must be said that not everyone agrees with either the 
existence of the long tail, or with how critical a shift it is. While some 
researchers concede that there are growing sales in the tail, they point out that 
the content industries still rely heavily on superstars.  
 Some of the evidence counter to the long tail has been observed in the 
DVD electronic markets. In a study of video sales (DVD and VHS) from 
                                                          
44. Giles DE, Increasing Returns to Information in the US Popular Music Industry, 
Econometrics Working Paper EWP0510, (2007) http://web.uvic.ca/econ/ewp0510.pdf.  
45. Dewan S and Ramaprasad J, Impact of Blogging on Music Sales: The Long Tail Effect, Paul 
Merage School of Business Working Paper (2007), http://www.citi.uconn.edu/cist07/1b.pdf.  
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2000 to 2005, Elberse and Oberholzer-Gee found that there was indeed a 
growth in “tail” markets, but interestingly they also found that the market has 
been suffering considerable polarization: fewer titles account for an 
increasingly larger slice of the market, while smaller sellers trail off into the 
distance.46 This is a remarkable find for two reasons: it seems to corroborate 
the long tail effect, but it also seems to hint at the presence of another 
network theory effect, that of “the winner takes all”. Presented with more 
choice, consumers seem intent not only on buying superstar products, but the 
share of the market of the top sellers seems to be increasing considerably. 
While electronic commerce has opened new revenue doors, it also is 
polarizing the market. It is almost as if we are seeing a runaway Pareto 
principle.  
 Elberse47 has found similar trends looking at other datasets. She inspected 
the figures for electronic music retailer Rhapsody, which featured 
prominently in Anderson’s book, and are often cited as one of the best 
examples of the existence of the long tail. While she found that there is 
indeed a tail, she found a remarkable concentration at the head, where 10 
percent of titles accounted for 78 percent of all clicks, and the top 1 percent 
of titles took a staggering 32 percent of all plays. Similarly, she looked at 
figures for video rentals from digital service Quickflix, and she also found 
that 10 percent of DVDs accounted for 48 percent of all rentals. Elberse 
comments that the polarisation has actually been detrimental to smaller 
creators: 
 
When I differentiate between artists on smaller, independent labels and those on 
major labels, I find that the former gain some market share at the tail end of the 
curve as a result of the shift to digital markets. However, that advantage quickly 
disappears as we move up the curve: A more significant trend is that independent 
artists have actually lost share among the more popular titles to superstar artists on 
the major labels. [...] The data shows how difficult it is to profit from the tail. 
 
 Another source of criticism for the long tail has come from the British 
Performing Right Society (PRS). Will Page and Andrew Bud looked at an 
unnamed dataset for music sales and presented their findings at an industry 
event. They found that: 
 
For example, we found that only 20% of tracks in our sample were ‘active’, that is 
to say they sold at least one copy, and hence, 80% of the tracks sold nothing at all. 
                                                          
46. Elbersei A and Oberholzer-Gee F, Superstars and Underdogs: An Examination of the Long-
Tail Phenomenon in Video Sales, Harvard Business School Working Paper (2006), 
http://www.people.hbs.edu/aelberse/papers/hbs_07-015.pdf. 
47. Elberse A, “Should You Invest in the Long Tail?” 86:7/8 Harvard Business Review 88 
(2008).  
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Moreover, approximately 80% of sales revenue came from around 3% of the 
active tracks. Factor in the dormant tail and you’re looking at a 80/0.38% rule for 
all the inventory on the digital shelf. Finally, only 40 tracks sold more than 
100,000 copies, accounting for 8% of the business.48 
 
 Unfortunately, the authors have not published their results, and there is no 
indication as to what dataset has been used. There has been speculation that 
the data may come from mobile downloads, which may account for the very 
wide divergence from some of the other electronic commerce services.49 
Mobile content is a unique market because it consists mostly of ringtone 
downloads. Users would probably want to download a very distinctive tune 
to have as their ringtone, which could explain why there is such a sharp skew 
in this dataset.  
 Page has also looked at data from the popular streaming service Spotify. 
Here the data is even more contrary to the long tail theory. Page found that 
by 2009 there were 4.5 million songs available in the service, but of those 
only 3 million had been played by the almost 2.6 million users.50 This is a 
long tail of tracks with no plays. Moreover, listening figures clearly favoured 
popular artists, which seem to be consistent with the existence of a “winner 
takes all” scenario. Rich acts get richer, smaller acts languish at the tail.  
 Why is this concentration happening? As it has been explained, one of the 
reasons why there is a long tail effect in online environments is the ease of 
connecting consumers and the existence of recommendation systems. 
Dellarocas and Narayan51 conducted a survey of online recommendations for 
films in Yahoo Movies for 2002, and correlated that information with box 
office receipts. They found that online consumers were more likely to review 
popular products, and so, contrary to the long tail effect, online reviews may 
exhibit “tall heads” instead of “long tails”. The “winner takes all” scenario 
that we have been witnessing could very well be explained by a situation 
where users are simply more likely to review popular titles.  
 Having said this, even the conflicting evidence still points towards a 
change in consumer patterns. Whatever importance one may give long tail 
economics, it is clear that the old Pareto distribution model is undergoing 
major shifts. 
 
                                                          
48. Telco 2.0, The “Long Tail” Interrogated, (12 November, 2008), http://www.telco2.net/ 
blog/2008/11/exclusive_interview_will_page.html.  
49. Anderson C, “More Long Tail Debate: Mobile Music No, Search Yes”, The Long Tail Blog 
(November 8 2008), http://www.longtail.com/the_long_tail/2008/11/more-long-tail.html.  
50. “Spotify: The UK Stats”, Music Ally (15 October, 2009), http://bit.ly/ao9U66.  
51. Dellarocas C and Narayan R, Tall Heads vs. Long Tails: Do Consumer Reviews Increase the 
Informational Inequality Between Hit and Niche Products? Robert H. Smith School of 
Business Research Paper No. 06-056 (2007), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105956.  
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3. PEER-TO-PEER 
 
3.1 Brief introduction to the technology 
Having explored the legal side of the equation, it is time to turn to illegal file-
sharing and copyright infringement. While this is a topic often covered in the 
literature, the actual technologies involved in wide-scale copyright 
infringement online are often misunderstood and even misrepresented.    
 Peer-to-peer (P2P) is a term that is most usually used to describe illegal 
file-sharing. However, at its most basic level, the term simply is used to refer 
to decentralised technical and/or organisational architectures. The term is 
used to describe decentralised banking,52 lending,53 social networks,54 and 
many other non-technical arrangements.  
 In strict information technology terms, P2P is usually used to describe a 
generic way to distribute transport loads in a telecommunications network. It 
mostly “refers to the concept that in a network of equals (peers) using 
appropriate information and communication systems, two or more 
individuals are able to spontaneously collaborate without necessarily needing 
central coordination”.55 In other words, participants in the network share the 
resources necessary to make the system work, be it storage, bandwidth, 
energy, data, etc.  
 While the technology itself is self-evidently neutral, the term has become 
almost synonymous with illegal file-sharing because of the prevalent use of 
P2P networks to share copyright infringing copies. In the last decade we have 
seen three main types of P2P technologies used for sharing files: semi-central 
server systems, decentralised client-based networks, and BitTorrent.  
 The mediated56 server-based P2P network is a model that relies on some 
form of central server to operate; the most famous example of which is 
Napster. In the Napster network, users downloaded the Napster client, and 
connected to a central server that held information on which files people 
were sharing. A user would then connect to other user’s computer and 
download the file. This type of model is technically a P2P network because it 
connects two users, even though it relies on the central server in order to keep 
                                                          
52. http://www.wiseclerk.com/group-news/.  
53. Svolkia J, “Forget Citibank – Borrow from Bob” Harvard Business Review (2009), 
http://hbr.org/web/2009/hbr-list/forget-citibank-borrow-from-bob.  
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55. Schoder D and Fischbach K, “Core Concepts in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Networking”, in 
Subramanian R and Goodman B (eds), P2P Computing: The Evolution of a Disruptive 
Technology, Hershey PA: Idea Group Inc. (2005), p.21.  
56. Backx P et al, “A Comparison of Peer-To-Peer Architectures”, EURESCOM Summit (2002), 
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track of users and files.57 Some literature refers to this type of architecture as 
a mediated system. 
 The decentralised client-based P2P networks operate entirely without 
mediation from a central server; examples of these are networks such as 
Fasttrack, eDonkey2000 and Gnutella; and software clients such as Aimster, 
Grokster, Limewire, eMule, eDonkey and Kazaa. In this model, the user 
would download a client which would connect to one or several P2P 
networks. Once connected, the user would be able to search files shared by 
other clients connected to the network, and then would download the content 
from one or many computers hosting the same file. The client developers do 
not run the actual networks; they just make a client that can connect to the 
network.58 The main difference between the centralised and the decentralised 
models is precisely the lack of a central server that stores information about 
the files.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 A typical BitTorrent swarm59 
 
 The BitTorrent network is a qualitative jump from the other two models 
described because it does not require a client, although users may still need a 
                                                          
57. Saroiu S, Gummadi KP and Gribble SD, “Measuring and Analyzing the Characteristics of 
Napster And Gnutella Hosts”, 9:2 Multimedia Systems 170 (2003). 
58. Sen S and Wang J, “Analyzing Peer-To-Peer Traffic across Large Networks”, Proceedings 
of the 2nd ACM SIGCOMM Workshop on Internet Measurement (2002).  
59. The circle in the middle is the local file. The full circles are seeds, and the incomplete circles 
are peers in the swarm. All of the peers are exchanging small parts of the file amongst each 
other. The screenshot was taken from Vuze from a legitimate copy of Open Office 2.2.  
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program that can process .torrent files. BitTorrent is a communications 
protocol that distributes file-sharing amongst users with an entire copy of the 
file (seeds), and/or amongst users with incomplete versions of the whole 
(peers). The information of who is sharing the files at any given time is 
distributed through a tracker file which allocates resources accordingly at the 
local level; all of the seeds and peers sharing a file form a network (swarm).60 
If a user wants to find a file, all he needs to do is to go to a search engine and 
type the name of, say, a movie. If the film is being shared, there may be a 
torrent file that contains information of those who are sharing the file at the 
moment. All that is needed is for one person to initially have the file and 
upload the tracker to a torrent tracking site; for that reason this person will be 
seeding the copy. Once other users find it, they will start downloading the 
file, but at the same time they will be sharing it with others in the swarm. 
Eventually, peers that complete the download and keep their BitTorrent client 
open will become seeds; the more seeds, the “healthier” a torrent is (Figure 
5.3).     
 Of all the three models, the one that is prevalent at the time of writing is 
unsurprisingly the BitTorrent protocol. This is a very efficient manner of 
sharing large files, as it distributes the load amongst participating users. 
Because it is wholly decentralised, the decisions about the amount of 
participation and the time of connection are all left to the user. As long as the 
BitTorrent application is running and instructed to share files, it will do so.61 
It is relevant to stress the technical importance of the tracker: it helps peers 
connect to each other, tell each other which port they are listening into and 
the contact information on which seeds and peers are sharing the same file. 
This is perhaps the only centralised feature of BitTorrent, as it relies on the 
existence of tracker servers.  
 It must be noted that the BitTorrent protocol has been adopted by 
mainstream content owners in order to share files as well; for example, it is 
used by Microsoft in its consumer synchronisation service.62 It is also used 
by game developers to distribute upgrades, such as World of Warcraft, and it 
is also a very popular manner of distributing open source software, such as 
Linux distributions and Open Office.  
 
3.2 P2P and network theory 
It is easy to see why P2P networks are of interest to complexity theory. Here 
we have real-life examples of large-scale networks designed specifically to 
exchange information. Because most of the networks are non-proprietary, 
                                                          
60. BitTorrent.org, Protocol Specifications, (2006), http://www.bittorrent.org/protocol.html. 
61. Cohen B, “Incentives build robustness in BitTorrent”, Proceedings of Workshop on 
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62. Windows Live Mesh. 
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researchers often have access to almost entirely unprecedented vast datasets. 
P2P networks also seem to present us with corroboration of many of the 
principles of complex systems that have been described in earlier chapters, 
namely whether or not they present scale-free distributions, whether or not 
they are small world networks, their resilience and, perhaps more importantly 
for Internet regulation, whether or not they self-organise.  
 When researchers have looked at P2P networks using the analytical tools 
of network theory, they have found that they do indeed display power law 
characteristics, which may explain many of the features of scale-free 
networks, particularly stability and robustness. Ripenau, Foster and 
Iamnitchi63 conducted a survey between 2000 and 2001 of the Gnutella P2P 
network to assess its structure. They found some interesting power law 
characteristics in the network. First, they discovered that P2P networks were 
scalable; in other words, while the network kept growing consistently, the 
overall features remained the same64 – if you recall the discussion of power 
law distributions, this is a common tell-tale sign of the existence of power 
laws. Second, when looking at the distribution of links within the network, 
they found typical scale-free distribution of links – namely, most nodes had 
fewer links, while few hubs had a disproportionate amount of edges. Third, 
when looking at the connectivity to the network, that is, the amount of time a 
client stayed connected, they found a strong power law as well.65 More 
research into the Gnutella network has been producing similar results,66 
which is strong evidence to assume that P2P networks are indeed power law 
networks.   
 If power laws are present in P2P networks, and there is no reason at the 
moment to assume otherwise, other characterises of complex systems should 
also be found. In another study, researchers charted path lengths in P2P 
networks in order to find out if they represented small worlds.67 How would 
small worlds operate in P2P networks? It would of course depend on the type 
of network studied, but in a small world P2P network one would expect to 
find small interconnecting paths from any given node. This can be measured 
by looking at the average number of nodes and hubs that information has to 
travel to get to a random recipient. The aforementioned study discovered 
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some power law behaviour, but researchers were surprised that links tended 
to cluster more than would otherwise be expected in a scale-free topology. 
The researchers then created their own P2P network, as they guessed that 
their results were being skewed by the efficiency of web site search engines. 
The resulting link distribution between nodes in the network corresponded to 
power laws. Further research into the topic tends to corroborate these 
findings, and serves as good indication that P2P are not only scale-free 
networks, but that they are also small world networks.68   
 P2P, and particularly BitTorrent, appear to be almost perfect examples of 
self-organisation in action. While the networks arise from architectural 
decisions at the start, the fact that they are almost completely decentralised 
means that there is no organising force, and consequently their growth and 
evolution is autonomous and organic. A key to the self-organising principles 
of complex adaptive systems is that seemingly chaotic conditions become 
ordered thanks to systemic and/or architectural conditions. Brahm Cohen 
admits that he designed the BitTorrent protocol with two key features in 
mind, robustness and efficiency.69 The BitTorrent client will attempt to form 
Pareto efficiency between peers, this is to say, it will try to maximise up to 
the point where both peers will benefit from the exchange. These two 
architectural conditions explain exactly why BitTorrent is so good at 
organising peers and seeds to serve large amounts of data efficiently.  
 If P2P networks display power laws, then it is evident that they would also 
be robust by design. This is because scale-free networks are resilient as any 
random attack on a node will not hit an essential one, and the network will 
remain operational.70 Most evidence points that nodes and hubs in P2P 
networks follow a power law, so any attack on the system will not result in 
wider failure. Studies seem to confirm this finding. A study into the Gnutella 
P2P network found inherent vulnerabilities, but concluded that: 
 
There are two mechanisms that cause the formation of scale-free topologies. First, 
networks expand continuously by the addition of new vertices, and second, new 
vertices attach preferentially to vertices that are already well connected. In 
Gnutella, the first mechanism can be seen by the fact that new nodes are 
continuously entering and leaving the system, meaning the topology is undergoing 
constant change and growth. The second mechanism can be seen by the fact that 
there are only a few hosts that clients initially connect to [...]. Hence, the topology 
                                                          
68. See: Saroiu S, Gummadi KP and Gribble SD, “A Measurement Study of Peer-to-Peer File 
Sharing Systems”, Proceedings of Multimedia Computing and Networking 2002 (2002); and 
Adamic L and Huberman B, “Zipf’s law and the Internet”, 3 Glottometrics 143 (2002).  
69. Ibid.  
70. Newman MEJ, Barabási A-L and Watts DJ, The Structure and Dynamics of Networks, 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press (2006), p.425. 
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of the Gnutella network is scale-free because of its adherence to these two 
mechanisms.71  
 
 It is remarkable that most of the literature which studies P2P networks 
remarks on their resilience and stability.72 P2P networks not only have a 
power law distribution of links, but they are also very fluid. Any given file 
shared using a protocol such as BitTorrent will have a steady number of 
seeds, but it will also have peers coming in and out of the swarm. Some seeds 
will act as hubs in the network by staying connected for longer periods and 
sharing larger portions of bandwidth to the swarm, but most peers connected 
to the network will have both smaller connection times and smaller 
bandwidth to share. The removal of any given seed, even if it is a central one, 
will not affect the swarm. And this does not even touch on the most 
interesting feature of P2P BitTorrent networks. Each tracker creates its own 
network. Even if it was possible to remove one tracker, there are hundreds of 
others waiting to carry the load. This is what resilience is all about. 
 However, while extremely resilient, P2P networks could also have 
inherent vulnerabilities. The first potential issue is one of computer virus 
propagation. Because these are highly-efficient networks, P2P systems seem 
to be remarkably prone to computer virus epidemics. According to Adamic 
and Huberman:  
 
Finally, it has been shown that scale-free networks are more susceptible to viruses 
than networks with a more even degree distribution. Namely, a virus spreading in 
a random network needs to surpass a threshold of infectiousness in order not to die 
out. However, if the network has a Zipf degree distribution, the virus can persist in 
the network indefinitely, no matter what level of its infectiousness.73  
 
Another issue with the legendary resilience of P2P networks is that they 
really cannot be completely decentralised. At some stage, any individual who 
wants to share files using a P2P network will have to connect to another 
computer and/or server in order to obtain information about where the file is 
being shared. Decentralised P2P client-based networks rely on peer 
connections in order to find hosts, which create inefficient search 
architectures.74 A user operating a client-based network like Gnutella will 
broadcast a file search to its networks, which in turn will broadcast the search 
                                                          
71. Keyani P, Larson B and Senthil M, “Peer Pressure: Distributed Recovery from Attacks in 
Peer-to-Peer Systems”, Proceedings of the International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer 
Computing 306 (2002), p. 307.  
72. Qiu D and Sang W, “Global Stability Of Peer-To-Peer File Sharing Systems”, 31:2 
Computer Communications 212 (2008). 
73. Huberman and Adamic, supra note 68.  
74. Ibid. 
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to their networks; this can slow down the system and make finding peers an 
inefficient exercise.75  
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Long tail of tracker sites?76 
 
 BitTorrent is not immune from the problem of centrality either. While it is 
true that each file shared is its own network, BitTorrent is heavily reliant on 
tracker files. To illustrate this point, let us follow a typical infringing file-
sharing download of one of the instalments of the popular teen vampire 
Twilight saga, Eclipse. The first stage is to find the tracker file. To do this 
one just needs to type “twilight eclipse torrent” into Google, which at the 
time of writing produced 29 million results. All of the links in the first four 
pages of the search directed to torrent tracker sites which are sites that either 
host the tracker or that link to places where the tracker is hosted. Let us 
remember that the tracker file is vital. The links in the search result would 
direct you to a site where you can download the .torrent file for that specific 
work. If you wanted to download the file, you would need a computer 
program that can handle torrent files. As it has been said before, these 
programs can be used for all sorts of legitimate uses. In this case we are using 
Vuze. Clicking on the link opens the program and then you have the option to 
download the file. This results in joining a swarm that is sharing the file. In 
the example we are using, the program is connected to over 2,000 seeds, and 
                                                          
75. Ibid. 
76. Vliegendhart R, Top 20 BitTorrent Trackers, (2009), http://www.tribler.org/trac/wiki/ 
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just over 100 peers. The tracker itself lists 3,100 seeds and 102 peers on 
average, and the tracker is hosted in different sites, each version carrying 
more than 2,000 seeds. It would be practically impossible to shut down all of 
these connections: even if one shuts down one seed, there are thousands of 
other users sharing the file.  
 Why is this vulnerable? The clue is in the tracker. Any user willing to 
download Eclipse will still have to connect to one single tracker file. 
However, an interesting and perhaps ironic feature of BitTorrent tracker files 
is the fact that most trackers are hosted in very few servers in a manner that 
resembles Pareto distributions. Research has been conducted into tracker 
sites, and it has become clear that few sites host most trackers (Figure 5.4).  
 It is obvious that by 2009 the PirateBay was by far the most popular 
tracker site. One can assume that if the PirateBay website were to disappear 
tomorrow others would take its place. Nonetheless, the chart above shows 
that BitTorrent is still highly centric, and centrality means potential 
vulnerability.   
 
 
4. COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS OF NETWORK THEORY 
 
It is hoped that the above sections have provided enough evidence that there 
are indeed practical applications of network theory to copyright subjects, 
both in the legal and illegal markets. Most of what has been explained so far 
is mostly useful for descriptive purposes. The creative industries operate 
under Pareto’s Law, and digital content increasingly displays long tail 
distributions. In illegal file-sharing, P2P networks undoubtedly work as 
scale-free networks. Can network theory give us any prescriptive insights? 
Can network theory help us draft better copyright laws? 
 The first issue is a practical one. Historically, copyright law has been 
highly susceptive to lobbying by the content industries. However, there 
seems to be a growing trend in intellectual property policy to draft future 
strategies based on evidence.77 There are three relatively successful examples 
of evidence-based policymaking in Europe. The first was the considerable 
public consultation process and research going into the discussion of the 
European Directive on Computer Implemented Inventions, which resulted in 
the eventual demise of the proposal.78 The second example has been the 
                                                          
77. One of the most outspoken supporters of this approach is Professor James Boyle. See: Boyle 
J, “A natural experiment”, Ft.com (November 2004), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/4cd4941e-
3cab-11d9-bb7b-00000e2511c8.html.  
78. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on the Patentability of 
Computer-implemented Inventions, COM(2002) 92. For more about this, see: Guadamuz A, 
“The Software Patent Debate”, 1(3) Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice 196 
(2006).   
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Gowers Review of Intellectual Property,79 which has made a big point of 
putting evidence before the interests of powerful lobbying groups. The third 
example was the extensive consultation process that led to the drafting of the 
Digital Britain Report80 in the UK, which would later inform the passing of 
the Digital Economy Act.81  
 While none of these examples has made use of the research highlighted in 
previous sections, the following section will attempt to pose examples of how 
network theory could inform legislators and policymakers in order to produce 
better-informed copyright policy. Just as in the rest of the chapter, both 
“legal” marketplaces and illegal file-sharing will be dealt with separately, 
although it is clear that there is room for cross-pollination between one and 
the other.  
 
4.1 Towards a long tail copyright policy 
The discussion about a possible long tail copyright policy must begin by 
making a clear distinction between the law and business models. It is 
perfectly possible to have in place copyright legislation that does not reflect 
existing business models, or that business models could adequately change 
without affecting copyright law and policy. If this is the case, then the 
emergence of the long tail would not necessitate changes in copyright law. Is 
it possible for long tail models to exist under existing copyright regimes? 
Perhaps the mere existence of the long tail is an answer to this question.  
However, what if copyright policy is being drafted to maintain a decreasingly 
relevant business model? What if the newest and future legislation simply 
perpetuates defunct strategies? Would it not be vital to try to avoid passing 
legislation that is irrelevant the moment it is enacted? 
 Traditionally, copyright law has one main purpose, succinctly expressed in 
the US Constitution, which states that it copyright exists “to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts”.82 As laudable as this goal is, were one 
to draft a justification for modern copyright law, it would probably read “to 
promote profits for copyright holders”. Copyright law serves to sustain 
specific business models. Current business models are based – wittingly or 
not – on Pareto’s Law, so current copyright law protects the status quo.  
 A look at some of the latest attempts to draft copyright legislation will 
serve to illustrate this point. As it has already been mentioned, the UK was 
                                                          
79. Gowers A, Gowers Review of Intellectual Property, HM Treasury, (2006).  
80. Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, Digital Britain Report (2009), 
http://interactive.bis.gov.uk/digitalbritain/report/.  
81. Digital Economy Act 2010 (c. 24), http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2010/ 
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recently involved in a crucial policymaking exercise in order to adapt 
copyright law to the challenges presented by the Internet. In one telling 
paragraph, the Digital Economy Report highlights why the evidence 
presented by network theory is more relevant today than ever before. The 
Report states: 
 
The popularity of X-Factor and Britain’s Got Talent shows the enduring drawing 
power of content-creating talent that few people possess. The digital world allows 
more of that talent to find its way to more consumers and admirers than ever 
before. But it is not wholly democratic: some have the talent to create content; 
many others do not. As throughout history, there need to be workable mechanisms 
to ensure that content-creators are rewarded for their talent and endeavour. And 
the need for investor confidence is key. User generated videos can be hugely 
popular, but there remains a healthy appetite for big movies costing many millions 
to produce.83 
 
 Unwittingly, the drafters of the Digital Britain Report have produced a 
paragraph that reeks of Pareto’s Law. Hidden throughout the report is the 
assumption that only a few can create content, that only a few can profit from 
such content, and that these creators must be rewarded for their investment. 
Reading through the Report, anyone who knows about the Internet but, most 
importantly, who has seen the rise of the long tail cannot help but notice that 
here we are presented with policy solutions that are simply attempting to 
maintain Pareto distribution inequalities in place, regardless of the evidence. 
The above paragraph should have said that the popularity of shows like the 
X-Factor and Britain’s Got Talent have a decreasing share in a growing 
market, and that it is now evident that more and more people can create 
content, regardless of talent. While this will be discussed in more detail in the 
next chapter, it should be stressed that such mentality cannot go 
unchallenged.  
 It is true that it is difficult to pinpoint specifically Pareto’s influence in 
existing copyright law, but it is clear not only from the Digital Britain Report, 
but from almost any other legal document dealing with copyright and the 
Internet, that these assumptions are taken as a given.84  
 This brings us back to the principal question of the difference between 
business models and the law. It seems clear that copyright law is still today 
being drafted to accommodate Pareto distributions. Is that incompatible with 
new business models exemplified by the long tail? If the answer is no, then 
                                                          
83. Digital Britain Report, supra note 80, p.109.  
84. Take for example, the recitals in the Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and 
the Council of 22 May 2001 on the harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society, where the profits of copyright holders are given 
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copyright policy can continue as it stands. But if there any specific area of 
existing copyright law and policy where the interests of the traditional 
copyright owner and the long tail business models diverge, then this should 
pose a significant conundrum for policymakers. There is indeed one area of 
copyright where there seems to be a conflict between the status quo and new 
business models brought about by digital marketplaces, and that is the chief 
role of the intermediary in online environments. 
 One key feature of the Internet is the role played by intermediaries, be 
they Internet service providers, content aggregators and search engines. The 
amount of online information means that we rely more and more on these 
intermediaries for almost every aspect of our wired lives. ISPs allow us to 
connect, but in many instances they also provide hosting services. Search 
engines and content aggregators allow us to find content, some of which 
might be infringing.  
 The liability of these intermediaries for illegal actions taken by their users 
within the networks has been the subject of litigation, scholarly analysis and 
regulatory response since the early days of the Internet. Early on, content 
owners undertook legal action against ISPs and other intermediaries in order 
to attempt to obtain damages and/or injunctions for infringement taking place 
in their networks.85 While some of these lawsuits were successful, the effect 
on early intermediaries was devastating, and it soon became clear that there 
needed to be some sort of rationalisation of the liability regime.86 The 
rationale for this is that with a growing number of users and multiplying 
amount of content, it would be impossible for most intermediaries to police 
whatever took place in their networks unless they exercised strict editorial 
policies.  
 The solution was the creation of a limited indemnity for intermediary 
service providers online, exemplified by the EU Electronic Commerce 
Directive (ECD)87 and the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).88 
The common denominator of both legislative solutions is to maintain liability 
for Internet intermediary services, but also to create a limited indemnity 
regime if ISPs have no previous knowledge of any illicit activity. This 
principle assumes that intermediaries have no editorial control over the large 
                                                          
85. Amongst others, see: Frank Music v. CompuServe Inc., No. 93 Civ. 8153 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552 (M.D.Fla. 1993); Sega Enterprises v. 
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1:96CV157 (N.D. W.Va.).  
86. For more on this, see: Edwards L and Waelde C, Online Intermediaries and Liability for 
Copyright Infringement, WIPO briefing paper WIPO/IIS/05/1, (2005), http:// 
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1159640.  
87. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in 
the Internal Market.  
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 124   Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation  
 
 
amount of information within their networks, and for that reason cannot have 
any knowledge of infringement being committed. As long as they act to 
remove the infringing content, this indemnity will remain in place. Art. 12 of 
the ECD works on the assumption that intermediaries act as “mere conduits”, 
and the DMCA establishes safe harbours for intermediaries who provide a 
notice-and-take-down procedure for content owners.89 While imperfect,90 this 
system worked reasonably well for almost a decade; it gave intermediaries 
some respite from excessive litigation, and it gave content owners a workable 
system that still allowed them to take down infringing materials.  
 However, copyright infringement continued unabated, and as a result 
some copyright owners have been trying hard to bring back some form of 
intermediary liability into the statute books through lobbying and through 
case law. The opening salvo in the new intermediary wars was undoubtedly 
Viacom v YouTube in 2007.91 In this case, media giant Viacom sued video-
hosting site YouTube for $1 billion USD for direct infringement of the 
exclusive rights to public performance, public display and reproduction of 
owned content. In their complaint Viacom alleged: 
 
Defendants encourage individuals to upload videos to the YouTube site, where 
YouTube makes them available for immediate viewing by members of the public 
free of charge. Although YouTube touts itself as a service for sharing home 
videos, the well-known reality of YouTube’s business is far different. YouTube 
has filled its library with entire episodes and movies and significant segments of 
popular copyrighted programming from Plaintiffs and other copyright owners, that 
neither YouTube nor the users who submit the works are licensed to use in this 
manner.92 
 
 This was not really a surprising development for those following the 
copyright wars. What seems surprising is that Viacom would go to the extent 
of suing a large service provider knowing that the law was not on their side. 
The judge agreed and granted summary judgment in favour of YouTube by 
stating that the site is protected by the safe harbour provisions of the DMCA. 
Just before the complaint, YouTube had been purchased by Google, so this 
case became emblematic of the struggle between the content lobby and 
intermediaries.  
                                                          
89. Bernstein A and Ramchandani R, “Don’t Shoot the Messenger! A Discussion of ISP 
Liability”, 1:2 Canadian Journal of Law and Technology 1 (2002).  
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 The trend has been repeated in other jurisdictions. In Australia, Roadshow 
Films v iiNet93 looked at similar questions. iiNet is an Australian internet 
provider, which was sued for secondary infringement by Australian film 
producer Roadshow Films, part of the Village Roadshow media 
conglomerate. The question at the heart of the proceedings was whether an 
ISP can be held liable for the copyright infringement committed by its 
customers. The judge in the case correctly identified that while there was 
ample evidence that there was infringement taking place in the defendant’s 
network, but that they could not be held liable just by providing a connection 
to the Internet because iiNet could not be seen as “sanctioning, approving or 
countenancing copyright infringement”.94  
 In Europe, a Belgian court came to a different decision in Sabam v 
Tiscali.95 The case was brought by the Belgian Society of Authors, 
Composers and Publishers (Sabam) against ISP Tiscali (now called Scarlet). 
Sabam wanted Tiscali to install filtering software in its systems, which would 
allegedly curb illicit file-sharing in P2P networks. The first ruling in the 
District Court of Brussels agreed with the claimants based entirely on expert 
reports about the feasibility of deploying filtering systems. The case, 
however, has been appealed and is currently referred to the European Court 
of Justice.96  
 On the legislative front, content owners have been lobbying hard to reform 
or repeal the existing liability indemnity principles. One of the most 
publicised attempts has been the enactment of so-called three-strikes laws 
which shift the burden of enforcement from owners to ISPs. Under this 
regime, a content owner would issue an ISP with notification that a user is 
engaged in copyright infringement. The ISP would then issue a warning letter 
to the user and if he failed to comply a second letter would be sent, and 
further infringement would see the service being disconnected from the 
Internet altogether, hence the name. The first country to adopt such a law was 
South Korea, which in March 2009 passed reforms to its Copyright Act 
which gives authority to ISPs to send warning letters to infringing users 
asking them to stop transmission of illegal copies, and ultimately allows them 
to suspend or terminate the offending accounts.97 The second country to enact 
similar legislation was France, which enacted the Loi favorisant la diffusion 
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et la protection de la création sur Internet (HADOPI).98 While controversial 
and hotly contested in the French Parliament, HADOPI has put in place a 
system of disconnection that has to be approved by civil courts, and thus it is 
not as burdensome to ISPs as some of the earlier proposals seemed to 
imply.99  
 Not to be outdone, the UK has included the possibility of disconnection in 
the aforementioned Digital Economy Act 2010, which might see users 
disconnected after repeated infringement notices have been sent.100 At the 
time of writing the precise details of disconnection are under consultation, so 
they will not be discussed in detail at this moment. However, it can be 
remarked for the purpose of this work that during the debate leading to the 
enactment of the Digital Economy Act, the content industries were engaged 
in a monumental lobbying effort in order to see the notice and disconnection 
regime included in the final legislation.101 
 Finally, at the time of writing another possible large-scale shift is being 
discussed in the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). This is a 
multilateral trade agreement between the EU, the US, Mexico, Canada, 
Australia, South Korea, New Zealand and a few others, that is set to tackle 
trade mark and copyright infringement issues. While the negotiations are 
being kept secret, leaked versions of the text indicate that we could see an 
end to the liability indemnity regime. As it has been mentioned, the “mere 
conduit” and “safe harbour” provisions in the ECD and DMCA respectively 
operate on the basis that the intermediary has no actual knowledge of the 
infringement. Art. 2.1.2 of the leaked text of the agreement would eliminate 
the actual knowledge provision for injunctions, which may open up the 
liability floodgates once again.102  
 Why is all of this relevant for the long tail? After all, most of the attacks 
against intermediaries are against copyright infringers, not against tail-end 
content owners. Nonetheless, it seems clear that the long tail relies on search 
engines, content aggregators, and word of mouth for it to work. From all of 
the above evidence, it is clear that Internet intermediary services are under 
fire like never before. It seems obvious that a return to the days where 
intermediaries could be liable for content would serve as a chilling effect to 
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the entire way in which the Internet operates. The attack against 
intermediaries is done precisely to keep the Pareto Law system going, a 
model in which content owners carefully choose the channels of distribution, 
but where they also control these channels. In the age of Google, content 
owners have lost this power and content is available through a growing 
number of legal and illicit sites. To make intermediaries liable for the content 
placed by users is to perpetuate a system that does not work well in 
cyberspace. It is no coincidence that some of the evidence debunking the 
long tail comes from the chief economist for the British Performing Right 
Society (PRS).103 This is unsurprising, as the current framework of 
commercial content production has been built upon the assumptions of Pareto 
inequalities, and any change in the underlying business models could affect 
the existing regimes. 
 The copyright industry is trying to find its feet online. Its efforts should be 
directed at fostering the emergence of new business models, of which the 
long tail is just one. By looking at how users engage with content, copyright 
policy should keep this in mind, and policymakers should resist the siren 
calls of dying profit-seeking methods. A long tail copyright policy would 
keep intermediary liability to a minimum, so any change that leads us away 
from the current regime should be opposed.  
 
4.2 Copyright, networks and P2P 
 
4.2.1 Copyright and P2P 
It may be needless to repeat that copyright infringement on the Internet is 
rife. If one was to take industry figures seriously (and that is a big if), by 
2015 digital piracy will have cost the industry €32 billion EUR, and will have 
caused job losses of 611,300.104 While scepticism about these figures is 
warranted,105 there is also room for concern. The data about the effect of file-
sharing on sales is still a hotly disputed economic argument. While some 
researchers place the effect at around 12 percent,106 others have found 
practically zero impact.107  Regardless of the actual losses that can be 
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attributed to file-sharing, there can be little doubt that a situation where a 
generation of users is engaged in wilful copyright infringement is 
undesirable. If anything, unauthorised copying of other people’s works is 
unethical, but also a situation where large parts of the population willingly 
flaunt the law because of personal choice creates a situation that is 
undesirable to say the least. Either we scrap copyright enforcement 
altogether, or we devise ways in which most of these practices can be 
brought back to legality. The current situation does not seem to favour 
anyone.    
 Wherever one stands in the great copyright debate, it is clear that the 
existing landscape is unsustainable. Could network science tell us something 
about how to tackle file-sharing? Perhaps that would be too much to ask, but 
one thing for sure is that it can tell us where existing enforcement strategies 
have gone wrong. How this information is used will be up to the creative 
industries and policymakers. 
 From reading the evidence presented in section 3, it may be clear why an 
understanding of networks is vital when it comes to enforcement of illegal 
file-sharing online. P2P networks display strong power law behaviour, so it is 
baffling that while some of the evidence for this statement has been available 
for years, owners and policymakers seem to be completely unaware about the 
implications of such a fact, hence the failure to tackle widespread copyright 
infringement in digital systems. A cursory look at the case history of lawsuits 
against P2P networks showcases some astonishing ignorance both of the 
technology and of the implication of scale-free topologies.  
 Napster was the first P2P system to be subject to a lawsuit from content 
owners. In 2000, it was sued in the US by several music record companies 
for contributory and vicarious copyright infringement, and it eventually lost 
the case and subsequent appeal.108 Because Napster was a mediated server-
based network, it relied entirely on the existence of a centralised database in 
order to connect users to one another. This was the seed of its demise, as the 
network could not exist without the services provided by the company.109 
This is consistent with network theory, as the network relied entirely on one 
super-hub which connected all of the nodes in the system. By taking out the 
central hub, the network could not exist.  
 The legal situation with decentralised client-based P2P networks was 
much more difficult. During a period between 2001 and 2008, several makers 
of P2P clients were also sued by content industry in various jurisdictions, but 
the most visible cases were in the US with Aimster,110 Limewire111 and 
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Grokster,112 and in Australia with Kazaa.113 The common denominator of 
these cases was that initially, courts found it difficult to deal with the 
technology. These were services that featured a client connected to a wider 
network that ran independent from the client. It should be remembered that 
US courts had to take into consideration the Supreme Court decision of Sony 
v Universal114 by applying the Sony Doctrine, which states that technologies 
that have substantial non-infringing uses cannot be held liable for secondary 
and vicarious liability. Both Grokster and Aimster were found to have 
substantial non-infringing uses, and the fact that the services were not 
centralised played in favour of the defendants.115 Grokster eventually made it 
all the way to the Supreme Court, which came up with another doctrine, that 
of incitement to copyright infringement. Evidence was presented that 
Grokster was not only aware that the client was used to infringe copyright, 
but also that it encouraged such actions.116 Grokster turned out to be a turning 
point for legal actions against client-based services, both Kazaa and 
Limewire were defeated in court, and all the early difficulties in enforcement 
against P2P networks seemed to be over.   
 However, all of these gains were not only short-lived, but proved to be the 
very definition of a pyrrhic victory. As it has been explained repeatedly, 
client-based P2P networks are not centralised, and consequently they could 
exist even if the company who made the client software disappeared. For 
example, Limewire allowed users to connect to the Gnutella network, which 
still exists even at the time of writing.117 The key is that the lack of central 
servers means that these networks are exceptionally resilient. Attacking the 
client manufacturers did not really dent P2P usage. It is true that these 
networks are nowhere near as popular as they were when the lawsuits were 
filed, but the reason for this is not legal action, but the fact that users have 
migrated to BitTorrent.  
 The legal status of BitTorrent has been considerably more difficult to pin 
down. As it has been stipulated already, the technology itself is nothing more 
than an efficient way of distributing traffic loads between users, so it has 
enormous non-infringement potential. This would at lease serve to cover 
BitTorrent under the Sony Doctrine in the US and other jurisdictions where 
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similar provisions exist. Nonetheless, it is clear that the BitTorrent protocol is 
also used for widespread online infringement. Who is liable when such 
actions occur?  
 To analyse the legal challenges of BitTorrent, it is essential to remember 
the nature of the technology. In a typical BitTorrent transaction, a person 
holding a digital copy of the work makes it available to the public by creating 
a tracker file and uploading it to a tracker site, thus advertising to the world 
that the work is available for download. The file then becomes a swarm, and 
potentially thousands of Internet users may be involved in exchanging parts 
of the file until they obtain a complete copy. In an excellent analysis of the 
legalities of BitTorrent, Rietjens118 usefully identifies three key exclusive 
rights that come into play on each transaction: 
 
1. Reproduction: Let us ignore first the origin of the copy; this might be 
a legitimate copy purchased through an online retailer, or it might be 
an unauthorised copy, in which case the person making the copy 
would be directly infringing copyright. Does a person making a full 
copy infringe the exclusive right to reproduce the work? The answer 
seems to be yes in most jurisdictions. For example, in Europe all that 
is required for infringement is that the reproduction takes place “in 
whole or in part”,119 and it would seem that BitTorrent copies would 
certainly infringe on this right.  
2. Distributing: Art. 6(1) of the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) 
establishes the exclusive right of the rights holder to distribute the 
original and copies of the work. This right, however, only exists for 
copies in tangible form, and for that reason does not cover digital 
copies. 
3. Making available to the public: Art. 8 of the WCT determines the 
exclusive right of the copyright owner to make the work available to 
the public in a manner, time and place chosen by them. This is a 
much trickier question, is making the tracker file available to the 
public equivalent to making a full copy available to the public? Logic 
dictates that the answer is positive. A full copy is made available so to 
speak by the first seeder, subsequent members of the swarm exchange 
parts of the whole, and the end result is that a full copy is eventually 
present in the recipient’s computer. So it seems like this is another 
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exclusive right infringed by participants in a swarm, as they are 
making the work available to the public as well.  
 
 The main legal authority dealing with the legal nature of copyright 
infringement in BitTorrent sites is the aforementioned Roadshow Films v 
iiNet.120 In this case, the judge presents some of the most clear-headed 
analysis of the legal issues surrounding the BitTorrent protocol. When 
looking at a typical BitTorrent transaction, it is hard not to think of the 
collective nature of the infringement. In previous P2P incarnations, 
enforcement was easier because individuals and organisations were more 
important to the end result of copying one work from one computer to 
another using the Internet. In a typical BitTorrent transaction, several things 
need to happen: there must be at least one seeder with the entire copy of the 
file, there needs to be a tracker site, there needs to be a client and there needs 
to be several users sharing the file. The judge in iiNet looked at these 
elements and rightly came to the conclusion that they constituted a plural 
entity, what he calls the “BitTorrent system” comprising the client, the 
tracker and the users.121 Not only was that a plurality, but the judge asked 
whether each individual connection in a swarm should be considered an 
individual infringement instance, or if the entire swarm was the infringing 
action. He rightly answered that the individual connections were irrelevant, 
as the work was being shared and copied by multiple users, so each swarm 
would be an infringing instance for copyright purposes.122  
 From all of the above, it is easy to see why BitTorrent has been so difficult 
to enforce. At any given time there are millions of works being shared using 
the BitTorrent protocol. For example, at the time of writing, more than 31 
million users were sharing 3 million torrent files in The Pirate Bay,123 with 
more than 20 million seeders. Assuming that most of those files are 
infringing copies of copyright works, it would be impossible for copyright 
owners to try to sue so many users. P2P traffic online has only continued to 
grow. Depending on the methods used to measure Internet transfer, it has 
been said that P2P transactions can hit as high as 80 percent of all recordable 
online traffic.124 How can they stop this P2P flood? 
 The obvious targets are the tracker websites. Taking a hint from previous 
victories against Napster and client-based services, representatives from the 
content industries attempted to attack The Pirate Bay which, as has been 
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pointed out earlier, is the largest tracker site in the world.125 In January 2008, 
Swedish prosecutors brought civil and criminal charges for the Swedish 
equivalent of secondary copyright infringement against four individuals 
associated to The Pirate Bay.126 The main question rested, unsurprisingly, on 
whether The Pirate Bay was guilty of making works available to the public 
without authorisation of its owners. The court found that the defendants were 
indeed guilty of providing a site with “sophisticated search functions, easy 
upload and storage, and a website linked to the tracker”, sentencing each to a 
year in jail, and awarded 30 million SEK (approximately €2.7 million EUR) 
in damages and costs. In any normal situation, this would be a crippling 
indictment of the technology, but we are dealing with resilient networks here. 
The defendants had already fled Sweden, and by the time of the trial The 
Pirate Bay was hosted in several other countries.127 Needless to say, the site 
is still operating at the time of writing.  
 If attacking the main services has proved futile, what else can copyright 
owners do? Their second strategy was to attack individual users. Starting in 
2003, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) began a 
controversial campaign of suing individual users for direct copyright 
infringement in P2P networks,128 and later began a campaign of sending 
settlement letters to P2P users.129 The International Federation of the 
Phonographic Industry (IFPI) followed suit by issuing thousands of 
complaints against individuals around the world.130 While it is difficult to 
ascertain exactly how many thousand suits were filed and letters were sent, 
the campaign resulted in some high-profile PR disasters for the industry. 
Because they identified users via IP addresses, which is not an exact science 
by any stretch of the imagination, some of the suits were issued against 
children, the elderly, and even the deceased.131 There were also two very 
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high-profile cases in the US against individual users which resulted in 
astoundingly high damages: RIAA v. Tenenbaum132 and Capitol v. Thomas.133  
All of these cases against individuals served to prove two points. Firstly, it 
painted a picture of greedy industry giants trying to squeeze as much money 
from users as possible, and created a perception of a David versus Goliath 
situation where the little man was being attacked by rich faceless 
corporations. Secondly, it served as further example that the fight against P2P 
file-sharing has no easy answers, as even despite all of these lawsuits, 
copyright infringement continues to exist.  
 
4.2.2 How to stop worrying and learn to love P2P 
Given all of the legal failures highlighted, can content owners learn 
something from network science?  
 There are two main areas where the scale-free nature of P2P networks 
would be relevant to legal efforts to curb infringement in those sites. The first 
is the built-in resilience of the network, and the second is that of cascading 
failures.  
 The fact that P2P networks are stable and resilient to random attacks has 
already been explained in detail, and their survival even after the most 
concerted legal attacks against the network seems to attest to the truth of that 
observation. This statement is consistent with what we know about the 
resilience of scale-free networks. Take, for example, the thousands of 
lawsuits and cease-and-desist letters sent by copyright owners against 
individual file-sharers. Even if each targeted lawsuit and letter managed to 
change the behaviour of those individuals, the chances are these were not 
central hubs in the network, and consequently their removal from the system 
has no overall effect on the whole. The removal of random items is not the 
only element that matters in legal attacks to P2P networks, but even massive 
adversarial failure of nodes in a scale-free topology does not result in the 
destruction of the network.134 P2P networks not only display this resilience, 
but they can even be designed to be more resilient to such attacks.135 
 During the heyday of the client-based network model, copyright owners 
undertook a different approach to that of the strict legal route, namely the 
“poisoning” of P2P systems by introducing decoys into the network. These 
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are fake, faulty and otherwise unusable copies of copyright works.136 The 
idea was that the presence of poisoned files would somehow affect the 
reliability of the network, and would deter future users. While there is 
research that confirms that such attacks could have had some limited 
effect,137 it is clear that they did not affect the networks to the extent that they 
would be destroyed. The continuing existence of the networks seems to 
support that hypothesis.  
 Is there any sort of non-legal attack that could theoretically bring down a 
P2P network? The answer is yes, and here we move to the topic of cascading 
failures. In order to refresh this concept, a cascading failure can occur in a 
power law topology when key vertices in a network affect other vertices; in 
other words, if hubs and super-hubs that glue the network together are taken 
out, this could have a downstream effect on relying nodes within the system. 
Dumitriu et al138 conducted a simulation on types of attacks that would result 
in a cascading failure of a P2P network. In their study, they accounted 
specifically for the presence of power-law graphs in P2P networks, and 
included graph-theory concepts into their attacks, such as protocol properties, 
graph properties, client-based counter-strategies, and even user behaviour. 
Their model is both elegant and simple, to introduce malicious nodes into the 
system that would overwhelm nodes and hubs. They explain: 
 
[W]e develop and study a new class of attacks designed to collapse a p2p 
network’s goodput. In such an attack, a malicious peer modifies replies to queries 
for any file, before it forwards them to the client. In a “false reply attack”, the 
malicious peer points the client to itself. When the client then requests a download 
from the malicious peer, it presents a corrupted copy of the file, forcing a repeated 
request and download in order for the client to obtain the true file. [...] Even a 
small percentage of nodes in a large-scale system can represent 100s or 1000s of 
hosts. We note two mechanisms by which attackers can control numerous hosts. 
First, the attacker can deploy all malicious nodes itself at a single or multiple 
Internet Data Centers. A second way to launch an attack is by subverting peers via 
a “trojan horse” program that serves corrupted content. Trojan horse programs are 
already common on both the Internet (e.g., those spread via email viruses, worms, 
and the web) as well in p2p systems.139 
  
 While devastating, this sort of attack would itself stretch the borders of 
legality. Moreover, this sort of attack seems to work much better in the 
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second generation client-based P2P model, and would not work with 
BitTorrent.  
 In my first publication and subsequent presentations on this topic, I must 
admit that the cascading failure solution to P2P filesharing seemed to be the 
most viable option for content owners.140 My own argument was that while 
scale-free networks are resilient, they also can be the subject of catastrophic 
failures when a vital super-hub in the system collapses. However, this initial 
assessment completely underestimated the level of resilience of P2P 
networks, particularly the resilience displayed by the BitTorrent protocol. Try 
to imagine an attack like the denial of service strategy described above on a 
BitTorrent file, and you will begin to see what the problem is. BitTorrent 
files do not rely on a semi-central client, so even if one were to poison some 
seeds, this would not affect a swarm as a whole. And even if a swarm was 
brought down, there would still be dozens of other swarms sharing the same 
work.  
 This does not mean that copyright owners have stopped trying. Poisoning 
has been also introduced to BitTorrent sites, where “fake” copies of a work 
are distributed all the time. However, sharing communities have found a way 
around this. Many tracker sites have the possibility of rating and commenting 
on specific files, so it is possible to tell the community if a file is fake, or if it 
has a virus, or if it does not work as intended. Peer-to-peer meets peer 
review.  
 There is only one answer to the BitTorrent conundrum. As it has been 
repeatedly stated, BitTorrent is not completely decentralised, it relies heavily 
on the existence of tracker sites such as The Pirate Bay. The obvious solution 
would be to take out or restrict access to these sites. However, this is not as 
simple as it sounds, as the example of legal action against The Pirate Bay 
exemplifies. It is perfectly possible that by the time you are reading this, The 
Pirate Bay no longer exists, but chances are there is another tracker site that 
has taken its place. Literary references to genies out of bottles, cats out of 
bags and opening forbidden boxes apply here. The technology exists, and it 
will be almost impossible to undo.  
 Based on all of what we know about network theory, the conclusion that 
should be reached by content owners is that – at least in the short-term – P2P 
networks cannot be brought down easily. Attacks against tracker sites and 
against individual file-sharers are not having any effect; their resilience is 
quite simply insurmountable, at least for the time being.  
 Nonetheless, there are possible scenarios that might work, but they might 
involve a change of how we see the Internet. Back in Chapter 3 we discussed 
how some countries have created their own separate Internet by means of 
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regulation of the Internet entry-points into their countries, the chokepoint 
model of regulation. Under this scheme, it would be possible to attempt to 
restrict national access to certain sites. This strategy can be eventually scaled 
down to individual ISPs, whereby all of the addresses connected to a specific 
site would be blocked; this strategy has been used in several countries, from 
Ireland to Denmark, with varying degrees of success.141 National firewalls, 
however, can be easily circumvented by anonymisers, Virtual Private 
Networks, and other similar tools.  
 This game of cyber cat and mouse is wasteful once one understands the 
underlying topologies of the vast copyright network. Content owners are 
perennially engaged in the futile exercise of chasing users, service providers, 
P2P clients and tracker sites; all to no avail. The networks are too robust for 
traditional legal enforcement, and may even be too resilient for technical 
solutions unless the distributed nature of the Internet is somehow changed. 
The solution may be not to give in completely, but to try to use the existence 
of P2P networks to one’s advantage. In a seminal work on copyright in the 
Digital Age, William Fisher proposes a compensation system for copyright 
owners. He says: 
 
A creator who wished to collect revenue when his or her song or film was heard or 
watched would register it with the Copyright Office. With registration would come 
a unique file name, which would be used to track transmissions of digital copies of 
the work. The government would raise, through taxes, sufficient money to 
compensate registrants for making their works available to the public. Using 
techniques pioneered by American and European performing rights organizations 
and television rating services, a government agency would estimate the frequency 
with which each song and film was heard or watched by consumers. Each 
registrant would then periodically be paid by the agency a share of the tax 
revenues proportional to the relative popularity of his or her creation. Once this 
system were in place, we would modify copyright law to eliminate most of the 
current prohibitions on unauthorized reproduction, distribution, adaptation, and 
performance of audio and video recordings. Music and films would thus be readily 
available, legally, for free.142 
 
 It may be strange to suggest a solution that ignores entirely the evidence 
from network theories so far, but it makes sense precisely because it would 
work regardless of the architecture and network behaviour described above. 
The only real legal solution at the moment would be one that embraces the 
scale-free nature of P2P networks, and that works regardless of the 
underlying resilience. Fisher’s proposal is compatible with what we know 
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about networks. Not only that, it could work better once one understands 
concepts such as small worlds, hubs, and robustness.  
 I would also like to end this chapter on a positive note that unites the long 
tail and P2P. A study into P2P file-sharing has unearthed the fact that sharing 
does indeed seem to affect music sales from top earners.143 Blackburn 
conducted research trying to ascertain what would be the effect for music 
sales of a reduction of file-sharing volumes by 30 percent. For top earners at 
the head, the result was a marked increase in sales. However, for those with 
minimum sales, decreasing file-sharing actually had a negative impact on 
sales.144 If this data is accurate, then it could be said that P2P is good for the 
tail, but bad for the head.    
 P2P and the long tail may very well be the saviours of the creative 
industries. 
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6. Peer-production Networks 
 
 
In many of the more relaxed civilizations on the Outer Eastern Rim of the Galaxy, 
the Hitchhiker’s Guide has already supplanted the great Encyclopaedia Galactica 
as the standard repository of all knowledge and wisdom, for though it has many 
omissions and contains much that is apocryphal, or at least wildly inaccurate, it 
scores over the older, more pedestrian work in two important respects.  
First, it is slightly cheaper; and second, it has the words “DON’T PANIC” 
inscribed in large friendly letters on its cover. 
Douglas Adams, The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy1 
 
In April 1999, author Douglas Adams founded a website called H2g2.com in 
honour of his successful series The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy. The 
stated purpose of the website was to create an informal guide to “life, the 
universe, and everything”, a sort of online encyclopaedia edited and 
maintained by its users. The project was eventually taken over by the BBC in 
2001, where it is still hosted. You may be forgiven for not having heard of 
this project, as its functions are replicated by a more recent online 
collaborative project called Wikipedia. Created in 2001, Wikipedia has 
become everything that Douglas Adams pretended for his online experiment. 
The online encyclopaedia boasts more than 12 million articles in 262 
languages, of which 25 have more than 100,000 entries.2 As a manner of 
comparison, the online edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica contains 
120,000 articles.3  
 Why has Wikipedia succeeded where Douglas Adams failed? Is it the 
technology? Is it the bottom-up approach of the wiki model? Is it 
serendipity?  It could be argued that the reason for Wikipedia’s success can 
be attributed to the rise of what is described as the participatory Web. For 
large periods of human cultural history, the process of creative creation has 
been subject to strict control of distribution channels. The status quo has 
rested on the assumption that only a few people can produce worthwhile 
works, and it has been up to publishers to serve as the judges of what should 
be communicated to mass audiences. This top-down approach does not only 
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exist in cultural works, but can be seen in almost all facets of intellectual 
creation, from academic output to the production of software.  
 One of the many aspects where the Internet has prompted societal change 
has been that it has challenged the existence of this top-down approach. 
Distribution channels have been democratised, and it is now easier for 
hobbyists and amateurs to bypass the gatekeepers and make their works 
available to wider audiences. It is not the remit of the present work to judge 
the wisdom of the new bottom-up approach, but the existence of wider 
participation mechanisms cannot be denied. Wikipedia, Flickr, YouTube, 
blogging, Facebook, Twitter and many other social media have developed an 
environment of unparalleled creative momentum. This chapter will explore 
the phenomenon using complexity theory, trying to analyse whether the 
existence of peer-production and social media can be explained through some 
of the theories studied previously.  
 From the legal perspective, the subject of peer-production may seem of 
somewhat less importance than the commercial copyright subject dealt with 
in the last chapter. However, there are several aspects of the emergence of 
user-generated content where the tools of network science can be useful from 
a policy and user perspective in the copyright arena. The first is the subject of 
licensing of these works in the shape of open licences. The second is a more 
important policy question about the role of peer-production in the Pareto-
driven copyright policies that we have in place at the moment. This chapter 
will concentrate on these two legal issues.  
 
 
1. THE RISE OF PEER-PRODUCTION AND THE USER-GENERATED 
WORLD 
 
1.2 Defining peer-production 
Peer-production is a term that defines a particular form of developing 
content. In its most basic form, it simply describes a way in which 
individuals, firms and organisations come together to produce intellectual 
creations. As it was discussed in the previous chapter, the traditional view of 
content creation rests heavily on the idea of the creator as a struggling 
individual who requires protection in order to incentivise creativity.4 The 
words “creation”, “owner” and “author” have therefore been co-opted by the 
copyright industries in order to justify a particular commercial model. The 
reality, also discussed in the previous chapter, is that content creation is a 
collective effort involving a plurality of individuals, publishers and 
distributors. This responds to very specific business model, but also it exists 
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as an institutional organisational process that distributes profits and allocates 
resources. Peer-production is a term that defines an alternative model to the 
existing system. 
 The term peer-production was first used by Yochai Benkler,5 who was 
interested in looking in more detail at the paradoxical success of non-
proprietary methods of developing software that seemingly ignored profit and 
Pareto’s Law from the equation. In order to create a theoretical framework 
that could explain the reasons why individuals co-operate, write and 
distribute software seemingly without profit in mind, he looked at some of 
the ideas that explained the way in which individuals come together to form a 
collective organisational entity. He relied heavily on the work of economist 
Ronald Coase, who had established one of the principles of organisational 
economics – namely that if the cost of coming together as a collective was 
lower than the alternative, then individuals would create a group to achieve 
their goals, to reduce costs and enhance productivity.6 Under Coase’s original 
model, the copyright industries could be described as entities that came 
together because the cost of doing business together was lower than the cost 
of individually negotiating and producing content. Benkler’s great insight 
came in stating that there are different ways in which the production of works 
can be achieved. While traditionally this organisation has been reached by 
hierarchical and directed approaches, the cost of producing content through 
the undirected and non-hierarchic models is lower than the alternative. He 
comments: 
 
A distributed peer production model allows individuals to self-identify for tasks 
for which they are likely to be the best contributor. This makes peer production 
particularly well suited to organize activities in which human capital is the 
dominant input, as long as the coordination problems can be solved and that some 
mechanism to adjust for individuals’ errors regarding their own suitability for a job 
is implemented.7 
 
 Without really thinking about it in that context, what Benkler really is 
talking about is self-organisation.  
 A related, yet more radical approach has been commented upon by Eben 
Moglen,8 one of the main theorists of the free and open source movement. 
Moglen accurately pinpoints one of the most glaring problems faced by the 
commercial content paradigm, that which is succinctly encapsulated in the 
                                                          
5. Benkler Y, “Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux and the Nature of the Firm”, 112:3 The Yale Law 
Journal 78 (2002).  
6. Coase R, “The Nature of the Firm”, 4:16 Economica 386 (1937), p.403.  
7. Benkler, supra note 5, p.6. 
8. Moglen E, The dotCommunist Manifesto, (2003), http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/ 
publications/dcm.html.  
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dominance of Pareto distributions. This is the fact that currently, commercial 
exploitation of content relies heavily on a system that brings together 
individuals that produce works, but the bulk of the profits go to a few. 
Moglen states: 
 
To the owners of culture, we say: You are horrified at our intending to do away 
with private property in ideas. But in your existing society, private property is 
already done away with for nine-tenths of the population. What they create is 
immediately appropriated by their employers, who claim the fruit of their intellect 
through the law of patent, copyright, trade secret and other forms of “intellectual 
property”. Their birthright in the electromagnetic spectrum, which can allow all 
people to communicate with and learn from one another, freely, at almost 
inexhaustible capacity for nominal cost, has been taken from them by the 
bourgeoisie, and is returned to them as articles of consumption–broadcast culture, 
and telecommunications services--for which they pay dearly.9 
 
 Forget the political undertones for a moment, and you will see that this is 
indeed a powerful description of the reason why the Internet has become 
such a disruptive force to the existing business models. When users become 
producers, we have reached a stage of fundamental change in the information 
economy. Whenever you read about one of the 20th century copyright 
industries complaining about the Internet, you need to keep in mind the fact 
that this change has been brought about by a shift in the economy of 
information. 
 Peer-production is a term that is often used interchangeably with other 
concepts that describe the creation of intellectual works by members of the 
public instead of the professional industries that have dominated for more 
than a century. You will hear the phenomenon described interchangeably as 
user-generated content (UGC), and even the so-called Web 2.0. UGC is 
usually used to refer to the actual content created by users,10 as the name 
clearly indicates; while Web 2.0 is often defined as the set of tools used to 
create such content.11 In the end, what we are seeing is that each term 
describes three aspects of the Internet content revolution, peer-production 
describes the process, UGC describes the content and Web 2.0 defines the 
tools. While these terms have nuanced meanings, it will be assumed that in 
the end they are all describing the same phenomenon, namely, a change in 
the organisation of the creation of content that includes larger numbers of 
users. So, when we talk about peer-production we are fundamentally talking 
about all three elements.  
                                                          
9. Ibid.  
10. Lee E, “Warming up to User-Generated Content”, 5 University of Illinois Law Review 1459 
(2008). 
11. O’Reilly T, “What is Web 2.0: Design Patterns and Business Models for the Next 
Generation of Software”, 1 Communications & Strategies 17 (2007). 
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 Benkler brings together all of these in his definition of peer-production. In 
his influential work The Wealth of Networks, he sets an impressive 
framework for cultural means of production and the participatory Web. He 
states: 
 
This cluster of phenomena, from free and open-source software to Wikipedia and 
SETI@Home, presents a stark challenge to conventional thinking about the 
economics of information production. Indeed, it challenges the economic 
understanding of the relative roles of market based and nonmarket production 
more generally. It is important to see these phenomena not as exceptions, quirks, 
or ephemeral fads, but as indications of a fundamental fact about transactional 
forms and their relationship to the technological conditions of production. It is a 
mistake to think that we have only two basic free transactional forms – property-
based markets and hierarchically organized firms. We have three, and the third is 
social sharing and exchange. It is a widespread phenomenon – we live and practice 
it every day with our household members, coworkers, and neighbors.12 
 
 The social element of sharing is precisely what had been missing in the 
previous assumptions about cultural production. Profitability in Coase’s 
organisational economics cannot explain the wealth of production that we are 
currently witnessing. Social transfer of information plays an important role in 
our everyday lives; the Internet has allowed us to extend the social networks 
and allows users to share their creations with others.  
 Another theorist of peer-production phenomenon is Cass Sunstein. In his 
book Infotopia13 he sees several problems with what he perceives as the 
growing balkanisation and atomisation of information, but still he opines that 
its potential is great. He argues that: 
 
[T]here are remarkable exercises in the development of cumulative knowledge, 
producing an astonishing range of new goods and activities. We shall see that 
some of the underlying methods are novel and exceedingly dramatic. They will be 
used far more ambitiously than they now are. With respect to the aggregation of 
information, we are in the first stages of a revolution.14  
 
 While there is much room for agreeing with the concept of peer-
production described above, it is only fair that one should sound a word of 
caution. It would seem that in response to the dominance of Pareto, we could 
be responding with the myth of social production. While peer-production is 
an important development, one should not forget that the marketplace of 
                                                          
12. Benkler Y, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom, New Haven, CT; London: Yale University Press (2006), pp.462–463.  
13. Sunstein CR, Infotopia: How Many Minds Produce Knowledge, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press (2008), p.7.  
14. Ibid, pp.8–9.  
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ideas is still very much reliant on production inequalities. While none of the 
authors cited above has hinted that peer-production will replace commercial 
approaches, the outlook and impact of social media seems overstated. A 
common feature of those who tend to analyse new technological trends (the 
author included) is that we operate in a scholarly environment that is already 
familiar with the technologies involved. Could we be guilty of becoming too 
enamoured with peer-production because we are part of a group that 
constitutes its core user base?  
 This is what one could design as “If you build it, they will come”15 
argument. There is a growing trend to assume that by simply building a blog, 
a wiki or a Twitter stream, users will flock to a site and immediately 
participate and engage with the content. While this is mostly a personal 
anecdote based on a long list of failed UGC experiments, it is important to try 
to address this often overlooked fact about Web 2.0 applications. Do the 
successful showcases such as Wikipedia, YouTube and Twitter distract us 
from the long digital graveyard of content nobody has ever seen or cared for?  
Further sections will try to measure the true relevance of the peer-production 
economy to try to answer this valid question. 
 
1.2 Clash of cultures 
In a conference I attended in 2007, which dealt with licensing issues of peer-
production, one of the legal keynote addresses was given by a representative 
from the International Confederation of Authors and Composers Societies 
(CISAC). Presenting to a potentially hostile audience, the CISAC 
representative gave a balanced view of the interaction between collecting 
societies and open licences, and also commented that the history of collecting 
societies proves why collective management of intellectual property benefits 
creators. The reason for showcasing this seemingly innocent comment is that 
it exemplifies a view of the process of creation, and of intellectual property in 
general, as something that is only done with commercial interest in mind; and 
the fact that it was given to an audience convened specifically to talk about 
creation outside of the existing frames of reference displayed precisely why 
some in the copyright industries simply do not seem to get that the rules have 
changed. To think of creators as only those who make a profit or make a 
living may seem like common sense, but it is a view that ignores the fact that 
the Internet has changed the creative process. The advent of easy-to-use tools 
that allow the publishing of text, video, photographs, music and all other 
forms of digitised media have brought about a new generation of creators 
who are less interested with traditional distribution channels and are willing 
to explore other methods. We have all become potential publishers. 
                                                          
15. Named so by the famous tagline used in the Kevin Costner movie Field of Dreams, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0097351/. 
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 As it was discussed in the previous chapter, existing copyright law and 
policy has been drafted with the assumption that Pareto’s Law is the only 
game in town. Copyright maximalism is a legal approach that makes sense 
when the vast majority of content is created with a specific purpose in mind, 
that of making profits based on a small number of superstar hits. The existing 
commercial model of creation was driven by the Pareto distribution model 
which relies heavily on thorough filtering by a minority. What is taking place 
nowadays is something which quite literally does not fit any of our previous 
ideas of what drives people to produce and maintain an intellectual work. 
There is a clash of cultures, of which the changes in commercial production 
of works is just the tip of the iceberg. 
 What may explain the clash is that there has been a fundamental change in 
how some people approach the production and management of resources in 
the information age. From a theoretical perspective, what we are talking 
about is in its very core about self-organisation. If we take the way in which 
society generates information as self-organisation, then the way in which 
content is produced will be dependent on the prevalent conditions for it to 
occur. Up until recently, that predominant paradigm was through a system of 
a minority of creators who submitted works to intermediary distribution 
channels. Because of commercial constraints, only a few of those were 
distributed to the public on a large scale, be it through the printed press, 
music industry, audiovisual creations and art exhibitions, just to name a few. 
The majority of users were consumers. 
 With the Internet, such constraints do not exist. The price to enter the 
marketplace has been considerably diminished; all one needs is an Internet 
connection and the willingness to learn how to use basic tools in order to 
produce and publish content. Therefore, societal conditions and limitations 
have shifted enormously, which in theory should prompt the emergence of 
new models in true self-organising fashion. Nobody has dictated that people 
should produce more content, they just can. And they do. 
 This shift has resulted in a revolution in the process of content production 
the likes of which dwarf all other periods of human creativity. Google’s CEO 
Eric Schmidt is given to some rather flamboyant and controversial 
statements, but recently he made a point that should place the current 
information revolution in perspective. He commented that since the dawn of 
civilisation and up to 2003, the total amount of information created was 5 
exabytes.16 However, by 2010 we have reached a point where collectively we 
produce 5 exabytes of information every two weeks.17 By any measure, such 
a statement should prove to be a sobering thought.  
                                                          
16. An Exabyte is 1018 bytes, one quintillion bytes, or a ten followed by 18 zeros.  
17. Kirkpatrick M, “Google CEO Schmidt: ‘People Aren’t Ready for the Technology 
Revolution’”, ReadWriteWeb Blog (4 August, 2010), http://is.gd/eNTTN.  
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 Everywhere we look on the Internet, we can see examples of the vast 
amount of information that is being produced by individuals located outside 
of the traditional framework based on the creator/publisher economy. Lessig 
also has commented on the existing shift, and he places peer-production and 
user-generated content in terms of a clash between the read-only culture (RO) 
and the read/write culture (RW).18 Lessig explains that for much of human 
history, the norm was to build upon cultural works, and therefore the act of 
creation was mostly a communal process. However, the Western idea of 
copyright that places the single creator at its centre prevailed, and therefore 
we were stuck with the read-only proprietary model. New technologies have 
made it possible to go back to a more organic way of cultural exchanges 
through the remix ethos that permeates much of the UGC universe. While 
Lessig claims that both cultures can coexist, an interesting feature of some of 
his work is to stress the relative importance of the RW culture by framing it 
in constant clash with its RO counterpart.  
 To stress this point, let us contrast some traditional content industries with 
their Internet-driven peer-produced counterparts. For example, in software a 
way to measure the amount of work that has gone into a program is to look at 
the single lines of code (SLOC), the individual lines of instructions that 
constitute it.19 This is useful because it allows one to have an accurate 
estimate of the amount of programmer-hours that have gone into the 
development of a piece of software. Windows Vista is calculated to have 
approximately 50 million single lines of code, while Debian 4.0, an open 
source operating system released the same year, had 213 SLOC.20 Peer-
production can produce content in a manner that dwarfs commercial content.  
 Take also the newspaper industry; by 2010, there were 12,297 daily 
newspapers in circulation around the world.21 Contrast that with the numbers 
of web blogs around the world (145 million at the time of writing),22 and you 
may begin to see that there is a fundamental shift in how we view 
information delivery.  
 This clash of cultures does not mean that commercial creation and 
distribution of content is dying out; one can say that our culture is still 
dominated by Pareto’s Law paradigm. One should also be careful when 
making quantitative and qualitative analysis of content figures; it may be true 
                                                          
18. Lessig L, Remix: Making Art and Commerce Thrive in the Hybrid Economy, London: 
Bloomsbury Academic (2008), pp.28–29.  
19. Wheeler DA, More Than a Gigabuck: Estimating GNU/Linux’s Size, (2002), 
http://www.dwheeler.com/sloc/redhat71-v1/redhat71sloc.html.  
20. Amor JJ et al, “Measuring Etch: The Size of Debian 4.0”, Debian Conference (2007), 
https://penta.debconf.org/~joerg/attachments/33-measuring_etch_slides.pdf.  
21. World Association of Newspapers, World Press Trends 2010, (2010), http://www.wan-
press.org/worldpresstrends2010/home.php.  
22. According to BlogPulse’s daily blog survey: http://www.blogpulse.com/.  
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that there are considerably more blogs than newspapers, but nobody would 
contend that one can completely forego professional journalism and 
substitute it with blogs. There is still room for the prevalent model to exist, 
even if the rules have changed. What is being said here is that there has been 
a democratisation of content production, that has to be taken into account by 
policymakers and legislators. 
 Given this environment, it is no surprise that the enduring myth of the 
struggling creator has been translated into copyright policy. However, it is 
important to repeat a relevant example to stress the point that although there 
is a shift in content creation, policymakers do not seem to have noticed the 
changes. The UK government conducted a review of the content industries 
entitled Digital Britain,23 which established the government’s Internet 
regulatory strategy for the next decade. The report tackled several topics, 
including content. Unsurprisingly, the UK government’s strategy with 
regards to content seems to be geared towards enforcement, piracy and 
unlawful use. What is surprising is that a report looking at the future of 
content in the digital environment practically ignored user-generated 
endeavours. The only mention of Web 2.0 and peer-production is in the 
glossary, which simply glosses over the rich opportunities brought by the 
participatory web by insisting on the outdated view of the top-down content 
provider. There is an obligatory mention to UGC and YouTube, but then the 
drafters have no idea what to do with it other than to mention that digital 
technologies lower barriers to new providers such as “the wide range of 
services now catering to ethnic minority communities and to specialist 
interest, the development of community services, of user-generated content 
whether on YouTube or on social networking sites”.24 In one dismissing 
paragraph the UGC revolution is relegated to fringe status. It is disheartening 
that whenever it talks about content, it is talking about institutional content.  
 Interestingly, another result of the perpetuation of the myth of the 
commercial creator is that it has resulted in a clash between traditional media 
and Web 2.0 services. We are currently experiencing conflict between the 
top-down business models, and the organic business model championed by 
aggregated service providers and UGC application builders and managers, 
such as Google, YouTube and Facebook. Whichever way one would like to 
define peer-production, it is clear that its meteoric rise has been fuelled by 
the widespread availability of popular tools and applications that allows users 
to easily upload content online. It is no coincidence then that as traditional 
media sees their fortunes dwindle, content aggregator giants such as Google 
                                                          
23. Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform, Digital Britain: The Interim 
Report (2009), http://www.culture.gov.uk/images/publications/ 
digital_britain_interimreportjan09.pdf.  
24. Ibid, p.45.  
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have benefitted from the popularisation of their services, at the same time as 
they promote its spread to ever growing sectors of the public. This conflict 
has culminated in legal challenges mostly against Google; such as the case of 
Viacom v YouTube,25 and the recently settled cases against Google Books.26 
While the legal conflict between intermediaries and content owners has 
already been covered in the previous chapter, it must be stressed that the 
common denominator in these suits is that there is a palpable reaction against 
what is often described as parasitic practices by new media. Alongside the 
myth of the creator, a new one is arising, that of participatory technologies as 
leeches that thrive while the real content creators struggle. Perhaps the most 
prominent example of this was an article in the UK newspaper The Observer 
by Henry Porter. He commented:  
 
Despite its diversification, Google is in the final analysis a parasite that creates 
nothing, merely offering little aggregation, lists and the ordering of information 
generated by people who have invested their capital, skill and time.27 
 
 This seems to imply that anyone who does not create content and simply 
offers an aggregating service is by definition a “parasite” that has done no 
investment whatsoever. Google has invested large amounts of money in 
creating a vast and complex infrastructure that allows its users to access, 
create and aggregate content. These are tangible, useful and valuable services 
that make it easier for content creators to get their message across. Moreover, 
users are creating their own content.  
 What seems clear is that the RO and RW cultures, to use Lessig’s 
terminology, will continue to be in conflict, as the RW culture gains more 
ground and the RO model continues to lose share in the market.  
 
 
2. OPEN LICENSING 
 
The changes discussed in the previous section are mostly important from a 
policy perspective, as the growth of peer-production has come to clash with 
policies informed by maximalist agendas proposed by the copyright 
industries.  
                                                          
25. Viacom International, Inc. et al v. Youtube, Inc. et al (United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, filed 13 March 2007, case no. 1:2007cv02103).  
26. Authors Guild v Google Inc (United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, Docket No 2005 CV 8136, filed September 20, 2005); and McGraw-Hill Cos, Inc v 
Google Inc (United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Docket No 
2005 CV 08881, filed October 19, 2005). 
27. Porter H, “Google is just an amoral menace?” The Observer (5 April, 2009), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/apr/05/google-internet-piracy.  
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 There is, however, a legal issue that is crucial to the topic of peer-
production, and this is the subject of open licensing. Traditionally, the 
commercial content industries have relied on strong copyright protection in 
order to distribute works. The protection is done through copyright law, but 
also through licensing. At the very basic level, a licence allows users to 
perform actions that would otherwise not be permitted under copyright law.28 
The most common form of copyright licence is one that gives users minimum 
permissions, and where all other copyright is reserved, so they are “all rights 
reserved” licences.  
 Open licences are copyright licences that allow considerably more 
permissions to the user. If we have a spectrum of rights with “all rights 
reserved” licences at one end, and no protectionat the other (the work is in 
the public domain), open licences come somewhere in the middle. These 
licences still reserve some rights, but give users many others, what some call 
the “some rights reserved” licence.29 There is ample literature describing this 
model, but this section will provide a basic introduction to the concepts, as 
their relevance will hopefully become evident when discussing the regulatory 
implications of peer-production and complexity later on.  
 
2.1 Defining openness 
Openness has almost become a buzzword attached to various movements and 
ideas. Open source, open content, open science, open standards, open 
databases; the very use of the work describes an opposition with networks 
that are closed by definition. But what does the concept mean in a peer-
production context? 
 At its core, the definition of openness in peer-production is opposed to the 
concept of closed content. Under restrictive “all rights reserved” copyright 
regimes, the work that is being distributed comes attached with all of the 
exclusive rights allocated to its creator (or more accurately, its owner) 
through copyright law. These include, amongst others, the exclusive rights to 
copy, publish, distribute, execute, make derivatives and communicate the 
work to the public. If this is the definition of a closed work, then by 
definition an open work will, through the use of an open licence, allows users 
to perform some or all of the aforementioned exclusive rights.  
 The concept of openness in this context is historically related to the 
concept of freedom.30 The father of the “free” movement was Richard 
                                                          
28. Guadamuz A, “The License/Contract Dichotomy in Open Licenses: A Comparative 
Analysis”, 30:2 University of La Verne Law Review 101 (2009).  
29. Kansa EC, Schultz J and Bissell AN, “Protecting Traditional Knowledge and Expanding 
Access to Scientific Data: Juxtaposing Intellectual Property Agendas via a Model”, 12:3 
International Journal of Cultural Property 285 (2005). 
30. Moody G, Rebel Code: Linux and the Open Source Revolution, London: Penguin (2002).  
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Stallman, a software developer who became disillusioned with the collapse of 
what was perceived as an earlier golden age of programming where most 
code was shared between small numbers of creators. Stallman explains that 
software began to have restrictions imposed in the shape of proprietary 
licences that told users that they could not access the source code to modify 
the software, or share it with other people with the purpose of enhancing its 
functionality. If the user engaged in any tinkering with the code, then he/she 
stopped being a hobbyist and became a pirate.31 Eventually, Stallman and 
other like-minded programmers created a powerful software development 
force under the general principles of non-proprietary software.  
 One of the main proponents of the idea of freedom as expressed by 
Stallman has been the Open Knowledge Foundation. In their definition of 
freedom, they have identified the main characteristics that a “free” (and 
consequently, an open work) should have. These freedoms are: 
 
 the freedom to use the work and enjoy the benefits of using it  
 the freedom to study the work and to apply knowledge acquired from it  
 the freedom to make and redistribute copies, in whole or in part, of 
the information or expression  
 the freedom to make changes and improvements, and to distribute 
derivative works.32 
 
 By definition, all licences that propose to be free contain all of these 
freedoms. While there is a philosophical argument between the users of the 
term “free” and “open”, particularly in the software arena,33 most of the times 
both camps are talking about the same core principles.  
 
2.2 Free and open source software 
There is a considerable amount of literature which deals with the subject of 
free and open source software, so this section will only serve as a small 
introduction for those unfamiliar with the concept.34 There are two common 
names given to the application of peer-production models to software 
development, free software and open source software, which result in the 
                                                          
31. Revolution OS, Directed by J.T.S. Moore, (2001).   
32. Open Knowledge Foundation, Freedom Defined, (2008), http://freedomdefined.org/ 
Definition.  
33. For a discussion of the differences, see: Guadamuz A, “Viral Contracts or Unenforceable 
Documents? Contractual Validity of Copyleft Licenses”, 26:8 European Intellectual 
Property Review 331 (2004).  
34. For a more detailed introduction, see: Guadamuz A, “Free and Open Source Software”, in 
Edwards L and Waelde C (eds), Law and the Internet, 3rd ed, Oxford: Hart (2009), pp.359–
391; and Phillips DE, The Software License Unveiled: How Legislation by License Controls 
Software Access, Oxford: Oxford University Press (2009).  
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compromise name free and open source software (FOSS).35 Contrary to 
popular misconception about the movement, it is important to note that FOSS 
is not necessarily free of charge, and that it is not a movement opposed to 
traditional intellectual property protection.  
 In its more general form, FOSS is simply defined as software which is 
subject to later modifications by the user or other developers by allowing free 
access to its source code.36 In this light, non-proprietary software is 
considered such if it is released under a permissive licence that allows such 
later modifications to the work, also known as “forks”. These licences not 
only allow others to make their own modifications, but also permit users to 
distribute them accordingly. It is also understood that FOSS licences allow a 
wider range of rights to consumers that they would otherwise have, such as 
making copies of the work, or installing and distributing the software.37  
 FOSS licences cover a large spectrum of legal approaches and 
philosophies; and therefore a classification of licences is difficult. A survey 
conducted by the author found 131 software licences that could be defined as 
either free or open.38 However, all FOSS licences share some common 
elements. These are: 
 
 Attribution. Copyright notices are to be kept intact, and the author(s) 
will be attributed in the code.  
 Access to the source code. This is the most basic common element in 
all licences. The source code will be included either with the 
distribution, or is to be made available to the public in an open source 
repository.39 
 User rights. Users are granted a non-exclusive right to use, copy and 
distribute the work.  
 Derivatives. All FOSS licences allow developers to make 
modifications to the source code and make those modifications 
available to the public. This modification may come with restrictions.  
 
 There is, however, one element that is not shared by all licences, and that 
is copyleft. Copyleft is a legal mechanism contained in a licence which 
maintains the general freedoms awarded to FOSS users, but by acquiring a 
                                                          
35. Also often referred to as FLOSS, Free Libre Open Source Software, adding the French and 
Spanish word for free as in freedom.  
36. Source code is the programming statement expressed in a programming language that exists 
before the program is compiled into an executable application. The executable form of the 
software is generally known as the object code, and can only be read by the machine.  
37. Guadamuz, supra note 34.  
38. See: Guadamuz A, “Public Rights Licences”, WorldLII (2008), http://www.worldlii.org/int/ 
other/PubRL/.  
39. Such as SourceForge, located at: http://sourceforge.net.  
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program released as copyleft, the user agrees to a licence that states that the 
software will not be used to develop closed source applications derived from 
it.40 This is done by the inclusion of a clause that requires that all derivatives 
arising from the original code will be released under the same freedoms 
under which they were received. Arguably, the GNU General Public License 
(GPL)41 is the most important copyleft licence.42 One of the most essential 
clauses included in the GPL is the copyleft clause, which sets restrictions 
against using the software in proprietary manners. The section reads:  
 
2. You may modify your copy or copies of the Program or any portion of it, thus 
forming a work based on the Program, and copy and distribute such modifications 
or work under the terms of Section 1 above, provided that you also meet all of 
these conditions: […] b) You must cause any work that you distribute or publish, 
that in whole or in part contains or is derived from the Program or any part thereof, 
to be licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of this 
License.[Emphasis added]43   
 
 What this means is that any software developed by using the source code 
of the copyleft program must ensure that the GPL is transferred to future 
users of the derivative software. This type of licence has been aptly named a 
“viral contract” as the contractual obligations contained are passed through a 
chain of distribution to other contracting parties.44 The GPL therefore spreads 
in viral form, as the licensee must include the terms of the GPL in any 
subsequent derivative work they produce. Those subsequent licensees will be 
under the obligation to license their derivatives with the same obligations in 
place, and so forth. 
 This opens up a crucial legal question relevant to the present work. The 
presence of hundreds of FOSS licences creates sometimes operational 
problems for developers. Imagine that you are a developer who wants to 
include software under a FOSS licence to your project. From the start, you 
are presented with a choice of licence, assuming that you do not feel inclined 
to draft one from scratch. If this is a non-copyleft licence, then probably one 
of the main requirements is that you keep the source code open, and you are 
free to choose your own licence. But imagine that the code is released under 
                                                          
40. Rosen LE, Open Source Licensing: Software Freedom and Intellectual Property Law, Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall PTR (2004), p.105.  
41. http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html. 
42. At the time of writing, 62 percent of all projects charted by the open source project Black 
Duck are released under one of the different versions of the GPL. Of these, version 2 
commands 47 percent, and the latest version (3.0) has 6.35 percent of the total share. See: 
http://www.blackducksoftware.com/oss/licenses#top20.  
43. GPL, s.2(b).   
44. Radin M, “Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment”, 75 Indiana Law Journal 1125 
(2000).  
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a copyleft licence such as the GPL, then any modifications you do will have 
to be released under the same licence, or in some instances, a compatible one. 
This may seem straightforward, but with code being released under different 
licences you may end up with conflicting and incompatible code. This is the 
problem of licence incompatibility,45 and it is of growing concern in FOSS 
licensing. Some possible solutions to this problem will be discussed later.  
 
2.3 Open content 
Open source licensing only applies to software, and it has undoubtedly been a 
very successful example of the peer-production sharing ethic.46 A measure of 
the success of both the licensing model and the open source development 
philosophy is that the same ideas have been exported to other areas of 
intellectual creation, most significantly in the creative industries.  
 The most successful deployment of the FOSS “some rights reserved” 
licensing model to cultural works is to be found in Creative Commons (CC) 
licenses.47 The Creative Commons project attempts to create so-called 
“intellectual property conservancies”,48 separating a block of human 
knowledge offered for the benefit of the public, but still protected by 
intellectual property.49 This is analogous to nature conservation areas that 
exist for the wider social benefit, but have restrictions on certain uses. In the 
Creative Commons, the goal of intellectual property conservancies is 
achieved through the offering of a wide variety of licenses to protect creative 
works from misuse. This is done through the application of open source 
principles, where the work retains its copyright protection, but it is 
distributed freely50 as long as the conditions contained in the license are met. 
An interesting part of the CC licensing environment is that users get to 
customise the rights given by picking from various licensing elements. 
Creators and authors need only to go to the CC website and select from 
different options offered in a few drop-down menus; the system then chooses 
the license that fits the parameters entered. These licenses range from 
offering the work straight into the public domain, to more complex licenses 
with restrictions as to the commercial distribution of the work and the use of 
licenses in such distributions.51   
                                                          
45. For more about this subject, see: Rosen supra note 40.  
46. Weber S, The Success of Open Source, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press (2004). 
47. See: http://creativecommons.org/.  
48. Creative Commons, Legal Concepts, http://creativecommons.org/learn/legal/.  
49. For more details about CC licences, see: Dusollier S, “The Master’s Tools v the Master’s 
House: Creative Commons V Copyright”, 29:3 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 271 
(2007); and Elkin-Koren N, “What Contracts Can’t Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in 
Facilitating a Creative Commons”, 74:2 Fordham Law Review 375 (2005).  
50. In the Free Software sense, free here means free as in freedom, not free as in beer.  
51. For more about Creative Commons see: Waelde C et al, The Common Information 
Environment and Creative Commons, Final Report to the Common Information 
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 Creative Commons licenses resemble their software counterparts in the 
fact that they maintain a minimum set of standards that are met by all of the 
licences. All CC licenses allow owners to retain copyright, but also allow 
users with the right to copy, distribute, display, digitally perform and make 
verbatim copies of the work into another format. This allows users to freely 
share, remix and redistribute content. For example, many of the images used 
in this book are released under a CC licence, and therefore can be included 
without having to ask permission from the owner.52  
 It is important to note that the baseline definition of CC licenses does not 
mention anything about modification or adaptation of a work; does not deal 
with copyleft-like clauses requiring the use of similar licenses to distribute 
the work; does not mention attribution; and does not deal with the 
distribution of copies for commercial purposes. Nevertheless, creators can 
choose a CC license that maintains all of the restrictions mentioned from all 
of the options offered. Authors then can choose from the following options to 
generate their license:53 
 
 Attribution: The work is made available to the public with the 
baseline rights, but only if the author receives proper credit.54    
 Non-commercial: The work can be copied, displayed and distributed 
by the public, but only if these actions are for non-commercial 
purposes.55  
 No derivative works: This license element grants baseline rights, but 
it does not allow derivative works to be created from the original.  
 Share-Alike: This is based on copyleft principle. Derivative works 
can be created and distributed based on the original, but only if the 
same type of license is used, which generates a viral license.  
 
 It is possible to have licenses that combine several of these options.56 The 
strongest (and most popular) CC license is the Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike License,57 which is the license that most resembles the strongest 
copyleft software ones (such as the GPL). All CC licenses are presented in 
three formats: the first is a short and easy to read “Commons Deed”, which 
                                                                                                                             
Environment Members of a study on the applicability of Creative Commons Licences 
(2005).  
52. See for example, Figure 2.4.  
53. For more about the CC license elements, see: http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses.  
54. Starting with Creative Commons version 2.5, the Attribution element is factually a baseline 
right and not an element that can be selected for.   
55. For more details about what constitutes a non-commercial work, see: Creative Commons, 
Defining “Noncommercial”: A Study of How the Online Population Understands 
“Noncommercial” Use, (2009), http://wiki.creativecommons.org/Defining_Noncommercial.  
56. However, the No Derivative and the Share-Alike elements are exclusive.  
57. Version 2.5 can be found here: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/. 
 154   Networks, Complexity and Internet Regulation  
 
 
explains the terms and conditions of the license in a simple manner; the 
second format is the “Legal Code”, which is the full license; the third is the 
“Digital Code”, which is described in an HTML version of the license58 that 
can be read by search engines and makes it easier to list the content in the 
Creative Commons directory.  
 Creative Commons presents a very positive step towards the wider 
distribution of creative works that is thoroughly compatible with the principle 
of peer-production. These licences are almost entirely tailored to respond to 
the needs of the user-generated content environment because they allow users 
to take control of their own works without having to consult a lawyer in order 
to draft a licence. It also allows the reuse of works, a goal that makes it 
particularly well-tailored for non-commercial uses widespread in the peer-
produced Internet. Any time someone releases their work with a CC licence, 
it is an invitation to the world to share the work. Sharing information and the 
collaborative nature of content is precisely one of the most powerful 
characteristics of peer-production. Social engagement and distribution of 
content enriches the content environment. Piracy is not really a concern 
within the UGC universe.  
 The success of the Creative Commons licensing model cannot longer be in 
dispute. At the time of writing, Creative Commons calculated that there were 
at minimum 350 million CC licensed works available online. This figure is a 
minimum because it only offers a metric of works that can be searched on the 
Internet, and it is possible that there are many more.59 Another measure of the 
licensing success is that Wikipedia has started sharing all of its content using 
CC licences;60 which serves as further evidence of the peer-production 
credentials of the open content movement. Moreover, the image-sharing 
website Flickr had 13,290,440 individual images released under a CC 
licence.61 But not only is Creative Commons used only for creative works, a 
considerable number of scientific and scholarly publications are now 
published using CC licenses.62  
 Open content is an excellent example of the relevance of peer-production; 
from photographs to blogs, from music to scientific works, the message is 
clear. Open content has become an important part of the Internet’s content 
                                                          
58. To be more specific, the code uses Resource Description Framework (RDF) metadata. For 
more about RDF, see: http://www.w3.org/RDF/. 
59. For a discussion on the difficulties of fining CC content, see: Bildstein B, “Finding and 
Quantifying Australia’s Online Commons”, 4:1 SCRIPTed 8 (2007). 
60. Nicole C, “Wikipedia Now Uses Creative Commons”, Mashable Blog (12 February, 2007), 
http://mashable.com/2007/12/02/wikipedia-creative-commons/.  
61. http://www.flickr.com/creativecommons/.  
62. For more about this, see: Guadamuz A, “Open Science: Open Source Licences for Scientific 
Research”, 7:2 North Carolina Journal of Law and Technology 321 (2006). 
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ecology, and the existence of easy-to-use licences that allow redistribution of 
content are a central part of their success. 
 
 
3. COMPLEXITY IN OPEN LICENSING 
 
3.1 Open self-organisation 
One noteworthy aspect of the peer-production phenomenon implemented in 
open licensing environments is that it is clearly an exercise in self-
organisation. It is not really necessary to repeat some of the concepts of self-
organisation present in complex-adaptive systems, but one factor that can be 
refreshed is that these are dynamic networks where the constituents (be they 
individuals or organisations) respond to one another to form some coherent 
and stable environment. In true self-organising fashion, open licensed content 
(particularly open source software) operates in a manner that brings together 
actors from around the world in order to work on a project that brings about a 
desired result, be it a collected book, a remixed song, or a piece of software.  
 One of the most powerful metaphors that explain the self-organising 
nature of open content was expressed by programmer Eric Raymond in his 
influential work The Cathedral and the Bazaar.63 There are two main ways to 
organise large numbers of people to produce a result, by hierarchical top-
down project management, or by organic and chaotic means. To build 
something large and magnificent as a cathedral, one needs a funding entity, 
architects, masons, sculptors, painters, carpenters and a large number of 
workers. These types of projects can only come about by the shared effort of 
hundreds of individuals, but more importantly, they require some form of 
centralised organisational structure in order to bring about the desired result. 
Bazaars are entirely different organisational entities, they are non-
hierarchical, people come together seemingly without pattern, and either by 
custom or local norms produce a stable yet chaotic environment. Despite 
lacking structure, somehow bazaars exist. Raymond commented that open 
source software development was akin to a bazaar, it should not work, but 
somehow it does, even by being open to “the point of promiscuity”. While 
Raymond seems to be unaware of words like autopoiesis, emergence, and 
self-organisation, what he is describing is precisely a network that comes 
together and creates order from chaos. Open source is a complex adaptive 
system at work.  
 The end result is that open licensed content presents an excellent case 
study for self-organisation. Moreover, the networks of developers, creators, 
distributors and re-users also provide an excellent testing ground for the legal 
                                                          
63. Raymond ES, The Cathedral and the Bazaar: Musings on Linux and Open Source by an 
Accidental Revolutionary, Sebastopol, CA: O’Reilly Media (2001).  
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application of complexity theory, as these are environments where the 
copyright licence reigns supreme.  
 A cursory look at the area of FOSS development features some apparently 
impressive examples of self-organisation in action. Take, for example, the 
Linux operating system. Linux is a UNIX-based kernel64 which began as a 
hacker project by Finnish programmer Linus Torvalds in 1990. He had been 
waiting for the developments of a UNIX-like kernel from free software 
developers, but when one was not forthcoming he developed his own, named 
it Linux and then placed it on the Internet for free, asking programmers to 
improve and build on it.65 In true open source fashion, Torvalds managed to 
get lots of feedback from other programmers by making the source code for 
Linux available to everybody. By the end of 1991, a stable version of the 
Linux kernel was available to the public, and development has continued 
ever since.66 This has led to different versions (known as distributions) of 
Linux being developed, giving this operating system a lot of stability and 
security, as the community was in charge of its support.  
 The remarkable fact from a self-organisation perspective is that while 
Linus Torvalds remained as the main maintainer of the Linux project through 
the years, the development has continued with the contribution of thousands 
of programmers around the world, and by 2001 the Linux kernel contained 
2.4 million lines of code;67 and it has continued to grow, with the latest 
version boasting 4.2 million lines of code.68 Needless to say, such an amount 
of work would have been impossible if Torvalds had decided to work on his 
own. Most of the contribution to the project has been by hobbyists, people 
who give up their free time to write code, test the program and debug its 
interoperability. This constitutes an impressive case of self-organisation in 
the truest sense of the term.69  
 Moreover, it is possible to calculate what the cost of any open source 
project would have been if it had been produced via commercial centralised 
methods, in other words, if it had been built like a cathedral. Because the 
source code for FOSS projects is available to everyone for examination, it is 
possible to calculate the number of single lines of code that each program 
has, and therefore it is also possible to calculate the number of programmer 
                                                          
64. The kernel is the central component in an operating system, which manages system 
resources and allocates memory and processor usage.  
65. Moody, supra note 30; pp.31–35.  
66. Ibid.  
67. Wheeler, supra note 19.  
68. Wheeler DA, Linux Kernel 2.6: It’s Worth More! (2004), http://www.dwheeler.com/essays/ 
linux-kernel-cost.html.  
69. Hars A and Ou S, “Working For Free? Motivations of Participating in Open Source 
Projects”, Proceedings of the 34th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System 
Sciences (2001). 
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hours that have gone into producing the software. A report funded by the 
European Commission70 looked at the five largest FOSS software projects, 
and calculated the cost that would have gone into producing the programs 
using the cathedral model. The results are: 
 
Table 6.1 Production cost estimate for the five largest FOSS software 
products71  
Software package 
Lines of 
code Months 
Person-
months 
Cost 
(million 
EUR) 
Openoffice.org 5,181,285 130 79,237 482 
Linux Kernel-
source-2.6.8 4,033,843 160 145,036 882 
Firefox 2,437,724 87 25,339 154 
GCC-3.4 2,422,056 113 54,048 329 
Xfree86 2,316,842 90 27,860 169 
 
 These figures hint at the existence of a commercially viable self-
organising model; somehow the bazaar works. But how exactly do these 
communities come together to produce millions of lines of code? This is 
where the study of complex adaptive systems comes into play. The FOSS 
developer communities are in the end networks of interacting agents that 
come together with an ultimate objective. These networks can be local, for 
example, a group of programmers that know each other and come together to 
produce software. However, for larger projects, the network spans across 
countries, which requires more complex organisational structures.  
 An interesting study into these networks has produced some intriguing 
results.72 By looking at the social network structure of the agents in the 
network, and their constituent nodes and links, researchers found that open 
source software communities resemble other organisational types found in 
both natural and artificial networks. In particular, they studied the 
organisational structure of wasp colonies, and found a striking similarity with 
the social network structure of FOSS communities. Specifically, the wasp 
network relied heavily on successful nodes to maintain the colony together. 
Similarly, a degree and link analysis of email communication of 120 separate 
                                                          
70. Ghosh RA, Study on the Economic Impact of Open Source Software on Innovation and the 
Competitiveness of the Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) Sector in the 
EU, European Commission Report ENTR/04/112 (2006). 
71. Ibid, p.50.  
72. Valverde S et al, “Self-Managing Systems – Self-Organization Patterns in Wasp and Open 
Source Communities”, 21:2 IEEE Intelligent Systems 5 (2006).  
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software teams produced a similar reliance on heavily centralised nodes.73 
Not only that, when plotting the number of links in both a small network of 
wasps and in small software communities into a logarithmic graph, both 
networks had similar communication distribution patterns.74 The implications 
of the study are clear, and it is something that we can see all across the board 
when dealing with complex adaptive systems – self-organising networks rely 
on the hubs.  
 The apparent reliance of FOSS teams on hubs within the network may 
seem inconsistent with the bazaar model, but it makes sense. Distributed 
networks of programmers who may have never met may self-organise, but 
self-organisation does not preclude some form of hierarchical structure, with 
the appointment of leaders and organisers that help the group to reach an 
objective. Crowston et al75 conducted a survey of several high-profile FOSS 
projects, and found that while there is undeniably self-organisation at work in 
these networks, there is also a leadership structure that allows successful 
communities to produce software programs. They were particularly interested 
in teams where there was no assigned leadership; in other words, where 
leaders emerged from the community, also in self-organising fashion. The 
need for some leadership was required precisely because the group needed 
direction in ways to incorporate new members to the team, and also because 
there was need to develop norms and rules to maintain cohesion and 
efficiency.76 Other research seems to corroborate this finding, as it seems 
clear that projects that are held together by an important hub in the network 
have more chance to succeed than others where no such role is present.77    
 All of these investigations hint at the existence of strong self-organising 
forces within FOSS development groups, but the presence of such emergent 
features in the network could also be found in other organisational models, 
such as Raymond’s cathedral example. Another study78 has tried to look 
precisely into this question, trying to determine if the self-organisation found 
in open source communities is similar to that found in proprietary software 
development groups. The first point to address is that FOSS self-organisation 
tackles specific areas of project management. An essential element of self-
organisation of large distributed networks is the allocation of resources and 
                                                          
73. Ibid, p.39.  
74. Ibid, p.38. 
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77. Grewal R, Lilien GL and Mallapragada G, “Location, Location, Location: How Network 
Embeddedness Affects Project Success in Open Source Systems”, 52:7 Management 
Science 1043 (2006). 
78. Crowston K et al, “Self-Organization of Teams for Free/Libre Open Source Software 
Development”, 49:6 Information and Software Technology 564 (2007).  
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the assignment of tasks. A group that has come together often without 
monetary goals is difficult to organise in the best of situations, so how these 
networks are able to allocate specific tasks within the group can be a 
structural nightmare, yet it happens in thousands of FOSS projects. The study 
found that there were two main ways in which the communities self-
organised: by self-assignment of tasks, and by some form of leadership 
assignment where programmer reputation served to allocate some level of 
hierarchical structure. This is an entirely different manner to that which 
proprietary software is produced, where assignment of tasks is the norm. The 
researchers found that there was a clear distinction in how proprietary and 
non-proprietary firms are organised, and therefore FOSS projects are indeed 
self-organising in manners that are dissimilar to how the cathedral model 
operates.  
 It seems clear that self-organisation exists in the free and open source 
software arena. However, does this translate into the open content field? This 
is a more difficult question to answer, particularly because the amount of 
research into open content does not match that found in software. The 
existence of large peer-produced open content projects, such as Wikipedia, 
hint at the existence of self-organising mechanisms here as well. However, 
Wikipedia is a difficult example to offer because while it is undeniably a 
peer-produced repository of knowledge, it has evolved over time. In the 
beginning, everyone could add and edit content to the online encyclopaedia, 
but this led to low quality of content in many entries, and also led to editing 
wars in controversial subjects. The community has organised itself in strict 
hierarchical manner, with heavy editors becoming de facto leaders of the 
community, and where an even smaller group of users with administrative 
powers can exercise heavy control.79 While this still shows the predominance 
of emergent order, there seems to be some difference between this type of 
self-organisation and that found in software development. Duguid80 has 
commented that this may be caused by the existence of strong quality 
controls in the software arena, as opposed to the open content creation. 
Nonetheless, he still found strong self-organising features in several UGC 
sites, such as Gracenote, Project Gutenberg and Wikipedia.81    
 While it is true that many of the studies highlighted provide some 
descriptive insight into self-organisation in general, there are also some 
prescriptive lessons to be learned. Particularly, it has been one of the goals of 
this work that a theory self-organisation in Internet regulation is possible. 
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The above examples into the emergent order of FOSS communities offer 
actual examples that some level of regulatory control and norm-setting will 
arise within online networks regardless of the existence of top-down 
guidance. Social networks with a common objective will produce some 
operational structure; this simple yet powerful finding is in itself a vital piece 
of the regulatory puzzle. Moreover, these networks still rely on hubs to 
coalesce and produce works.  
 
3.2 Open scale-free networks 
The self-organising nature of peer-production opens up another possible use 
of network theory in the analysis of the phenomenon. The evidence into the 
organisational structure of open communities may lead to the hypothesis that 
the ordering described could be caused by the presence of scale-free 
networks. This seems to be a common feature of complex adaptive systems, 
so whenever we see such order, it is possible that this might be caused by the 
presence of power law distributions within the networks. There are two main 
elements of peer-production where the presence of power laws could provide 
some insight into self-organisation. Firstly, there are the networks of 
developers and creators themselves. Secondly, there are the works created 
under peer-production models. It is important to keep this distinction in mind, 
as the presence of a power law in one may not be translated into a power law 
in the other. It would be interesting to see if self-organisation occurs only 
from the existence of a scale-free network of developers, even if the actual 
content created does not display power laws.  
 There is growing evidence that peer-production networks are indeed scale-
free. Maillart et al82 conducted a network analysis of the content in Linux 
distributions, namely the growth in size of the number of packages contained 
within the Debian Linux distribution, which were created under the FOSS 
development model. They measured the growth of the distribution over time, 
and found that Debian had been growing steadily following Zipf’s Law. If 
you recall, Zipf’s Law takes place where the frequency of an occurrence is 
inversely proportional to the one next in rank. When looking at the growth of 
Debian over time and plotting the number in a logarithmic scale, then the 
resulting graph is a straight line, where one version of Debian would be 
proportionally larger than the preceding version. The study found that this 
was probably caused because there was a power law in the links between the 
software packages that constituted the distribution. The reason for this is that 
not all of the software included in Debian  was created at the same time, but 
was dependent on the regular flow of created objects. New software would be 
included only where there was an existing package that supported it, hence 
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the steady growth. In other words, software grows steadily because new 
software relies on the existing one. While this may seem a completely 
intuitive result, the presence of power laws in the growth of Linux tells us 
that there is clearly a self-organising force at work.  
 Other researchers have found power laws in the developer network. 
Madey, Freeh and Tynan83 collected data from almost 60,000 FOSS projects 
between 2001 and 2003, and conducted network analysis of the size of 
projects as a whole, the number of developers within each project, and also 
identified important actors within each network by trying to determine if they 
collaborated with other projects. The study found power law distributions in 
all areas, for example, the size of projects presented a power law, but also the 
clustering of developers within each network. However, when the study 
looked at clusters of developers, they found high clustering in some groups; 
while the majority of projects followed a power law, some projects were 
highly clustered around smaller number of developers. The researchers 
comment: 
 
The analysis provides support for the contention that the F/OSS community is a 
self-organizing system, and it also yielded an unexpected finding regarding the 
structure of the community. Several different types of analyses on the F/OSS data 
obey the power-law, which gives support to the hypothesis advanced by many 
qualitative researchers that the F/OSS community operates as a self-organizing 
system. When one examines the size of connected projects and developers, 
however, a second phenomenon emerges. It appears that there may be a dual 
nature to the structure of the F/OSS community, at least at this point in time. 
While the less well-connected clusters fit the power law, suggesting that part of the 
network is operating as a self-organizing system, there is a substantial percentage 
of the network (34.6% in March 2003) that is behaving differently, and that cluster 
does not fit the power-law pattern of the rest of the network data.84 
 
 This result may be caused by another self-organising characteristic of 
scale-free networks that the study seems to have ignored, and this is the small 
world phenomenon. It seems evident that some open source projects 
collapsed into tight clusters, which is also consistent with scale-free 
networks, as what may be happening is a “rich get richer” scenario. Another 
study85 that looked at a similar dataset of developers came to this conclusion 
when it found that there was indeed some high clustering of some of the 
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communities, and explained that this was caused by preferential attachment: 
nodes already attached to the network attract new nodes, but the more 
connected nodes attract more nodes than others with a lesser degree of 
centrality. Preferential attachment is precisely one of the reasons behind the 
“rich get richer” phenomenon.86 
 From the above, it seems like the self-organisation present in peer-
production networks is not only the result of the scale-free network 
distribution of the networks, but may also be caused by the presence of 
preferential attachment. Success breeds success online, successful sites draw 
more links, and therefore the network organises itself around these hubs. This 
seems to be occurring as well in open content networks where power law 
distributions are present. A study into Wikipedia data produced hard 
evidence that the online encyclopaedia was organising itself around popular 
links.87 Wilkinson and Huberman explain that while large sites such as 
Wikipedia are usually open to large-scale editing from almost anyone, the 
patterns suggest that some articles accrue most of the editing efforts: 
 
We have shown that although Wikipedia is a complex system in which of millions 
of diverse editors collaborate in an unscheduled and virtually uncontrolled fashion, 
editing follows a very simple overall pattern. This pattern implies that a small 
number of articles, corresponding to topics of high relevance or visibility, accrete a 
disproportionately large number of edits. And, while large collaborations have 
been shown to fail in many contexts, Wikipedia article quality continues to 
increase, on average, as the number of collaborators and the number of edits 
increases. Thus, topics of high interest or relevance are naturally brought to the 
forefront of visibility and quality.88 
 
 All of the above serves as further proof that a theory of self-organising 
Internet regulation is possible. It seems that not only is there self-organisation 
occurring in peer-production, but that this is caused by highly clustered 
popular nodes in the network. Wherever we find self-organisation, it is 
possible to postulate that we will also find networks that display power laws 
caused by preferential attachment of nodes. The prescriptive lesson is that it 
may be impossible to regulate these networks in traditional top-down 
approaches, but also, the presence of power laws may explain why it has 
been so difficult for regulators to stifle some practices such as illegal file-
sharing. The emerging picture from both file-sharing and peer-production 
networks is that these are highly resilient, self-organising complex entities. 
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The above evidence points towards the existence of structural laws of the 
Internet that have to be understood if one hopes to regulate the online 
environment. 
 
3.3 Open licences, social clusters and fitness 
Open licences are an important constituent part of peer-production. While not 
all user-generated content is released under an open licence, there are very 
important sectors that are. By definition, FOSS has to be released under one 
such licence, and there is also content that is released under “some rights 
reserved” schemes. As it has been stated earlier, these licences allow users to 
republish, reuse, redistribute and modify the original work. 
 It is in the reuse aspect of the licences where network theory tools may 
provide some helping hand in trying to unravel the licensing maze of 
potentially incompatible terms and conditions. As it has been mentioned 
earlier, open source software is released under various different licences, 
some of which may have terms that are incompatible with one another. When 
we are dealing with only one project, this is often not a problem, as the 
developers may choose source code and software packages incompatible with 
their own licensing objectives. Now consider larger projects that collect code 
from various existing packages, and you may start to see the problem.  
 To illustrate this problem, German and Hassan89 examined the licensing 
terms of 124 FOSS projects including some popular applications such as 
Apache web server, mysql, and GCC. These software packages have in 
common that they are not monolithic pieces of code; they are often complex 
software projects which include a large number of components. They found 
that the inspected software used more than 20 licenses, which could be 
roughly classed under 11 sub-groupings once different versions of the same 
licence were merged. Unsurprisingly, a large number of the inspected 
software was released under the GPL (45 in total), but the worrying result 
was the range of incompatibilities found. While the study found ways to get 
around potential incompatibility problems by mixing and matching packages 
released with compatible licences, the challenge to developers is clear. 
 Research in the specific area of licensing is scarce, and most investigative 
efforts seem to be directed towards the analysis of the development 
communities as such.90 Other social network tools have been deployed to 
analyse and visualise open source projects specifically from the codebase by 
looking at the interaction between developers. Take Gource, a powerful and 
                                                          
89. German DM and Hassan AE, “License Integration Patterns: Addressing License 
Mismatches in Component-Based Development”, International Conference on Software 
Engineering (2009).  
90. See for example: Lanzara GF and Morner M, “The Knowledge Ecology of Open-Source 
Software Projects”, Proceedings of the 19th EGOS Colloquium, Copenhagen (2003). 
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dare we say beautiful visualisation tool that allows developers to look at all 
aspects of their project (Figure 6.1). 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Social network representation of Linux91 
 
 The lack of research into source code distribution chains along licensing 
pathways may be the result of the various manners in which FOSS projects 
can be modified to produce new software. Source code can be simply 
adopted by another project, as has been explained, this would be a first 
generation adaptation from the original code, and it is known as branching.92 
It is also possible for a project to split into smaller components for 
development purposes, and then for the code to be brought together into the 
parent project, which is known as merging.93 A third way of adapting source 
code is for a project to diverge into another version, something that is known 
as forking.94 All of these derivative strategies hint at the prevalence of the 
functional nature of software. FOSS licensing is an efficient way to make 
                                                          
91. Found at: http://code.google.com/p/gource/wiki/Screenshots. Released under GNU General 
Public License v3, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html.  
92. Cheliotis G, “From Open Source to Open Content: Organization, Licensing and Decision 
Processes in Open Cultural Production”, 47:3 Decision Support Systems 229 (2009).  
93. Ibid.  
94. Ibid.  
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sure that the source code remains open for modification. This functional 
nature may dissuade researchers from looking at the distribution chains, as 
what matters is the decision-making process that produced the modification. 
Cultural works are different because creative expressions are intrinsically 
subjective and non-functional; each modification is dependent heavily on the 
aesthetic and cultural value of the original. 
 Interestingly, this difference between the functional aspect of software and 
the value of cultural remixes has allowed more research into the open content 
licensing modification chains. ccMixter95 is a relatively small online 
community of musicians and music enthusiasts where creators make their 
music available to the public under a CC licence, encouraging the reuse and 
remixing of these works. Cheliotis96 conducted a network analysis of the 
reuse of materials within a community of 1,850 active users sharing 7,484 
music works. He drew a directed graph of works, where each work was the 
node, and if there had been reuse of a work, then that would be established as 
a link. By looking at a smaller dataset, the study was able to look at several 
aspects of how peer-production occurs in real life but, more importantly, it 
was possible to examine the regulatory role of the licences in the remixing 
community. Cheliotis comments that: 
 
Interestingly we have thus far observed that in ccMixter (a) authors of derivatives 
tend to respect the licenses of the works they reuse, and (b) in cases where they 
could legitimately license their derivatives under more restrictive terms, they 
generally do not. Upon closer inspection we found out that this is primarily the 
result of an ingenious licensing mechanism implemented by the site 
administrators. Every author of a remix must state the sources used in the 
derivative work. As the license of each source work is stored in a database, the 
website will automatically select an ap-propriate license for the remix. Thus 
license compliance is ensured.97 
 
 This is a valuable regulatory insight into the peer-production licensing 
ecology. It seems like architecture plays an important part in the organising 
decisions made by content creators. Similarly, community norm-setting is 
still as important as the licence itself, as the community will be more likely to 
establish licensing decisions that should be followed by those participating in 
the sharing environment. Another finding of the study is that it analysed the 
chain of reuse of participating musical works; in other words, it could follow 
the number of remixes that the original piece received. This provides a 
                                                          
95. http://ccmixter.org/.  
96. Cheliotis G, Remix Culture: Creative Reuse and the Licensing of Digital Media in Online 
Communities, Participatory Media Lab Working Paper (2008), http://pml.wdfiles.com/local-
-files/working-papers/Remix_Culture_Web_Version.pdf.  
97. Ibid, p.8.  
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concise demonstration of distribution chains that are also present in other 
peer-production areas, such as software. Here Cheliotis found that most 
works were only remixed one, and that subsequent modified versions were 
less likely to occur, down to the fifth generation, where remixing was almost 
negligible. Finally, the study produced results that are consistent with the rest 
of the literature on peer-production networks, as it became clear that the 
network was organised around central hubs and popular mixes (Figure 6.2).  
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Network of works produced in the ccMixter community 
 
 Finally, the viral nature of peer-produced works released under copyleft 
licences could also be seen as well from a complexity perspective, and it 
could give us valid regulatory insights as well. One of the effects of copyleft 
licensing is that copyleft clauses require works to be released under the same 
terms licence. As has been mentioned before, this could prove to be a viral 
effect: the licence would replicate because it is explicitly required to do so. 
This serves as a very strong regulatory imperative to the community of 
creators and developers that are currently sharing and using the licensed 
work.  
 The question is whether copyleft licences are unintentionally creating a 
licensing environment that intrinsically favours copyleft content. Thinking 
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back on some of the concepts of self-organisation, complex systems can 
sometimes reach order within a fitness landscape where one of the fitness 
states is more stable than the other options. Could it be possible that copyleft 
licences are a fitness peak? The popularity of the licences is undeniable. As it 
has been mentioned already, copyleft licences are dominant in the FOSS 
ecology. Similarly, the ShareAlike licence element in Creative Commons 
licences is one of the most prevalent elements. More importantly, the share of 
CC-licensed works under a copyleft licence has been growing. In 2006, only 
45 percent of CC-licensed works were copyleft,98 while by May 2010, 57 
percent of all content was copyleft.99   
 Here we have a powerful indication of the existence of fitness landscapes 
in the self-organisational nature of the Internet. Theories of emergence tell us 
that order can be achieved when a system tries to find the most effective 
solutions to a problem. The simple addition of a clause in a copyright licence 
may serve as the point in which regulatory coalescence occurs, acting as a 
lightning rod for preferential attachment to occur. Something as seemingly 
innocent as a paragraph in a licence is an important self-organising force. 
Self-organisation can be directed, which has important implications for the 
proposed nascent theory of Internet regulation. 
 
 
4. PARETO REVISITED 
 
In the last chapter we examined the dominance of Pareto distributions in 
commercial creative works, but also the emergence of new business models 
exemplified by the long tail. Given the fact that there is currently a clash of 
cultures between peer-production and commercial content, it is logical to ask 
whether peer-production displays different consumption patterns to those 
found in their “all rights reserved” counterparts. Most, if not all, peer-
produced content is offered free of charge online, so one would expect that it 
displays very different usage characteristics to those present in the 
established creative industries. Is this the case? 
 
4.1 Measuring the UGC ecology 
A mere look at the size of the UGC universe produces an impressive picture 
of the numbers involved. Wikipedia contains more than 12 million articles in 
262 languages, of which 25 have more than 100,000 entries.100 In November 
                                                          
98. Creative Commons, License statistics, (2006), http://wiki.creativecommons.org/ 
License_statistics#Raw_search_engine_query_data.  
99. Creative Commons, ccMonitor World Statistics, (2010), http://monitor. 
creativecommons.org/World.  
100. Wikipedia, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia.  
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2008 Flickr reached the 3 billion picture mark.101 By March 2008, YouTube 
had 78 million videos on display, with 200,000 new videos uploaded every 
day.102  Exact numbers on blogging are difficult to come by; blog aggregator 
Technorati has indexed a total of 133 million blogs since 2002, 900,000 of 
which had postings within 24 hours.103 According to Nielsen, social 
communities (blogs and social networking sites) are now the fourth top 
online activity of internet users, beating email (Figure 6.3).104 By February 
2009, Twitter had received 7,038,000 visitors, a 1,382 percent change from 
previous year.105  
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Internet use according to Nielsen 
 
 Whichever way one looks at these figures about the biggest players in the 
Web 2.0 sphere, one cannot help but be impressed. However, as has been 
                                                          
101. Flickr, 3 Billion, http://blog.flickr.net/en/2008/11/03/3-billion/.  
102. Digital Ethnography, YouTube Statistics, (2008), http://ksudigg.wetpaint.com/page/ 
YouTube+Statistics?t=anon.  
103. Technorati, State of the Blogosphere 2008, http://technorati.com/blogging/state-of-the-
blogosphere/.  
104. Nielsen, Global Faces and Networked Places, Nielsen report (March 2009), 
http://is.gd/eTSFc.  
105. Nielsen, “Twitter’s Tweet Smell Of Success”, Nielsen Wire (18 March, 2009), 
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online_mobile/twitters-tweet-smell-of-success.  
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remarked before, there are commentators that see such numbers as little more 
than widespread organised copyright infringement. Are we witnessing a true 
upswell in creativity, or simply rehashed postings and mash-ups from “real” 
creators? This is not a baseless question; one of the most publicised copyright 
infringement case hinged precisely on this issue. In Rowling v. RDR Books,106 
JK Rowling and Warner Bros sued Steven Vander Ark, the author of the 
Harry Potter Lexicon, and his publishers alleging copyright infringement 
over the publication of the Lexicon in printed form. The Lexicon was a 
reference work which contained numerous entries detailing the Harry Potter 
world.  The case highlighted the existing clash between competing media, as 
the Lexicon was very much the embodiment of user-generated content, where 
a fan of the Potter books had taken considerable time and effort to document 
and reference the tomes for an online audience. However, upon closer 
inspection, the court found that while the Lexicon conveyed “new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings” to the original 
work, it had copied and pasted entire passages unattributed, in what 
amounted to little more than plagiarism.107   
 This case serves to illustrate a serious problem encountered by user-
generated content in particular and peer-production in general, and it is the 
perception amongst some sectors that most of the content is either pirated or 
copied from established sources. It is difficult to dispel this myth given 
examples such as the Harry Potter Lexicon, but surely there is a wealth of 
true creativity and inventiveness involved in peer production. How to 
measure this then? 
 Unlike commercial distribution of content, impact and success are not 
measured in sales, so the first task is to find an adequate way to assess its 
relevance. Mere hits could give us an indication of popularity, but website 
metrics could be clouded with a question of granularity of content. A more 
indicative measure could be done through link backs to content, as this could 
give a better idea about the way in which information is being shared online. 
Technorati does precisely this with blogs by measuring impact through peer 
linking within the blogosphere, what they call a blog’s authority. This type of 
measure provides a better indication of what users find relevant as they link 
back to that content. Interestingly, a look at Technorati’s top 100 blogs 
reinforces the idea that we are faced with some scale-free topologies in UGC 
content, just as was found in the FOSS environment. For example, the top 
authority blog is The Huffington Post with more than 25,000 links to it, while 
there is a sharp fall in authority, producing a long tail chart (Figure 6.4).  
 The inequality is even sharper when one looks further down the chart. As 
of the time of writing, an authority of 375 ranks at around 7,000; 200 
                                                          
106. Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. et al v. RDR Books et al (575 F.Supp.2d 513).  
107. Ibid. 
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authority ranks 17,000; 95 authority ranks 48,000; and 41 authority ranks 
133,000. The blogosphere is a long tail of millions of blogs, but those at the 
top have a disproportionate amount of followers when compared to less read 
ones. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Technorati’s top 75 blogs108 
 
  This phenomenon is replicated in other user-generated sites with uncanny 
regularity. Incoming links to Wikipedia articles provide yet another long 
tail,109 as does the measure of article views.110 A study of 1.8 million random 
pictures on Flickr during a 10-day period produced an almost perfect power 
law, where 7 percent of images accounted for almost 50 percent of the 
views.111 Another study on YouTube video popularity also produced a heavy 
skew towards the top viewed content, while it also displayed a heavy tail.112  
                                                          
108. Chart as of 11/04/2009.  
109. Wikipedia, Histogram of Incoming Links for English Wikipedia Articles, (2009), 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Histogram_of_incoming_links_for_English_Wikip
edia_articles,_January_2009.jpg.  
110. See: Wikirank: http://wikirank.com/en.  
111. Van Zwol R, “Flickr: Who is Looking?” Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE/WIC/ACM 
International Conference on Web Intelligence (2007), http://www.semedia.org/PubFolder/ 
vanZwol-FlickrWhoLooking.pdf.  
112. Cheng X, Dale C and Liu J, “Statistics and Social Network of YouTube Videos”, 16th 
International Workshop on Quality of Service 229 (2008), http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpls/ 
abs_all.jsp?arnumber=4539688.      
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 It seems clear that there is considerable content inequality in the top UGC 
websites. Is this replicated elsewhere? This is more difficult to find out, as 
the research into UGC impact tends to concentrate on the bigger websites, 
probably because of the availability and openness of datasets and the ease of 
crawling through content. Studies into the usage of open source software 
have produced similar results, where it is clear that software popularity also 
follows Pareto distributions.113 Research into the use of content released 
under Creative Commons licenses seems to indicate similar long tail 
behaviour.114 Although there are inherent limitations with producing accurate 
data in consumption of CC content,115 one cannot ignore that one result 
seems to keep coming up time and time again. Pareto is alive and well in 
peer-production. 
 These findings seem completely counter-intuitive when one considers the 
many differences between peer-production and the copyright industries, a 
difference that is not only about price; the entire licensing model is different, 
as well as the motivation of players. In fact, whether a work is offered for 
free online or paid seems irrelevant when one looks at sheer download 
figures, as evidenced by the fact that even P2P content follows the 
commercial popularity of the work: more popular films will be more 
downloaded for free.116 Therefore, one would have to ask the reason for the 
similarities in usage statistics displayed by both commercial content and 
user-generated content. It is possible that in both environments, information 
replicates in similar manners. Both UGC and commercial content appear to 
respond similarly to the self-organising laws that operate in cyberspace.  
 As seen in the previous chapter, commercial content is remarkably 
susceptible to information: the more buzz there is for a work, the more likely 
it is that it will display successful sales figures. This feature seems to be 
shared by successful user-generated content, where hits are often referred to 
as “going viral”. Be it a blog post, a video on YouTube, or a picture on 
Flickr, there are some instances when the content accumulates incoming links 
causing a tipping point, and the work is replicated throughout the internet.  
What makes content reach this point is still a mystery, for example, there 
seems to be little aesthetic logic or uniting theme in top video content on 
                                                          
113. Hunt F and Johnson P, “On the Pareto distribution of Sourceforge projects”, Proceedings of 
the Open Source Software Development Workshop (2002). 
114. See: Cheliotis et al, “Taking Stock of the Creative Commons Experiment Monitoring the 
Use of Creative Commons Licenses and Evaluating Its Implications for the Future of 
Creative Commons and for Copyright Law”, 35th Research Conference on Communication, 
Information and Internet Policy (2007), http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2007/805/ 
CreateCommExp.pdf. 
115. Bildstein, supra note 59.  
116. Pouwelse JA et al, “Pirates and Samaritans: A Decade of Measurements on Peer Production 
and Their Implications for Net Neutrality and Copyright”, 32:11 Telecommunications Policy 
701 (2008).  
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YouTube.117 As anyone who follows popular culture closely, the same seems 
to apply to commercial content. However, one feature is shared in both RO 
and RW cultures, and this is the fact that preferential attachment and the 
“rich get richer” phenomenon are strong features of both production 
philosophies. 
 Nonetheless, UGC is much richer than the few instances where a work has 
gone viral, yet if it can be described using the same distribution curves that 
apply to traditional creation models, then perhaps both systems are not as 
different as one would expect. While it is clear that UGC represents a 
departure from commercial methods of exploitation, the apparent similarity 
in distribution could mean that both types of works could be covered under 
the same set of copyright policies, much as it is done now.   
 
 
 
Figure 6.5 Visits versus user participation in Wikipedia 
 
 There could be a deep structural similarity between the RO and RW 
cultures, and it is that both production models share one striking 
characteristic, and this is the inequality in the numbers of creators versus 
consumers. Under Pareto’s Law, the content industries operate with small 
number of high earners at the head of the charts, followed by the long tail of 
lesser acts. More importantly, this inequality can also be found in the number 
of creators versus the number of users. While peer-production offers us a 
                                                          
117. Burgess J, “‘All your chocolate rain are belong to us?’ Viral Video, YouTube and the 
dynamics of participatory culture”, in Geert Lovink and Sabine Niederer (eds), Video Vortex 
Reader: Responses to YouTube, Institute of Network Cultures: Amsterdam, (2008), pp. 101–
109. 
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potential democratisation of the creative process, it is important to note that 
with few exceptions, the number of users that create content is still a minority 
when compared to the number of consumers of that content. Research firm 
Hitwise conducted a study into the amount of visitors top UGC websites 
received against the participation from users, and it found that there was 
considerable disparity in this regard. YouTube and Flickr had user 
participation of just 0.18 and 0.12 percent respectively, while Wikipedia had 
4.38 percent of user participation against visits (Figure 6.5).118 
 The reason for this is that not everyone is interested in the process of 
creation. Having the technical capacity to create a blog does not immediately 
turn one into a writer. Similarly, there is no reason to believe that just 
because one can upload content online, one should do so. Depressing as it 
may sound for the proponents of peer-production (of which the writer is one), 
the similarities between UGC and traditional methods still remain. This is a 
subject where the deterministic nature of scale-free networks seems to dictate 
the terms of usage.  
 
4.2 Copyright policy implications 
The relevance of these statistics for copyright policy is considerable. The 
popularisation of user-generated content, the growing number of Web 2.0 
applications, and the widespread replication of content online (both legal and 
infringing), pose several challenges for copyright law and policy. So far, 
policymakers have been single-mindedly intent in curbing copyright 
infringement and boosting the enforcement of intellectual property. These are 
solutions to problems that affect a small number of earners. Such interest in 
enforcement is understandable as the copyright industries generate large 
amount of income for the economy. However, policy should also consider the 
potential relevance of peer-production content as a source of wealth, 
research, creativity and innovation.       
 One corollary from the evidence presented so far is that policymakers 
cannot ignore peer-production. New business models are emerging and, like 
it or not, Web 2.0 tools and UGC have become an important part of the 
content ecology. One need only look at a comparison between blogs and the 
mainstream media to realise that peer-production models are often reaching 
as many users as their commercial counterparts.119  
 It also seems clear that the Internet favours the long tail model for both 
UGC and mainstream content. Particularly when talking about Internet 
                                                          
118. Tancer B, Measuring Web 2.0 Consumer Participation, Hitwise US Research Note (2007), 
http://hitwise.com/downloads/reports/Hitwise_US_Measuring_Web_2.0_Consumer_Partici
pation_June_2007.pdf.  
119. Sifry D, “State of the Blogosphere August 2005 Part 5: The A-List and the Long Tail”, 
Sifry’s Alerts Blog (10 August, 2005), http://www.sifry.com/alerts/archives/2005_08.html.  
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content, the rising popularity of content-creation by users may be occurring 
because Web 2.0 tools encourage the publication of creative works, and their 
ulterior dissemination to the entire Web. Policymakers should take this into 
consideration when looking at ways to regulate copyright in the digital 
domain. Evidence points towards the fact that an important number of 
copyright owners are located in the peer-production sector. It would be useful 
if policy was no longer designed with the idea of profit in mind. More often 
than not, the creator will be a hobbyist, never expecting a monetary return for 
her troubles. Nevertheless, it is easy to make this point while forgetting that 
while peer production is on the increase, readership of such content may not 
be. Just because something is online does not mean that it has an audience. 
Similarly, “traditional” offline world ideas of quality and peer-review still 
apply to the online environment.  
 Nonetheless, the pervasiveness of Pareto inequalities in both RO and RW 
cultures is only important if we see copyright as a mere economic right. If 
that is the case, then peer-production will be only relevant if it creates 
popular super-hits that could be transformed into commercial works. The 
continuing emphasis on the economic value of creative works would serve to 
dispel the utopian ideal of the Internet as a democracy of information where 
data is the currency.120 There would be an inherent inequality in the nature of 
information, everybody is free to participate in the online environment, but 
only the works at the head of the long tail will be of importance.  
 However, a fact that is often forgotten is that copyright is not only about 
economics. A copyright policy based on Pareto distribution models ignores 
completely the fact people are still willing to create without hope of 
remuneration. There is indeed an economic incentive provided by copyright, 
but this incentive is nebulous; many Internet users are happy to produce 
works subject to copyright protection for all sorts of reasons. There is 
something to be said about those who willingly inhabit the long tail.  
 So, while the data shows that the clash of cultures is not as deep as we 
may otherwise think, there cannot be any doubt that we are witnessing a 
monumental change in the manner in which information is produced and 
disseminated. If this is the case, and to be honest there is little reason to 
believe otherwise, then copyright has to respond. It is true that usage figures 
in peer-production are still governed by the same rules that apply to 
commercial works, but this does not change the fact that those who were only 
consumers of content are now also producing it. Copyright policy must 
recognise this in some form or another, perhaps by the inclusion of peer-
production friendly rights.  
                                                          
120. Some of these ideas can be seen expressed here: Lessig L, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of 
the Commons in a Connected World, New York: Random House (2001), pp.240–244. 
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 There does not need to be a monumental shift in copyright policy, but 
perhaps a reminder that copyright is not only about economic rights could be 
a start. One of the most important licence elements in Creative Commons 
licences is the Attribution. This has been a moral right present in 
international copyright law for more than a hundred years.121 Licence and 
copyright inevitably meet. So, peer-production friendly policies could 
include more exceptions for non-commercial uses, just like those present in 
CC licences, but also a renewal of the importance of moral rights.   
 There is a final point about the relevance of user-generated content to 
copyright policy. As more and more consumers become creators, they are 
also becoming copyright owners. Copyright used to be something that 
happened to wealthy and famous people, but now it increasingly happens to 
many of us. If you upload a picture on Flickr, post a video on YouTube, 
create a blog, program source code, release a song, or even post in a social 
media site, then you are also a copyright owner. This very fact should be 
advertised everywhere. Copyright has to be respected not because it might 
affect a millionaire author in a country far away, but it might also affect you. 
This is where both cultures meet, in the blurring between creator and 
consumer. 
 
 
                                                          
121. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (1886, as amended), 
Art. 6bis.  
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7. Cybercrime and Networks 
 
 
John McClane: Hey, what’s a fire sale? 
Matt Farrell: It’s a three-step systematic attack on the entire national 
infrastructure. Okay, step one: take out all the transportation. Step two: the 
financial base and telecoms. Step three: You get rid of all the utilities. Gas, water, 
electric, nuclear. Pretty much anything that’s run by computers which... which 
today is almost everything. So that’s why they call it a fire sale, because 
everything must go. 
Die Hard 4.0 
 
In the early hours of April 9 2009, an unprecedented attack took place against 
the cyber-infrastructure of a relatively small American town. Ten fibre-optic 
cables were cut by unidentified intruders in four separate locations in the 
town of Morgan Hill, near San Jose California.1 This seemingly small 
incident had tremendous implications in the surrounding area, affecting 
telecommunication services for Morgan Hill and three other counties, 
completely knocking down “911 service, cellular mobile telephone 
communications, land-line telephone, DSL internet and private networks, 
central station fire and burglar alarms, ATMs, credit card terminals, and 
monitoring of critical utilities”.2 The disruption to the digital 
telecommunications network was such that it stretched emergency services to 
such an extent that local hospitals had to revert to analogue technologies such 
as ham radio, as the affected area was completely cut-off from the rest of the 
country. 
 As of today, nobody has been charged with the attack, but what remains 
clear is that the perpetrators uncovered a serious vulnerability in digital 
telecommunications infrastructure, its centralisation, a pattern that may 
remind readers of the vulnerability of centralised P2P systems discussed in 
Chapter 5. The Internet was precisely created to avoid this kind of targeted 
attack. In theory, damage to part of the network should be redirected and 
most of the communication systems should have been distributed across 
other hubs. The problem in Morgan Hill was something that is increasingly 
                                                          
1. Asimov N, Kim R and Fagan K, “Sabotage attacks knock out phone service”, San Francisco 
Chronicle (10 April, 2009), http://bit.ly/q5iOd.  
2. Perens B, “A Cyber-Attack on an American City” Silicon Alley Insider (25 April, 2009), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-cyber-attack-on-an-american-city-2009-4.  
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common in the Internet’s architecture, and that is the fact that while the 
logical infrastructure is distributed, the actual physical cabling serving large 
geographical areas rely on too few chokepoints. Taking down only four such 
hubs blacked out a disproportionately large area considering the small nature 
of the attack.  
 While this incident was isolated, it can be used as an illustration of the 
growing problem presented by recent trends in network architecture. Instead 
of having a resilient decentralised telecommunications network, the actual 
implementation of the Internet has proved to be subject to cascading failures. 
The modern Internet relies on a centralised system that is increasingly 
vulnerable to coordinated attacks such as the one in Morgan Hill.  
 The present chapter will look at the issue of network centrality from the 
perspective of complexity theory, looking particularly at the implications of 
such centrality for cybercrime, both from a preventive perspective and also 
from an enforcement angle. The growing centrality of the Internet’s 
architecture can be seen as a problem if we want a robust network capable of 
withstanding cyber-attacks. However, cyber-criminals also operate as 
networks, and as such it might be possible to design enforcement strategies 
that rely on network theory in order to uncover patterns, helping to design 
more resilient networks, but also may help us in dismantling criminal gangs 
thanks to small-world analysis.  
 
 
1. CYBERCRIME 
 
One of the most important aspects of Internet regulation is that of online 
criminality, a phenomenon often described in the literature as cybercrime. 
While the Internet offers untold positive opportunities, there can be little 
doubt that it is also a breeding ground for illicit activity. This is only to be 
expected, since every big step in human invention provides opportunities for 
both use and misuse, and cyberspace is no different in that regard.  
 One of the challenges of those interested in studying the topic of 
cybercrime is how to define and delimitate the subject. For example, the 
invention of the telephone created new opportunities for criminal activity, so 
should there be such a thing as “telephone crime”? The answer is obviously 
no, the medium is not vital to the commission of the crime, it may simply 
facilitate it. So, why should we have a separate area of legal scholarship that 
studies crimes committed through a computer? It would consequently be 
essential to try to demarcate the subject of study. Nowadays, most human 
activities have an online element, and an increasing number of “offline” 
criminal actions also have an online element. For example, a fraudster that 
uses email to contact a target should not really be considered cybercrime in 
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the strict sense, just as whether the person telephoned the target would not be 
important to the final result.  
 The existing definitions of cybercrime are not useful in this regard. The 
Computer Crime Research Center defines it as “crimes committed on the 
internet using the computer as either a tool or a targeted victim”.3 This is of 
course too broad and perhaps not very useful definition because it would 
cover practically anything where a networked computer has been used in one 
way or another. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime seems 
to take the narrower approach when it defines cybercrime as any “action 
directed against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of computer 
systems, networks and computer data as well as the misuse of such systems, 
networks and data by providing for the criminalisation of such conduct”.4 
This narrows the field, as it adds the element that the criminal action must be 
against the network or computer itself. 
 A more useful approach is to think of cybercrime as those illicit activities 
that would not otherwise exist without the Internet. This filters out everyday 
crimes that may have an online element at some stage of commission. This 
narrow definition, however, would filter out some criminal types that have 
been already enacted into legislation. The aforementioned Convention on 
Cybercrime includes some offline offences that have an online element. The 
convention recommends the inclusion of the following categories of 
cybercrime: 
 
1. Offences against the confidentiality, integrity and availability of 
computer data and systems. These include illegal access, illegal 
interception, data interference and misuse of devices. The types of 
crimes covered here would be hacking offences where groups or 
individuals access a system without authorisation in order to attack 
the system or remove information. 
2. Computer-related offences. These include computer-related forgery 
and computer-related fraud, and the objective is mostly to alter or 
delete information with fraudulent means for economic gain. 
3. Content-related offences. These deal mostly with child pornography. 
4. Offences related to infringements of copyright and related rights. 
These are self-explanatory.  
5. Ancillary liability and sanctions. These include corporate liability, 
and aiding and abetting in the commission of one of the 
aforementioned offences.  
 
                                                          
3. Joseph A, Cybercrime Definition, Computer Crime Research Center Papers, 
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 National laws tend to treat the subject of cybercrime by a combination of 
the application of old norms and the enactment of new legislation. For 
example, in the UK, the main cybercrime law is the Computer Misuse Act 
1990,5 which contains only three wide-ranging offences: unauthorised access 
to computer material; unauthorised access with intent to commit or facilitate 
commission of further offences; and unauthorised modification of computer 
material. Other legislation has been changed specifically to cover new 
variants of old crimes, such as the Fraud Act 2006.6 
 However, while the law in this subject remains static, the complexity of 
criminal acts committed online continues to grow. One could see the offences 
described as traditional cybercrime. There are various new variations of 
criminal offences, what Edwards calls the next generation of cybercrime.7 
These new offences include variations of existing themes, but that because of 
their technical complexity and international nature require new means of 
legal classification. These include: 
 
1. Phishing: This is a combination of hacking, fraud and account 
hijacking. A phishing attack usually takes the shape of an email that 
seemingly comes from a financial institution, payment system, or e-
commerce site, which asks the user to connect to a website and enter 
login and password. The site is a fake portal that takes these details 
and uses them to enter the user’s account in the real service, and then 
removes funds, goods, or uses the facility to make purchases.8   
2. Botnets: These are networks of hijacked computers that have been 
infected by viruses or trojan programs. The program may lie dormant 
in the system for later use, or it may be used for sending out 
unsolicited email or phishing attacks.9  
3. Denial of Service (DoS): This is related to botnets. Infected computers 
that form part of a botnet may be used to send information requests to 
a specific website; the idea is that the target server will be 
overwhelmed and it will eventually be brought down.10 Botnets can 
be very effective, and have been used successfully by hackers to 
affect even large service providers such as Yahoo and eBay.11 
                                                          
5. Computer Misuse Act 1990 (c.18).  
6. Fraud Act 2006 (c.35). 
7. Edwards L, Cybercrime 2009: The Legal Perspective, RUSI CyberSecurity Conference, 
London (October 2009). 
8. Drake C, Oliver J and Koontz E, “Anatomy of a Phishing Email”, Conference on Email and 
Anti-Spam (2004), http://bit.ly/coZCQa.  
9. Maurushat A, “Zombie Botnets”, 7:2 SCRIPTed 370 (2010). 
10. Edwards L, “Dawn of the Death of Distributed Denial of Service: How to Kill Zombies”, 
24:1 Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 23 (2006).  
11. Brown I, Edwards L and Marsden C, “Information Security and Cybercrime”, in Edwards L 
and Waelde C, Law and the Internet, 3rd ed, Oxford ; Portland, OR: Hart (2009).  
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4. Cyber-terrorism: This is not so much an offence as such, but can be 
defined as the combined use of other existing forms of cybercrime to 
commit terrorist attacks. Cyber-terrorism therefore could use denial of 
service attacks against important infrastructure in order to disrupt 
services and create chaos, but in the wider sense it could also be used 
to describe websites that contain bomb-making instructions, or 
forums used to incite violence.12  
5. Cyber-warfare: This may seem not to be so much a new type of 
cybercrime, as the subject of international public law. However, 
modern cyber-warfare could be defined as a type of cybercrime 
because it uses some traditional and new offences in order to conduct 
some international policy strategy. Cyber-warfare could be a 
systematic attack via botnets against a country’s infrastructure, but it 
can also take the shape of a hacking attack against a corporate entity 
in order to obtain sensitive data.  This would include forms of cyber-
espionage.13  
 
 Regardless of the categorisation used to define cybercrime, there can be 
little doubt that it is a phenomenon that has been growing in importance in 
recent years, as more of our daily lives contain some online element. For 
example, phishing is of increasing concern to the financial services. The 
Anti-Phishing Working Group is a global industry and law enforcement 
association dedicated to removing phishing websites and conducting research 
into phishing attacks. They report that phishing peaked in August 2009 with a 
record 40,621 unique phishing reports, and a staggering 56,362 unique 
phishing websites.14 Of these sites, 39 percent targeted the financial sector, 
33 percent payment systems (such as credit cards and online account-based 
systems like PayPal) and 13 percent targeted online auction sites.15 While the 
actual damage is hard to calculate due to inaccuracy in reporting, card-not-
present online fraud in total accounted for £134 million GBP in the first half 
of 2009.16 
 Brown, Edwards and Marsden17 have compiled a number of cybercrime 
statistics that give good idea of just how big the problem is. Amongst these 
                                                          
12. Wilson C, Botnets, Cybercrime, and Cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy Issues for 
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Release (7 October, 2009), http://www.banksafeonline.org.uk/documents/ 
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are the following: 
 
 In 2008 Internet security firm Symantec identified 1,656,227 distinct 
new malware and spyware software programs. 
 In that same year, Symantec identified 9,437,536 infected machines 
part of botnets and other zombie networks. 
 The FBI/Computer Security Institute reported that by 2007, there 
were 10,000 denial of service attacks daily, with costs for each target 
ranging between $90,000 USD to $6.45 million USD. 
 In 2007, the US Federal Trade Commission received 221,226 
Internet-related fraud complaints, totalling $525,743,643 USD.18 
 
 By any reckoning, all of these figures serve to stress the seriousness of the 
problem presented by cybercrime to businesses, governments and 
individuals. The level of threat is compounded by the fact that very often, law 
enforcement is not particularly prepared to deal with high-technology threats, 
and most of the attacks tend to go unpunished. Given the level of damage 
done by hackers and other malicious cybercriminals to the economy, the 
level of enforcement is remarkably low. Take phishing for example. Given 
the large number of offences every month, these rarely result in indictments, 
and while there are exceptions19 it seems like cybercriminals are usually 
operating practically unopposed.  
 This situation has led to a shift from strict law enforcement strategies and 
has resulted in technical solutions being favoured. It is now practically 
unheard of to have a computer connected to the Internet that has no firewall 
and anti-virus software, which gives an indication of where the fight against 
cybercrime truly lies.   
 Take botnets as an example. Given the fact that there are millions of 
infected computers, it has become clear that it would be very difficult to try 
to go directly after the perpetrators. The best strategy seems to try to create 
filtering systems that might diminish the negative effects of botnet action, 
particularly in denial of service attacks.20 While this approach may seem 
defeatist, it is the most logical and efficient course of action.  
 Cybercrime relies heavily on existing infrastructure and architectures to 
thrive. Scholars dealing with Internet regulation have commented on the fact 
that architectural decisions made early about the way in which the Web 
operates have made cybercrime easier. Zittrain21 has been at the forefront of 
                                                          
18. Ibid. 
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warning about the choices made in the Internet’s early days, which have now 
been translated into a more vulnerable system. He posits that the Web was 
created as a generative space more concerned with stability, scalability, 
resilience and the ease of spreading information than with security. Once it 
became profitable for unscrupulous individuals to try to disrupt the network, 
the existing architecture was ill-prepared to meet the challenge. He 
comments: 
 
[S]urfing the World Wide Web often entails accepting and running new code. The 
Web was designed to seamlessly integrate material from disparate sources: a 
single Web page can draw from hundreds of different sources on the fly, not only 
through hyperlinks that direct users to other locations on the Web, but through 
placeholders that incorporate data and code from elsewhere into the original page. 
[...] To visit a Web site is not only to be asked to trust the Web site operator. It is 
also to trust every third party – such as an ad syndicator – whose content is 
automatically incorporated into the Web site owner’s pages, and every fourth party 
– such as an advertiser – who in turn provides content to that third party.22 
 
 It is slightly ironic that what makes the Internet such a vibrant medium 
also makes it vulnerable to cybercrime offences. While he does not mention 
it specifically, Zittrain’s model of the generative web is yet another example 
of self-organisation in action, and one that in this case can have negative 
effects for users. If the underlying structure of the Internet is vulnerable, then 
we will continue to play catch-up with cybercriminals because the system 
allows the misuse of the technology in order to commit offences.  
 This is why a better understanding of the network can help design more 
effective strategies to tackle cybercrime. It is hereby proposed that network 
theory can be used to tackle some of the illicit actions listed above. To do 
that, we must understand a bit better what network science has to tell us 
about the Internet’s structure. The next sections will highlight two areas 
where network theory may do just that.  
 
 
2. NETWORK CENTRALITY 
 
As stated repeatedly in Chapter 4, the Internet is supposed to be a distributed 
network where data is sent through various intervening points within the 
network in packets, and therefore it is not a centralised system. Moreover, the 
rapid growth of the Internet has produced a network that displays several 
power law topologies, and it also operates in a highly autonomous fashion. 
However, in that same chapter it was demonstrated that the Internet is also 
increasingly centralised at selected choke points, particularly at the national 
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level, as various governments around the world attempt to regulate 
cyberspace by generating a national infrastructure that has fewer points of 
entry, and therefore it is easier to control and filter content from the wider 
network. This situation has created a much less distributed network than 
originally envisaged. The problem with a more centralised Internet is 
precisely that it is much more vulnerable to attacks than the distributed 
network that we were supposed to have.  
 It is essential to study what we mean exactly by network centrality to 
understand its relevance to the present work. One of the most vital elements 
shared by both small world networks and scale-free networks is the 
significance of individual hubs within the network. For example, it has 
already been explained that in any given social network there are central hubs 
that serve as connectors, improving the inter-connectedness of the entire 
network. Think back to your own social network, and certainly you can think 
of one or several individuals that stand out as knowing lots of people. These 
can be said to be more central vertices in the network. In graph theory, 
centrality means a way to measure the importance of any given vertex within 
the network.23 However, there are many measurements that one could try to 
use in order to ascertain the importance of any given node. Is the node very 
informed, but isolated? Is the node social, but bad at communicating 
information? Graph theory looks at three main measures of centrality to study 
the importance of a node: 
 
Three measures were formalised: degree, closeness, and betweenness. Degree was 
the number of ties or neighbours of a node; closeness was the inverse of the sum of 
all shortest paths to others or the smallest number of ties to go through to reach all 
others individually; and betweenness was the number of shortest paths on which a 
node was on.24 
 
 While these three main points have been added to and modified 
throughout the years,25 what is important to note is that there are analytical 
tools available if one is to attempt to measure network centrality. What is 
vital for such analyses is that accurate data is gathered with regards to the 
three main elements of network centrality, namely, that one knows the 
number of links a node has to neighbouring nodes, the shortest number of 
paths to other nodes in the network, and the average shortest path (Figure 
7.1). If you recall what has been discussed about small world networks, it is 
evident that the concept of centrality is vital to occurrences such as the six 
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degrees of separation because it helps us to determine the importance of a 
node within a network, but also allows us to measure the shortest paths 
between nodes.26   
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Graph betweenness27 
 
 So, what does the Internet look like taking centrality into account? This is 
actually a problematic question, as there are various methods of trying to 
measure the Internet topology, from fine-grained system-by-system IP 
measurement, to a broader autonomous system (AS) analysis.28 The diversity 
of measurements can result in highly biased results, as the observed topology 
will be painted by the vantage point used to observe the network.29 The 
relevance of this important fact for the current work is that if one is expecting 
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to measure things like the potential centrality of a node in the network, the 
result may be biased by the vantage point used to measure such centrality. 
Imagine that one wants to try to ascertain the relative centrality of a node. 
The results would vary depending on whether one was behind a national 
firewall, or if the measurement was conducted in a more “central” hub, such 
as a survey conducted in Google servers. While there are proposed 
solutions30 to solve the problem of bias in Internet surveys, it must be 
stressed that any analysis about the Internet topology may still be biased.  
 Keeping that in mind, what does the Internet topology look like from the 
perspective of network centrality? One must add two more concepts about 
Internet architecture that are relevant to the question of centrality: (1) the 
physical elements of the Internet, namely routers, name servers, fibre optic 
cables, satellites and wireless hubs; and (2) the logical elements, such as the 
intervening logical paths information must travel from one point to another, 
incoming and outgoing links, search engine relevance and hosting service 
providers. Let us illustrate the difference by using a blog as an example. 
Imagine a website that is hosted in a server located in the UK, and you want 
to access it from the United Arab Emirates. The physical elements 
connecting you to that site would be the intervening servers, some of which 
may be more vital, for example the national firewall, the physical network 
that connects a server from the UK to your laptop in a hotel in the UAE. If 
one were to measure the centrality in such a network, one would have to look 
at the Internet backbone, the infrastructure connecting sites. Now, let us 
imagine the logical centrality, you would be looking at its importance within 
the overall Internet. Does the site show up in search engines? Are there other 
sites linking to the page you want to access? Were one to measure the 
centrality in the physical network, the more central elements would probably 
be the critical intermediary choke points, such as name servers and routers. 
Were one to measure the centrality in the logical network, the principal 
elements would probably be search engines, or influential linking sites. In 
other words, the physical and logical central nodes need not be the same.  
 Therefore, Internet topology depends on whether one is looking at the 
infrastructure, or the flow of information. So, we ask again, what does the 
Internet look like?  
 From the physical perspective, it is becoming clear that the Internet is 
nowadays more centralised than originally designed. In an interesting study 
on centrality,31 researchers found that when one looked at the Internet 
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backbone connections between large cities, and compared it to pre-Internet 
networks such as the airline transportation system, there was a striking 
similarity in which hubs were central to the network. In this study, 
researchers took data from a survey of international ISPs headquarters from 
59 countries and 180 cities, and paired cities in order to measure how data 
flowed from one city to another, assuming that there were no direct backbone 
connections to each other. This is consistent with the graph theory concept of 
centrality explored above. Then they looked at the connecting passenger data 
between cities by looking at airline traffic between city pairs. What this 
approach provides is a picture of the centrality of nodes in both networks. In 
other words, if you wanted to get information or passengers from one city to 
another, and they were not connected directly, then a central hub would be a 
city where either would have to go through in order to reach its destination. 
The results were striking, as both the Internet backbone and the airline 
system had the same top five cities as the more central hubs: London, Paris, 
New York, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, with London being the most central 
city by far in both networks. This tells us that Internet centrality matches 
geographical centrality. It is easy to see why the results are as they are, as the 
historical importance of London as a transportation hub has survived the 
Internet revolution. Be it data or passengers, London remains central.  
 While London is a key hub in the physical infrastructure of the Internet, 
for historical reasons the United States as a whole still remains as the most 
central country in cyberspace terms. After all, the Internet arose from US 
military and academic networks, so it is only reasonable that it retains a high 
level of centrality. For example, the description of an early average data 
transfer from the UK to Australia serves to illustrate this point: 
 
The first example is a trace from University College London to the website of an 
Australian Internet Service Provider. Unlike a telephone transmission, which sets 
up a dedicated circuit that remains open between caller and receiver, Internet data 
travels in discrete, destination-marked packets more similar to the way letters are 
transmitted through a postal system. After leaving the university, data packets 
cross the Atlantic on a dedicated link to New York leased by JANET, the UK’s 
scientific research network, and transit the United States on the UUNet network. 
Arriving in Los Angeles, they leave for Sydney where they will be offloaded onto 
the Australian Internet service provider’s network.32 
 
 This level of centrality is a hang-up from the way in which the global 
backbone arose, so the reliance in hubs located in the US and Europe have 
been there from the start. The result is that most of the Internet traffic passes 
at some stage through the United States, even if the exchanging countries are 
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close to each other. Cukier cites the example of Singapore and Malaysia, two 
neighbouring countries that used to send more than ten times the amount of 
traffic to the United States than to each other.33 Another example of the 
inefficient infrastructure could be found in Africa, where almost every 
country needed to connect to the Internet using an industrialised nation.34  
 While the centralised nature of the global Internet backbone has been 
improving, it still shows large levels of centrality around a few countries. For 
example, the DIMES Project distributes data-gathering autonomous agents 
around the world to produce pings and traceroutes of the global Internet in an 
attempt to paint a more accurate topology of its centrality.35 The emerging 
topology is one where servers and routers located in the United States still 
reign supreme as the most central constituents in the worldwide network, and 
results in some staggering images of just how centralised the Internet still is 
(Figure 7.2). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.2 Internet city-to-city backbone connections36 
 
 What about logical centrality? This could potentially be different to the 
underlying architectural centrality of nodes, as what we are dealing with are 
people, websites and more dynamic systems. After all, the physical 
architecture of the network tends to be more static, and as it has been shown 
above, the pre-existing importance of nodes is carried out through time. 
Logical elements of the Internet need not respond to these constraints, 
websites accumulate links, become more or less popular, hubs come and go, 
companies fall from favour and new ones pick up in importance. Three years 
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ago MySpace seemed destined to dominate the social network environment 
online, and not many people would have thought that Facebook would rise to 
the levels of popularity that the service has at the time of writing. There is 
even a chance that by the time you are reading this, these networks have been 
surpassed by a newcomer. The logical importance of hubs is ever-changing. 
 Nevertheless, evidence here also seems to indicate a high level of 
centrality in the information aspects of the network, with the United States 
again in front. For example, a study in 2001 looked at the number of national 
domain names as a measure of content-creation for each country, and found 
that 54 percent of all Internet content at that time was either hosted in the US, 
or had an American-assigned domain name.37 Recent data seems to 
corroborate this trend. ICANN maintains a list of all Internet domain name 
registrars around the world; these are the entities in charge of assigning and 
selling domain names. The US has almost 60 percent of all registrars, and has 
almost four times more than the second country in the list, Canada.38 
Interestingly, this distribution would also hint at the underlying existence of 
power laws. 
 But the location of domain names and registrars is only one piece of the 
information layer of the Internet – there appears to be a great disparity about 
the number of Internet users, and the location of content online. For example, 
by July 2010, North America had only 13.5 percent of the entire Internet 
population, with Asia and Europe commanding 42 percent and 24.2 percent 
respectively.39 However, a survey of the localisation of IP addresses, that is, 
the actual computers connected to the Internet, produced some contradictory 
results. The United States commanded a staggering 1.5 billion IP addresses, 
while China had 257 million in second place, and the UK had just over 200 
million. In fact, the US had more IP addresses than the other top ten countries 
combined.40 This dominance translates into page views. Most of the 100 most 
popular websites in the world by January 2010 are American companies or 
organisations, with only 12 non-US-hosted websites.41 All of this indicates 
that while other countries are making inroads in Internet penetration and the 
number of users online, most content and computers in the network are still 
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located in the United States. This would certainly display a high level of 
logical centrality in the global system. 
 Another study into the centrality of hyperlinks, an essential part of the 
information layer of the World Wide Web, seems to produce similarly high 
levels of US centrality.42 The study looked at 356 million hyperlinks and 
analysed incoming and outgoing links in each page, noting where the site was 
located and to which country it linked, and vice versa. Overall, the US came 
up as the most central country, followed by Australia, the UK, China, Japan, 
Canada and Germany. The US had the most incoming links, while Germany 
had the most outgoing links to other countries. The interesting aspect of this 
study is that it looked at reasons for the level of centrality, trying to correlate 
the results with economic and cultural preferences. Unsurprisingly, economic 
aspects accounted for high centrality in the hyperlink network. Perhaps more 
surprising is that there was a cultural correlation as well, with countries with 
highly individualistic cultures dominating also.43 This tells us that centrality 
has not only architectural elements, but also a cultural level.   
 These findings appear to be consistent with what we know of how large 
networks, and particularly scale-free networks, operate. Besides the 
architectural and historical importance of the US to the emergence of the 
Internet, it is only natural that because of these initial conditions, the global 
network would display high distribution of nodes according to the initial 
conditions in the network. The network simply self-organises around those 
conditions. Nobody tells people to visit US sites more, it just happens 
because those nodes tend to be older, and older nodes accumulate links 
faster. Moreover, large networks tend to display centrality levels distributed 
according to power laws;44 in other words, scale-free networks will always 
have fewer important nodes, the very definition of centrality in graph theory.  
 
 
3. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
 
One of the most exciting areas of network study is the subject of social 
network analysis (SNA). As has been discussed extensively in previous 
chapters, social networks are groups of individuals that are connected to and 
interdependent on one another. These individuals have interactions that can 
range from family ties to friendship, employment information and 
development. A social network can be understood “as any bounded set of 
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connected social units”.45 Social networks then rely on three key building 
blocks: the boundary of social elements studied, be it a family, a tribe, or a 
country; then the connected element between the social units, which are the 
links that tie the units together; and the definition of social unit itself, these 
are usually individuals, but also can be groups of groups, so we could have 
social units consisting of organisations and institutions.46 SNA is therefore a 
systematic way of looking at these networks in an analytical fashion by using 
graph theory in order to provide useful information about the group.  
 Social network analysis is not a new subject, it started as the study of 
social groupings through psychological analysis of things like group cohesion 
and friendship, in what became known as sociographs.47 The research and 
development into SNA continued in areas such as sociology and 
anthropology, but it was not until later in the 20th century that graph theory 
was used to analyse social interactions, such as looking at influence 
networks, and with the development of mathematical tools capable of 
analysing dynamic networks.48  
 Graph theory is therefore just a method of making sense of the various 
interpersonal interactions in a social system. Scott explains: 
 
A common framework for social network analysis programs is the mathematical 
approach of graph theory, which provides a formal language for describing 
networks and their features. Graph theory offers a translation of matrix data into 
formal concepts and theorems which can be directly related to the substantive 
features of social networks. If the sociogram is one way of representing relational 
matrix data, the language of graph theory is another, and more general, way of 
doing this. While it is not the only mathematical theory which has been used for 
modelling social networks, it is a starting point for many of the most fundamental 
ideas of social network analysis. [...] The concepts of graph theory, then, are used 
to describe the pattern of connections among points. The simplest of graph 
theoretical concepts refer to the properties of the individual points and lines from 
which a graph is constructed, and these are the building blocks for more complex 
structural ideas.49 
 
 So, what is the usefulness of SNA? As one can expect from a field of 
study that has been around since the 1930s, social network analysis has 
provided a diverse and rich level of scholarship that looks at social 
interactions from a formal perspective. Typical questions asked in SNA range 
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from comparing the level of connectedness achieved in a specific social 
setting, such as the difference between a family group and another social 
unit, to studies looking at whether one medium may influence the way in 
which people interact.50 However, it is useful to look at examples of research 
into SNA that are relevant to the Internet, that being the main topic of this 
work.   
 A good example of practical applications of social network analysis in an 
online environment is a comparative study conducted in a group of distance 
learners, trying to determine how often they made contact with each other 
depending on the medium of communication used.51 An important hypothesis 
presented by SNA studies is that the medium determines communication in 
some social contexts. In other words, while the content of the communication 
will be the same regardless of the medium, the number of people one can 
communicate with will depend on the medium used to establish a link; 
contact with non-friends will tend to be non-emotional regardless of the 
number of people involved, but with Facebook one can reach more friends 
and family. In this study, it was established empirically that this seemingly 
obvious statement held true by looking at the way non-emotional ties were 
acquired in the aforementioned group of distance learners. For example, 
when comparing the number of connections of the group between those using 
asynchronous communication tools such as email, and those using 
synchronous communication via Internet Relay Chat (IRC), it became clear 
that those who were chatting were more likely to interact with more peers 
than those simply emailing.52 Moreover, the study also looked at 
communication over time, and found that wilful top-down direction from 
course organisers would have considerable effects on the shape of the social 
network graph – by changing groups around and requiring specific 
communication media, the level of interaction would increase considerably.53 
While many seasoned teachers would probably be able to give similar advice, 
the value of social network analysis in an online setting is that it gives us 
clear evidence about pedagogic practices that encourage interaction between 
learners. This is by all means a valuable tool that tells us a lot not only about 
teaching, but about how online social networks operate.  
 SNA is not only giving us valuable insights into media, but also about a 
question that has been at the forefront of network theory since the days of 
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Solomonoff and Rapoport:54 how do people influence each other in a social 
context? Christakis and Fowler have conducted a much publicised and 
enlightening study into the small American community of Farningham across 
several decades using medical records and online social networks.55 They 
looked at the way people accumulated “friends” through Facebook, and 
found that something as simple as smiling in your profile picture would be a 
strong determinant in predicting the number of friends you would have. The 
authors looked at two types of datasets, the physical network of Farmingham, 
and the Facebook network of an unnamed American university to compare 
levels of friendship and “happiness” between the online and offline world. 
The results were astoundingly similar. Firstly, by looking at happiness 
indicators in the Farmingham network, they found that people who seemed 
happy tended to cluster around one another in strong hubs, while unhappy 
people would linger at the periphery. Similarly, people who smile on 
Facebook tend to cluster around other smiling people. The data showed some 
interesting facts related to small world clustering: 
 
 Each happy friend increased an individual’s probability of being 
happy by 9 percent. 
 Unhappy people connected to more happy people were more likely to 
become happy in the future, while those separated by more degrees 
would tend to remain unhappy. This fact carried through up to three 
degrees of separation. 
 There is no noticeable difference between the number of close friends 
online and offline (average 6.6 on both). However, Facebook users 
have more casual “friends” (average 106 per user).56 
 
 The third relevant example of SNA in the online environment 
demonstrates that social networks display certain levels of predictability that 
can be useful in identifying nodes and links within the system. Krotoski57 
conducted an impressive in-depth social network analysis of the virtual world 
Second Life, trying to find whether one could predict attitudes and 
behaviours from social units by studying their interaction within the system. 
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Krotoski adds to the growing evidence that social networks have extensive 
influence on individuals by stating that: 
 
Analysts have proposed that the structure of a network has implications for how 
much potential influence the social system may have on the individual. This is 
based on the principle of network exposure, which anticipates that the more people 
who have an attitude or perform a behaviour who are directly connected with an 
individual, the more likely the individual will adopt that behaviour or attitude. 
Exposure is progressive and maximal.58 
 
 One of the most interesting findings in this study is that social network 
influence seems to be immune to online anonymity; people will be influenced 
regardless of them being connected to a social setting or to a virtual persona 
in the shape of an avatar.59 Here we revisit the concept of centrality (or 
network position to use the SNA terminology). Within SNA, influential 
nodes in the network are logically more influential. However, does this 
translate to online worlds? The answer seems to be a resounding yes; even 
when one removes a personal element, the influence of disembodied avatars 
matches that of personal social units.60 
 The final useful characteristic of social network analysis relevant to this 
work is the presence of a phenomenon that seems intuitive, and that is the 
fact that social networks tend to produce clusters of units and close-knit 
communities. According to Girvan and Newman: 
 
A third property that many networks have in common is clustering, or network 
transitivity, which is the property that two vertices that are both neighbors of the 
same third vertex have a heightened probability of also being neighbors of one 
another. In the language of social networks, two of your friends will have a greater 
probability of knowing one another than will two people chosen at random from 
the population, on account of their common acquaintance with you.61 
 
 Why do we need methods of finding communities within larger scale 
networks such as the Internet? With a global network that has too much data 
about individuals operating in a social setting, it might be useful to delimit a 
community for various reasons. One may want to market only to targeted 
communities instead of mass spamming the entire network. SNA allows us to 
pinpoint accurately a cluster of individuals by analysing the ties between 
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each one. The opposite might be true as well. For example, if you wanted to 
find an individual, it would be easier to do this by analysing his/her network 
of known associates. Granted, this type of analysis may tell us something we 
already know about networks and clusters, but nonetheless, the results can 
sometimes produce informative outcomes. For example, an often cited study 
of political blogs62 in the US analysed blog communities by looking at which 
blog was linking to other blogs. The result is a striking display of political 
blogs distributed between conservative and liberal clusters that present one of 
the most beautiful and scary visual representations of the political divide 
(Figure 7.3). 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 The US political blogosphere63 
 
The relevance of this area of research will become evident later.  
 
 
4. NETWORK THEORY AND CYBERCRIME 
 
So, can network science tell us anything about cybercrime? This question can 
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be split into two sub-components. Firstly, can we design better networks 
based on what we know about how they operate? Secondly, can we use some 
elements of graph theory to design enforcement mechanisms that will lead 
towards a much better record in finding and apprehending cyber-criminals? 
This section will try to answer both elements of the question by concentrating 
on the issues of centrality and social network analysis explored above.  
 
4.1 Centrality and vulnerability 
The first aspect to analyse when looking at the interaction between 
complexity and cybercrime is to look at whether the centrality of the 
networked systems may facilitate the commission of cybercrime offences.  
 The most explored area of research on this topic is that of computer virus 
propagation through the network. There is ample evidence that points 
towards the presence of high infection rates in networks that present some 
form of power law distribution of nodes. One study, for example, looked at 
the rate of spread of a virus through email, and found that it would spread 
faster in a power law network, than it would in another type of distribution, 
such as a small world network or a random graph.64 The reason for this is that 
in a power law network the spread of a virus would be highly dependent on 
the number of recipients an email had, but also would depend on the 
frequency with which a node would check his/her email. In a power law 
network, such as the email network studied by the paper, both these variables 
responded to power laws. In a random graph, where users are distributed 
randomly and where there are no influential hubs, this did not have much of 
an effect.  
 Moreover, virus spread seems to be highly dependent on the malicious 
software reaching a central node in the network, namely a node with a high 
degree of connectedness, then it is highly likely that the virus will reach 
epidemic proportions.65 While this finding seems to be intuitive, it serves as 
further proof of the potential importance of network centrality for cybercrime 
purposes. Hubs are critical parts in the Internet architecture, and protecting 
them would be vital to avoid wider spread of infections.66  
 Computer virus infections can serve another purpose, and that is to look at 
potential social network elements of how malicious software spreads 
throughout the network. From the above, it seems that physical centrality 
within a scale-free network encourages viral infections. What about the 
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logical centrality? For example, will a virus affecting the computer of an 
influential node in a social network have similar effects in the rate of spread 
of a virus? In a study set out to look precisely into this question,67 Guo and 
Cheng gathered social network data for 14,933 students at an undisclosed 
university using MySpace, and produced a directed graph charting relational 
data between nodes, calculating centrality and clustering in the sample. The 
researchers simulated computer virus infections selecting random nodes in 
the network and then changed the simulation based on the centrality of 
nodes; in other words, they chose those nodes that seemed to have higher 
hierarchical value in the social network. The results were consistent with 
what has been highlighted in other studies, and that is that centrality seems to 
be a strong determining value in the level of virus spread, the more focal the 
node to the network, the higher the infection rates. 
 While all of this may seem intuitive, it is baffling that an understanding on 
networks is not part of law enforcement strategies, and while the topic of 
cybercrime gets an increasingly significant treatment in legal scholarship, the 
basics of how viruses spread online is still largely ignored outside of 
computing systems research. 
 Study into other network-dependent cybercriminal offences offer similar 
findings about the importance of network topology in the detection, and 
potential filtering, of attacks on a network. An obvious example of this would 
be in denial of service attacks, where by definition, one node, or perhaps 
even a central cluster of nodes, is being subjected to an external attack. The 
traffic is incoming, so it does not really matter if the system is a central part 
of the network or not, as it is a target. However, centrality may have an 
essential bearing on the situation if the target is an important hub in a 
network, as the intention may be to knock down computers connected to the 
hub. In a typical web-based DoS attack, a botnet is used to send an 
overwhelming number of service requests against a server. The most 
effective way in which this can be stopped is by technical means, mostly 
through the deployment of some form of filtering that will keep out suspected 
attackers from the system.68 The relevance of understanding network 
centrality in this issue is precisely to know where to deploy DoS defences. 
Key central hubs will have to be protected through technological means, as 
not doing it might compromise networks downstream. 
 It is precisely the issue of the Internet’s architecture what makes centrality 
such an essential subject for the legal study of cybercrime. The Internet is 
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resilient, but an attack on a central part of the network will have the potential 
to cause cascading failures in the network. This is a fact that cannot be 
stressed enough. As has been highlighted already, the Internet is increasingly 
centralised, so the scope for potential large-scale attacks increases 
exponentially. Taking both the evidence from virus spread and DoS 
vulnerability explored already, an obvious concern emerges. If the Internet is 
more centralised than we had previously believed, and if malicious 
information spreads easily through networks that display power law 
distributions (and therefore rely on connecting hubs), it is possible to 
postulate the hypothesis that anything that affects the global hubs in the 
Internet backbone could easily be replicated throughout the Internet.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.4: Strong country centrality (zoomed) 
 
 While not directly related to cybercrime, a study has looked precisely at 
this question. Karlin, Forrest and Rexford69 conducted a survey of country 
centrality to try to determine the potential downstream negative effects of 
country-wide censorship of the Internet. The objective of the paper was to 
establish an analytical framework for determining the influence of each 
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country within the flow of international traffic. The researchers collected 
traceroute data between countries trying to determine the paths taken by 
information in the global network. This produced high levels of centrality 
consistent with the other studies highlighted in previous sections. What is 
novel about the approach of this study is that it also calculated what they call 
“strong country centrality” (SCC). They assumed that under some 
circumstances there may be other paths to information that do not go through 
one country. SCC would take place when all other viable paths led through 
that country as well; in other words, data had no other way of getting from A 
to B other than through that country. In findings consistent with other 
centrality studies, they found that the United States, the UK and Germany 
were the most central countries on the Internet, but also displayed high levels 
of SCC (Figure 7.4). 
 This is a study of great consequence for various reasons, particularly 
because it is one of the first to try to rank centrality of data at a country level, 
but more relevant to the subject of cybercrime, it offers strong evidence that 
points towards a worrying level of country centrality that still to this day 
favours Western countries. Most importantly, it shows that the Internet relies 
on those central hubs too much. Any attack on the global infrastructure will 
undoubtedly target the central points in the network. 
 The implications of such centrality are clear for another aspect of 
cybercrime, that of cyber-warfare. While this may not seem like a cybercrime 
subject, it seems that it has become so in recent years given the nature of 
attacks. One of the most publicised cases of cyber-warfare took place in 2007 
against Estonia. The Baltic country found itself at the centre of a wide-scale 
cyber-attack from hackers against its information technology infrastructure 
due to a perceived slight against a Soviet-era statue.70 The unprecedented 
attack targeted almost every aspect of the country’s Internet presence, 
including media, government institutions and financial services. The reason 
why this is more of a cybercrime issue is that the attacks were conducted by 
Russian hackers, and while official Russian involvement has been denied, it 
is clear that large numbers of individual hackers were involved in some form 
or another.71 The attacks managed to disrupt the country’s digital 
infrastructure for days, although filtering international efforts managed to 
curtail the worst part of the attack. There are several interesting lessons about 
this incident, but one significant feature was that the attacks used dozens of 
botnets located around the world, encompassing almost a million separate 
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computers.72 The other issue is that while the attacks were conducted against 
individual websites in Estonia, the entire attack managed to knock down 
Internet connection throughout the country because the level of traffic 
overwhelmed the national infrastructure. It took high-level action from 
European root server authorities to try to minimise the damage, but many 
sites had to cut off their connection to the outside world.  
 A similar cyber-warfare attack took place against Georgia just before 
Russian troops invaded the country in August 2008. During the build-up to 
the Russian invasion, government, police and media websites were subjected 
to coordinated botnet attacks of such a scale that they brought down the 
networks, prompting several official services to relocate to servers outside of 
Georgia.73 The pattern was similar to the Estonia incident, with the difference 
that these attacks were followed up with physical military intervention. The 
end result could not compete with the fact that there was an actual conflict 
taking place, but it did result in the virtual disappearance of Georgia from the 
global Internet due to the virulence of the cyber-attacks.74 
 Estonia and Georgia are just two examples of what the problems for 
country-level centrality exposed above could look like. While in these two 
cases the affected countries were not particularly central, imagine a similar 
co-ordinated attack on a more influential country, and you could begin to see 
the potential for wider disruption. In both attacks, the Internet backbone in 
those countries was severely affected because of increased traffic, despite the 
fact that the assaults were directed not at the actual infrastructure, but at 
websites within the countries. A smarter and more targeted strike against 
national domain name servers could have had an even greater effect. Now 
imagine a similar scenario taking place against countries that are even more 
centralised, such as countries with national firewalls, and it is be easy to see 
how this could remove those countries from the Internet altogether.  
 Even more worrying, an attack against a country with strong country 
centrality could affect Internet traffic not only within the target, but also 
would affect international traffic that relies on data going through the 
network at a central hub.  
 The message is clear: the more centralised we make the Internet, the more 
vulnerable we become to co-ordinated attacks. While it may be easy to laugh 
at the preposterous scenarios painted by movies like Die Hard 4.0, the threat 
is real, and we need to heed the warnings from network science in this 
respect. Thankfully, some sectors of law enforcement seem to be taking the 
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potential threat seriously. In 2007, the US Department of Homeland Security 
conducted a military exercise called Cyber Storm, where a simulated assault 
from domestic terrorists, German hackers and some insiders was able to 
crash the Federal Aviation Administration computer control system, post 
false data and shut down commuter services.75 While this was a limited 
simulation, the message about the troubles posed by centrality is real. 
 
4.2 Social network analysis and cybercrime 
The second area of study of network theory that may have valuable input in 
the detection and prevention of cybercriminal offences is that of social 
network analysis.  
 The application of network theory to criminal social networks is one of the 
most exciting practical applications of the various theoretical characteristics 
of networks described in previous chapters. Humans are social creatures; our 
interaction with one another is an important element of social structures and 
criminality is undoubtedly one situation where interaction occurs. Criminals 
have to operate as well in these social settings; they have friends, families 
and conspirators, so it is only logical that any study of human links will look 
into the seedier aspects of social life. For example, there appears to be a 
strong correlation between societies that have strong connections and low 
crime rates.76 Social integration in the shape of strong social ties, or a sense 
of community demonstrated in the some forms of organised meetings 
between its members, seems to demonstrate social cohesion that translates 
into less criminal activity due to peer pressure and community control and 
surveillance.77  
 Not only is social interaction an essential determinant to criminality levels, 
but criminal organisations themselves seem to self-organise in ways where 
social connectedness and centrality operate in recognisable patterns present 
in other social settings. An interesting study78 of African American and 
Hispanic street gangs in Newark, New Jersey identified 736 gang members 
distributed into four main gangs. While each individual gang maintained a 
small world structure, the interesting part is that there was interaction 
between gangs by the presence of connecting individuals, or cut-points. The 
removal of these connectors sent the organisation into disarray, and had a 
strong effect on the overall social organisation.79 This is consistent with what 
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we know of how social networks operate, but offers an interesting insight 
into criminal groups. Given enough data, it is possible to chart criminal 
groupings just as any other social network, and it is also possible to try to use 
this data in practical ways. McGloin suggests, for example, that by knowing 
the social structure of a gang, law enforcement can direct its efforts into 
trying to gather useful data about associates and social patterns to better 
tackle intervention and allocate resources accordingly.80 
 The practical application of social network analysis to criminology rests 
on the assumption that criminal organisations can display similar 
characteristics to other social networks, and specifically small world 
networks. Coles81 proposes that the same principles present in Milgram’s 
small world networks are also to be found in larger organised crime groups; 
he states that acquaintance chains are also at work, and suggests that what 
keeps the network together are those specialised individuals in the network 
that act as connectors. What is innovative in Coles’s analysis is that he 
postulates that if one wants to look at how the network is organised, one 
should look at the networks of acquaintances of those who have been 
confirmed to be part of the organisation, and by looking at the “friends of 
friends” of these individuals it is possible to get valuable insight into the 
composition of the network. Nonetheless, Coles has been criticised as 
presenting a rather non-nuanced approach to organised criminal networks. 
For example, Chattoe and Hamill82 have commented that any social network 
analysis of criminal groups requires more than simple gossip about who is 
friends with whom, and that a quantitative study of the structure of the 
network is required. They use as an example terrorist network analysis to 
make their point: 
 
The disruption of terrorist networks has rapidly spawned a literature in the 
aftermath of 9/11. However, almost without exception, the work that is not merely 
anecdotal proves results using formal models that disregard both distinctive 
ethnographic knowledge of terrorist ‘culture’ and the working practices and 
insights of law enforcement agencies. For this reason, it is unlikely to have any 
lasting policy impact. Simulations constructed using ethnographic police data and 
access to the kind of reasoning the intelligence services use about networks seem 
likely to be far more productive.83 
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 This is an essential point to keep in mind. It is tempting to try to gather 
data and make assumptions about the shape of a social network based on 
vertices and edges in a graph. Quantitative and qualitative understanding of 
the network is still required at some level. Undoubtedly, having better 
pictures of the small world shape of any social group is a starting point into 
promoting better understanding of how criminal networks operate.  
 Can the work being conducted into criminal gangs be translated into 
useful analysis of cybercrime? Criminal groups online also operate in social 
networks, so there is no reason why this should not be the case as well. Chau 
and Xu84 have conducted an interesting analysis of blogs loosely identified as 
“hate groups”, which are sites that publish blatantly racist content. First they 
identified blogs that had already been highlighted by other research as 
containing extremist racists views, then they set out an autonomous agent 
that extracted useful link data from the blog (external links, comments, 
incoming links), and also copied content for textual analysis of the content. 
The researchers then conducted a topological structure of possible networks 
of racist blogs by using centrality analysis, such as looking at average 
shortest paths, clustering and degree distribution, which as has been 
mentioned are commonly found in SNA and centrality studies online. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, this resulted in a tell-tale power law graph where a 
few blogs accumulated a larger number of incoming links, hinting at a pattern 
of link distribution that is to be found in other online communities.85 The 
social analysis of the groups also produced expected results that are 
compatible with offline groups such as the ones described earlier. Even in an 
online environment, racist blogs exhibited high clustering, similar to the 
formation of gangs, and these networks relied on popular connectors but also 
exhibited influential individuals and blogs that crossed across several 
communities, just as is the case in gang-related studies.86 While the blogs 
may not be criminal per se, this study hints at the existence of centralised, 
clustered social structures in online groups. 
 However, the aforementioned method of using SNA to determine the 
composition and structure of the criminal network is limited by the fact that 
more serious cybercriminals do not advertise online, or have blogs with 
incoming and outgoing links. While this limitation should temper the 
enthusiasm for the deployment of social network analysis against cybercrime, 
this does not mean that there are not areas that could be subject to SNA 
study.  
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 One controversial area of study where SNA has both been suggested and 
deployed is the subject of cyber-terrorism. This is unsurprising, as the so-
called “War on Terror” set up by Western countries after the September 2001 
attack against the United States has opened researchers to a welcome source 
of research funding. One of the first to suggest the use of network science in 
the fight against terrorism is Barabási, who makes an impassioned argument 
about the potential use of graph theory and SNA in the detection and 
destruction of terrorist cells.87 He explains that the understanding of social 
networks could be used against terrorist networks by identifying members, 
and then he postulates that they could be vulnerable to targeted strikes 
against the hubs holding together the network. It is a tantalising promise, but 
one would need evidence that terrorist organisations behave according to 
power laws. While the evidence for this statement is still in the early stages, 
there is growing indication that at least security services are taking it 
seriously. Some basics of network theory are being taught in military schools 
in the United States.88 Perhaps most intriguingly, several reports indicate that 
Saddam Hussein was found and apprehended by using social network 
analysis by looking at his network of associates and their movements around 
the loyalist area of Tikrit.89  
 While SNA could be useful in identifying terrorist networks, its 
application to so-called cyber-terrorism is more difficult, because up until 
now there has not been a documented cyber-terrorist attack.90 However, it 
seems clear that the Internet has been used by terrorists to organise and 
communicate with one another, and this opens up the scope of the use of 
SNA to try to detect and possibly even prevent terrorist attacks. The 
challenge for this, and many other Internet-related criminal activities, is that 
while the data may be available, the analysis of the information may be lost 
in a sea of reports that drown out useful intelligence.91 This could be a 
challenge met by careful and judicious use of social network analysis. By 
looking at websites which exchange terrorist and extremist materials, and 
correlating it with social network data and small world analysis, it could be 
possible to get a picture of potential future terrorists.  
 The current use and effectiveness of online social network analysis in the 
identification of online terrorist networks is difficult to ascertain at this point 
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because intelligence services are understandably not forthcoming about their 
methods. However, there is a documented example of a missed opportunity 
with regards to telephone surveillance data which may serve to illustrate the 
potential validity of using SNA to fight terrorism. It is possible that the UK’s 
intelligence community may have had in its grasp valuable data that could 
have been used to prevent the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks in London. In 
March 2004, the Metropolitan Police conducted Operation Crevice, a raid 
launched against terrorist cells of Pakistani origin, which resulted in the 
indictment and conviction of seven individuals.92 As a result of the arrests, 
police and security services conducted an analysis of phone calls made within 
the network, and identified 4,020 calls related to the Crevice investigation.93 
No social network analysis was conducted of the participants of those calls. If 
there had been some form of systematic and informed analysis made, then 
authorities may have identified two members of the phone call network, 
Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shazad Tanweer, two of the 7/7 bombers 
(figure 7.5).  
 
 
 
Figure 7.5 Phone call network of Operation Crevice surveillance 
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 This seems like a clear instance where any sort of understanding of social 
networks might have prevented an atrocity. While it is unfair to deal in “what 
ifs”, one only needs to look at the chart above to wonder if a qualified expert 
in SNA might have identified crucial central nodes in this terrorist network. 
 Besides the study of criminal rings as social networks, there is another 
problem that can be highlighted. What would happen if cybercriminals 
became aware of network theory, and started using social networks to 
commit crimes? If one accepts the theory that cybercrime has become a 
cyber-arms race between law enforcement agencies, industry and criminals, 
then it would be possible to envisage a situation where individuals intent on 
committing offences may use the same theories explained previously in order 
to commit better crimes.  
 This is not such a far-fetched idea. There is an indication that some 
cybercriminals are already using the Internet to gather useful data about 
potential targets in what some researchers call “context aware phishing”.94 
This is a more targeted phishing attack on specific targets, where freely-
available data about friends, shopping preferences and browser history can be 
gathered online and can be used to tailor a very believable message that has 
more chance of prompting a response from the victim. Jagatic et al95 
conducted an experiment using Indiana University students as subjects. The 
researchers collected public data from blogging sites, social network sites and 
other machine-readable data in order to gather information about the target’s 
contacts and preferences. They then harvested the data and produced a 
database with tens of thousands of relationships. They then divided the group 
into a control group that would receive anonymous messages, and one that 
seemingly came from someone within their social network. The study sent an 
actual yet harmless phishing attack on both groups, asking them to enter their 
secure University credentials. Only 16 percent of the control group provided 
their details, while an astounding 72 percent of those in the social network 
group responded positively to the attack. 
 If you add this study to our understanding of social networks, then the 
results are worrying to say the least. Take Facebook, for example, where at 
the time of writing, 500 million users shared their personal details with 
friends, family, acquaintances and co-workers. While a large number of 
Facebook users nowadays share personal data only with their “friends”, that 
is, other people in their network, a less publicised feature of this vast network 
is that it allows search engines to crawl through the contact details. This is an 
invaluable tool for anyone who is looking to mine information. Bonneau et 
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al96 conducted a social network analysis on Facebook’s public listings in 
order to gather information about users’ networks and their centrality within 
the network. The stated purpose of the study was to create social graphs by 
using public friendship links. The results were worrying, as the paper found 
that it was possible to construct an accurate picture of a person’s closest 
contacts by simply analysing data that can be obtained through web searches. 
When one connects this research to “context aware phishing”, then we should 
really be concerned about the availability of information made available 
through social network sites.  
 The implication of all of the evidence presented is clear. Social network 
analysis offers a powerful tool against cybercrime, both as a means of trying 
to identify criminal organisations, but also as a warning about the amount of 
data available on the Internet that can be misused. It is hoped that by 
highlighting the rich analytical tools available to policymakers and law 
enforcement agencies, colleagues in the legal profession may start to look 
harder at the potential of network science to the fight against cybercrime. In 
danger of over-stating one of the objectives of this work, a better 
understanding of networks can only produce positive results. 
 
 
5. A NEW INTERNET? 
 
If complexity theory can teach us anything about how networks operate, it is 
that complex dynamic systems such as the Internet are self-organising 
networks. Enough evidence has been provided to support the statement that 
the Internet shows emergent characteristics resulting from the ad hoc 
engineering decisions that created it.97 From a few decisions setting out the 
Internet’s architecture, we currently have a system that has grown as a result 
of those initial decisions.98    
 This can result in the amazingly vast array of information described in the 
previous chapters but, as has been presented here, it can also lead to a deeply 
embedded structural fault line that allows the misuse of the Internet’s 
architecture to allow the spread of viruses, the prevalence of zombie 
networks and the vulnerability of the entire system due to centrality issues. 
The nature of the system is one that favours openness, distribution and the 
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free spread of information, using free here in both the freedom and economic 
meaning of the word. But that openness comes at the price of allowing spam, 
botnets, viruses, DoS attacks and a pervasive difficulty in regulating the 
system. 
 The structural problems with the Internet architecture have been known 
for quite a while. While the Web was built initially as a scalable and 
adaptable network, adding new protocols and more data to the existing 
architecture resulted in changes that did not fix the architecture, but simply 
latched on delivery systems on the existing protocols.99 Not only that, the 
system was created originally with flexibility of content in mind; the design 
of the original protocols facilitated the development of a network that could 
fulfil military, academic and commercial objectives by making a minimum 
set of assumptions about the type of data that was shared within the 
network.100 The network had one overarching design feature; it did not really 
care about the content of the data, as long as it got to the intended recipient. 
This lack of discriminatory filters in packet switching and information 
delivery are both a great advantage and a design disadvantage, as it makes it 
hard to remove undesirable data from the network. As Zittrain puts it: 
 
[I]f the Internet had been designed with security as its centerpiece, it would never 
have achieved the kind of success it was enjoying, even as early as 1988. The 
basic assumption of Internet protocol design and implementation was that people 
would be reasonable; to assume otherwise runs the risk of hobbling it in just the 
way the proprietary networks were hobbled. The cybersecurity problem defies 
easy solution, because any of the most obvious solutions to it will cauterize the 
essence of the Internet and the generative PC.101 
 
 So, we are stuck with an insecure global network where self-organisation 
has almost become a given. While it is clear that governments and regulators 
are attempting to exert some form of control in cyberspace, these efforts 
appear to be doomed to failure because of the very architectural composition 
of the network. Born as a distributed system, a network of such vastness 
cannot really be controlled efficiently, at least not in a way that will make 
cybercrime disappear entirely. Or can it? Would it be possible to re-invent 
the Internet and turn it into a system that is not self-organising? This may 
seem like a loaded question, but it is a real choice. Despite what some may 
think, emergence and self-organisation are not always present in complex 
systems. While self-organisation is simply the way in which a complex 
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system can bring order to chaos, it is possible for a complex system to remain 
chaotic, or for highly-ordered systems to emerge as a result of top-down 
control, or other statistical circumstances.102 In theory, a tightly controlled 
network could be organised in such a manner that self-organisation rarely 
occurs, or it results in a network that responds to network design choices. 
There is a small but vocal number of researchers that insist that the apparent 
self-organising nature of the Internet is the result of design decisions, and 
therefore future networks that are properly designed should display a directed 
self-organisation. Alderson and Willinger note that: 
 
If recent experience with the wired Internet is an indication, network self-
organization in the form of management simplicity will be a critical objective, but 
will likely be the result of deliberate and well-designed protocols rather than a 
feature that emerges out of randomness.103 
 
 If it is possible to reorganise cyberspace, then perhaps it might be 
desirable to forego the self-organising Internet, and replace it with a more 
centralised, closed and controlled version. Remove self-organisation, and you 
may have a global communications network that operates in a less chaotic 
manner. Is it time to reset the Internet? Internet 2.0, if you may.  
 The year 2010 will probably be seen in the future as a watershed moment 
in the history of the Internet because there are two very different models of 
how the global network will evolve. On the one hand, we have a vocal 
number of advocates for maintaining openness in the system despite its 
pitfalls. On the other hand, we have a number of businesses that are pushing 
for a more controlled and closed architecture where a few companies act as 
filtering gateways. In the first camp there is an array of “Web loyalists” 
comprising software engineers, bloggers, open source advocates and net 
neutrality proponents. In the other camp we encounter a puzzling coalition of 
governments and companies like Apple that want to create a closed Internet 
which relies less on the browser, and more on applications and clients that 
connect to the Internet in order to provide one specific function or service, 
and where users browse a limited version of the Web via pre-approved 
programs.  
 We are currently presented with two very different ideas about what the 
Internet should be, a choice that I call the dilemma of the open Web versus 
the closed Internet.104 For the Web loyalists, the status quo should remain; the 
open Web has given us peer-production, blogs, social networks, free email 
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and an amount of information that grows exponentially.105 For the proponents 
of change, the current Internet is a bloated network filled with superfluous 
data, porn, viruses and all sorts of unsavoury material. The solution is to 
create a more centralised network where users access information through 
filtered channels that will offer a safer and cleaner environment. Precisely 
like a gated community. Steve Jobs is perhaps the most vocal proponent of 
this version of the future. His vision is one of a more free Web. In a now 
legendary email exchange with one of the editors of the Gawker blog, Jobs 
commented that his vision is one of a free Internet, but one free from all of 
the hassles of the current one: 
 
Yep, freedom from programs that steal your private data. Freedom from programs 
that trash your battery. Freedom from porn. Yep, freedom. The times they are a 
changing’, and some traditional PC folks feel like their world is slipping away. It 
is.106 
 
 This statement needs some background, as it lies at the heart of the current 
debate about the future of the Internet. Apple has become the leading 
proponent of the Internet 2.0, a place that by the time you are reading this 
might already be prevalent. The World Wide Web is just a small part of what 
constitutes the Internet and it is the most visible aspect of the network – you 
connect to it via your browser, surf pages, watch videos and may even 
download content, legal or not. However, there is a competing version of the 
Web taking shape. As more people browse the Internet on their mobile 
phones, MP3 players, e-book readers and tablet computers (like Apple’s 
iPad), the relevance of the WWW is diminished. For example, on my own 
Android mobile phone, I am constantly connecting to the Internet, but not to 
the browser-based Web. I connect to Twitter via an application (app) called 
Twidroid; I connect to Google Maps, and browse local events and places 
using an augmented reality browser called Layar. All of these are clients; 
they use the Internet, but not the HTML-based Web. This is not an isolated 
occurrence; as more and more users rely on their mobile devices to connect 
to the Internet, the app will become a more important part of our daily 
interaction with the global network. This has prompted influential thinkers 
such as Chris Anderson to declare the death of the Web.107 
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 These apps have to be installed wilfully by the user, so only those apps 
that have been approved by the device maker can run on the device. This 
closes down the Internet, and also adds a layer of centrality that did not exist 
in the old Web. Undoubtedly, the Jobsian model of the closed and centralised 
Internet has certain appeal; it restricts self-organisation and it also allows 
regulators to monitor closely what application people are running. 
Controversial, illegal and even potentially liable programs will be filtered out 
in favour of bland, mass-appeal apps.  
 However, this version of the future has two main problems that stress the 
importance of network theory. The obvious one is that by concentrating 
application delivery into a few marketplaces, there is an added risk of 
creating a centralised network that would become a prime target for 
cybercriminal attacks. Just recently, hackers managed to hack into PayPal 
accounts and charge millions of dollars’ worth of Apple iTunes content.108 
The second problem with the Jobsian Internet is that perhaps it 
underestimates the power of self-organisation. The current Internet has 
become very adept at propagating a specific model of communication 
delivery to the world. While there are those who tell us that this model has to 
change, we have to accept the possibility that the emergent nature of the Web 
cannot be contained any more. It is possible that the future of the Internet has 
already been written in the protocols that gave it life. Once again, similes 
involving genies, bottles, boxes and apple trees apply.  
 The future of the Internet may already be written. 
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8. Conclusion 
  
 
Everything in nature is the result of fixed laws. 
Charles Darwin, The Autobiography of Charles Darwin: 1809-18821 
 
 
1. A TALE OF TWO INTERNETS 
 
Two events in the last few months surrounding the completion of this work 
have served to set the stage of the opposing philosophies regarding Internet 
regulation. These I believe serve as a good illustration of the main 
conclusions to be drawn from this book.    
 On November 28 2010, the whistleblowing site Wikileaks began releasing 
some of the more than 250,000 diplomatic cables from USA embassies 
around the world, in a coordinated exercise with five major international 
newspapers,2 but the bulk of the release was conducted through the Wikileaks 
website. The cables contained embarrassing details both to the United States 
and to various governments around the world, and in some cases, even some 
sensitive data that has sparked political unrest in various fronts.  
 From the very beginning, there were calls from numerous parties within 
the United States to try to shut down Wikileaks.3 What followed was almost 
a textbook case study on Internet resilience, and just how difficult it is to 
police the Internet. 
 To explain the regulatory attempts to shut down Wikileaks, it is important 
to remember some of the concepts seen in Chapter 4 about Internet 
architecture. If you wanted to reach Wikileaks with your Internet browser of 
choice (then identified as www.wikileaks.org), you had to know its address, 
or you could enter “wikileaks” into a search engine. The result would be that 
the Domain Name system would translate wikileaks.org into a computer IP 
address, and would direct your browser to the server hosting that content. 
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The actual Wikileaks website was housed in several hosting services, mostly 
in Sweden and France, but they had also bought hosting space in the cloud 
computing web services offered by Amazon.com. The wikileaks.org domain 
name was assigned by Californian domain name registrar EveryDNS.net, 
which also provided free DNS services for the site.4 By 1st December 2010, 
just a couple of days after the initial leaks, Amazon had dropped the service 
alleging breach of its Terms of Use, and EveryDNS.net had revoked the DNS 
registration alleging damage to its servers from coordinated cyber-attacks. By 
the end of that week, several payment systems which took donations for the 
Wikileaks (including Visa, MasterCard and PayPal) had also dropped the 
organisation. Bereft of hosting, routing and monetary channels, one would 
have thought that Wikileaks would simply be forced to disappear.5 However, 
if there is one thing that we have learnt about the Internet from network 
science is that it is incredibly resilient.  
 In any other type of architecture, such a massive attack on the entire 
Wikileaks operational infrastructure would spell its demise. However, as it 
has been repeatedly stated throughout this book, there is something at which 
the Internet is really good at, it takes censorship as an attack to its 
infrastructure and reroutes services to avoid the affected area. Just a few 
minutes after Wikileaks had its DNS services removed the fact was 
advertised to the world via Twitter and Facebook.6 Because the site was still 
being hosted in a computer connected to the Internet, it was still possible to 
access the content via an IP address despite the fact that writing 
Wikipedia.org into a browser would take you nowhere.7 Similarly, several 
mirrors8 and new DNS registrations started popping up everywhere – social 
media services were used to retransmit the latest IP address as they became 
available. Wikileaks even managed to get other domains.9 Moreover, 
Wikileaks made available an encrypted torrent file through The Pirate Bay 
which allegedly contained all of the cables as a manner of online insurance 
against complete disconnection.10 In short, this was Internet resilience at its 
best.  
 The so-called Cablegate incident made abundantly clear just how difficult 
it can be to regulate large distributed networks such as the Internet. One of 
the most important lessons taught by network science is precisely that a 
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scale-free network is resilient in the extreme. Even large co-ordinated attacks 
are unlikely to bring down the entire network, particularly when 
knowledgeable and determined agents are working within the very same 
Internet architecture to spread information. The lack of centrality within the 
wider Internet makes it almost impossible to shut down a website such as 
Wikileaks. Evidence of this is that even after considerable public and private 
efforts were used to remove Wikileaks from the web, the site is still running 
at the time of writing.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 The Egyptian Internet shuts down11 
 
 Here is where the second story comes to play. Right after the Wikileaks 
Cablegate scandal (and some have even suggested that because of it), the 
Arab world erupted in civil unrest. From Tunisia to Yemen, populations 
across the region began a series of street protests that resulted in the fall of 
several regimes. When the conflict reached Egypt in January 2011, a large 
part of the protests were coordinated using the Internet, particularly through 
the use of social media sites.12 It may be too much to suggest that the Internet 
caused the revolution in Egypt, but it certainly helped protesters to organise 
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and stay ahead of the authorities. It also was vital in mobilising large 
numbers of people to specific locations, such as Tahrir Square in Cairo.13 
What is certain is that the Egyptian government considered that the Internet 
posed a threat to their interests, so they did something that had never done 
before to such extent: they shut down the Internet.  
 On January 27 2011, at around 10.30 GMT, the entire Egyptian Internet 
was disconnected from the rest of the world.14 This was possible because 
Egypt, just as many other countries in the Middle East, has a national firewall 
consisting of an extra layer of Internet servers that intermediate all traffic in 
and out of the country through servers running the adequately named Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP). Egyptian authorities managed to shut down 
simultaneously 3,500 BGP routes into the country, which meant that more 
than 90 percent of all traffic in and out of the country could not get through 
(Figure 8.1).15  
 What the Egyptian case illustrates is an excellent example of the dual 
nature of Internet architecture. At the larger scale, the Web is a scale-free 
network, entirely distributed and remarkably robust. At the national level, the 
Internet is increasingly centralised, and therefore more likely to suffer from 
large cascading local failures. The more centralised the system, the easier it is 
to regulate.  
 This is therefore the conundrum currently presented to regulators around 
the world, and all is consistent with the empirical and theoretical evidence 
provided by network theory. It is possible to control the Internet, but to do so 
it must stop being decentralised. Higher levels of centrality allow for more 
control, but this in change translates into a less open system.   
 
 
2. SELF-ORGANISATION THEORY OF INTERNET REGULATION  
 
 When dealing with the subject of Internet regulation in Chapter 4, a 
hypothesis was presented, this forms the central part of this work. Assuming 
that the Internet is a complex adaptive system subject to self-organisation, 
then it is possible to postulate that any attempt to regulate specific elements 
within the network will have to take into account this important emergent 
attribute of the global communication system. Moreover, it is the main 
assertion of the present book that it is not possible to adequately regulate 
                                                          
13. Gustin S, “Social Media Sparked, Accelerated Egypt’s Revolutionary Fire”, Wired (11 
February, 2011), http://goo.gl/bz6J2.  
14. Williams C, “How Egypt Shut Down the Internet”, The Telegraph (28 January, 2011), 
http://goo.gl/j5PTU.  
15. Greenemeier L, “How Was Egypt’s Internet Access Shut Off?” Scientific American (28 
January, 2011), http://goo.gl/CCE08.  
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online environments that display self-organising characteristics without some 
knowledge of the empirical and theoretical features of such environments.   
 Throughout the work, several examples have been presented as evidence 
that the Internet is indeed a self-organising system. The network is made up 
of nodes and links that grow according to power laws. Older links in the 
network accumulate more links, and those successful nodes in turn tend to 
accumulate more links themselves, creating a “rich get richer” situation. The 
resulting hubs serve as important connectors within the network, which 
explain in turn the seemingly ordered nature of the system. The nodes 
themselves often cluster into small world networks where the intervening 
pathways between nodes tend to be short.  
 The scale-free nature of the network makes the Internet resilient to random 
attacks. However, this also means that other undesired networks which exist 
within cyberspace are also robust, such as P2P file-sharing networks, or 
cybercrime rings. Similarly, because of architectural decisions early on, the 
network displays high levels of centrality at the national scale.  
 All of these features, amongst others, offer strong confirmation that there 
are self-organising forces online. Any regulatory effort that ignores this fact 
is faced with severe difficulties, as the same self-organising forces that shape 
the Internet’s architecture are also at work to undermine and even defeat 
regulatory action.  
 When presented with autopoietic systems, regulation theories have two 
possible strategies. One could accept that the network responds to its own 
self-organising elements, and therefore cannot be governed. If this is the 
case, then regulation is not possible. This work has adopted the opposite 
view, that self-regulation need not mean that governance of the system is 
impossible. While this may be optimistic, it is the only viable avenue to take 
if one is willing to undertake regulatory efforts. Not to do this would be to 
fall prey to an anarchic and/or libertarian view of governance, where 
everything is left to the self-organising powers of the system. Even in the 
face of contradictory evidence we will adopt the optimistic view of 
regulation, and will assume that some form of order outside of the regulatory 
effort is possible.  
 Within the optimistic regulatory philosophy, we could try to build the 
system to fit the regulatory goals. Following the idea presented in Lessig’s 
Code,16 regulation strategies can be built into the system assuming that this 
will seed the elements around which self-organisation will occur. Complex 
systems will usually order themselves at fitness peaks of higher order. If we 
know how self-organisation works within the network, then we can try to 
code situations that will constitute fitness peaks in the overall landscape.  
                                                          
16. Lessig L, Code Version 2.0, 2nd ed, New York: Basic Books (2006).  
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 There are two examples presented in the work that can represent 
opportunities for engineered self-organisation. Firstly, in the fight against 
P2P file-sharing, it seems evident that the networks are robust self-organising 
entities. But what would happen if one built network architecture that 
specifically targets such networks? While there have been some attempts to 
attack the networks in this manner, perhaps more strict legislation that tackles 
not the infringers, but the architecture, would have more chance of success. 
Secondly, some forms of cybercrime rely heavily on the current open and 
centralised Internet architecture. A more tightly regulated network, with more 
gateways and intermediaries, may sacrifice the Web’s dynamic nature, but it 
may seriously hinder some forms of cybercrime, particularly denial of service 
attacks, spam and phishing.  
 The optimistic view of regulation also presents opportunities for smarter 
regulatory efforts by informing decision-makers and stakeholders about the 
way in which the target system operates. Any attempt to legislate in the areas 
covered by Internet regulation, such as privacy, copyright and cybercrime, 
has to consider the emergent traits of cyberspace. At some point 
policymakers will realise that their regulatory efforts are having no effect, 
and hopefully they will look at some of the research highlighted in this work 
in search of evidence.  
 I am aware that this may sound arrogant; it is not my intention to be the 
eccentric person in the street holding a placard stating that “The End Is 
Nigh”. There are many scholars who are already looking at the theories of 
complexity for possible answers to regulatory conundrums. The goal of this 
work is to point interested readers to the empirical studies that may explain 
regulatory failure.  
 To recap, the self-organisation theory of Internet regulation therefore is as 
follows: the Internet is a complex system that displays self-organisation. In 
order to efficiently and successfully regulate the digital environment, it is 
imperative that one understands how it is organised, what characteristics are 
present, what elements act as fitness peaks and how architectural decisions 
affect its emergent features.  
 One of my personal heroes is Edward Tufte. In his seminal book The 
Cognitive Style of Powerpoint,17 he commented that “Bullet outlines dilute 
thought”. I was tempted to make an outline list of the various salient points of 
the theory, but I believe that the above explanation should suffice without 
having to dilute the conclusion.  
 
 
                                                          
17. Tufte ER, The Cognitive Style of Powerpoint: Pitching out Corrupts Within, 2nd ed, 
Cheshire, CT: Graphics Press (2006).  
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3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This work has used three fields of Internet regulation as the case studies of 
the theory of complexity presented above. These include topics such as 
copyright policy, online copyright infringement, free and open source 
software, user-generated content and cybercrime. These were chosen for two 
reasons. Firstly, by reading through the literature on complex theory and 
network science, it became clear that these fields were more developed, and 
where it would be possible to obtain more supporting evidence for the ideas 
of self-organisation that are at the centre of the work. Secondly, these have 
been some of my main areas of research for the past eight years. It was hoped 
that the familiarity with the legal topic would allow me to make stronger 
connection to the wealth of research into networks that has been highlighted 
in the work. These three main case studies, however, are just some of the 
various areas of Internet law that could be subject to similar analysis.  
 There are three potential topics where I believe future research could be 
conducted. The first, and perhaps more obvious, is the subject of online 
privacy within social networks. At the time of writing, Facebook boasts 500 
million active users.18 At the same time as this figure was reached, Facebook 
was immersed in several privacy scandals about what it does with the 
information collected on its users.19 Almost by definition, such systems are 
practically tailor-made for disciplines such as social network analysis. 
Therefore, network theory could try to look at some questions about privacy 
concerns. What constitutes a user’s closest social network? How much of the 
information made available to “friends” can be mined for other purposes? Is 
it possible to create a social network where privacy concerns are minimised?  
 Another possible topic ripe for analysis is network neutrality. According 
to Marsden: 
 
In short, net neutrality is about the rules of the road for Internet users, and about 
the relationship between the owners of those roads and the users. Government is 
asked to make a decision as to which users have priority and whether road 
charging should be introduced, ostensibly to build wider and faster roads in 
future.20 
 
 This is a highly-politicised and controversial topic, particularly in the 
United States, where the choice of network provider in rural areas is limited. 
                                                          
18. Zuckerberg M, “500 Million Stories”, The Facebook Blog (21 July, 2010), 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=409753352130.  
19. Quigley R, “Facebook Privacy Fears for 100m Users as Their Personal Details Are 
Published on File-Sharing Site”, Mail Online (29 July, 2010), http://is.gd/eTGqX.  
20. Marsden CT, Net Neutrality: Towards a Co-Regulatory Solution, London: Bloomsbury 
Academic (2010), pp. 2–3.    
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The current debate hinges on the question of whether ISPs and bandwidth 
providers should charge for higher speeds. Currently, the Internet rests on the 
assumption that all packets are created equal. By favouring some content 
over another based on price, this model would be under threat. It is therefore 
easy to see why a network theory analysis would be favourable in this area. 
Would a change in the architectural structure of bandwidth provision affect 
the network as a whole? Is network neutrality possible or will different 
packet speeds emerge as a fitness solution in the system?  
 The other topic is that of intermediary liability. While this topic was 
covered when discussing copyright infringement, this is a much richer legal 
subject that involves areas such as defamation, electronic commerce and 
pornography.21 Because ISP liability deals mostly with the distribution of 
content through the network, the topic lends itself to network analysis 
because content placed online has incoming and outgoing links. It might be 
possible to try to analyse the centrality of content within a network to 
ascertain potential damages, and also to try to identify social networks and 
replication pathways within the system.  
 These are only three examples of the various subjects that could be 
analysed in light of the study of the architecture of networks. It is hoped that 
the present work will inspire fellow Internet Law colleagues to look into 
some of the tools described in previous chapters.    
 
 
4. A FINAL WORD ON REDUCTIONISM  
 
One of the most neglected stories of the 2008 global credit crunch has been 
the partial responsibility of physicists and mathematicians in creating the 
crisis. In 1999, the specialised magazine Physics World ran an editorial 
commenting on the growing phenomenon of physicists leaving academia to 
become quantitative analysts, better known in the industry as “quants”.22 The 
reason for this migration was twofold. Firstly, mathematicians and physicists 
were hired by financial services to provide models to make sense of the 
chaotic nature of markets and share prices. Secondly, several physicists were 
hired to come up with mathematical models and software programs that 
                                                          
21. See for example: Goldstein MP, “Service Provider Liability for Acts Committed by Users: 
What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You”, 18:3 The John Marshall Journal of Computer & 
Information Law 52 (2000). 
22. “‘Rocket Science’: The Facts”, Physics World (June 3 1999), 
http://physicsworld.com/cws/article/print/1081.  
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would be at the heart of complex financial instruments called derivatives, 
which many have blamed as one of the causes of the credit crunch.23  
 Derivatives are investment packages that do not have inherent value; their 
relative worth is tied to the value of other trade items, including shares, 
currencies, commodities and even aggregated credit packages (hence the 
name). As these instruments depend entirely on the linked tradable goods, 
they tend to be exceptionally complex, so much so that only a few 
mathematicians and physicists were said to understand them. Despite their 
seeming complexity, derivatives became highly sought after because they 
produced high returns for the initial investment. The problem seems to be 
that the instruments were so complex that nobody actually understood them, 
and therefore an entire market rested on the assumption that some people 
actually knew what they were doing, when they almost certainly did not.  
Derivatives rose in value far higher than they were actually worth, and they 
were often tied with large insurance-like packages called credit default 
swaps. When the faulty nature of the packages was unearthed due to the 
collapse of several credit schemes, the pyramid-like house of cards inevitably 
tumbled down.  
 The results of this staggering display of hubris is well known, and at the 
time of writing global markets are still reeling from the acts of folly 
displayed by financiers and bankers. With the benefit of hindsight, it seems 
clear that entrusting mathematicians with the keys of the City and Wall Street 
placed too much faith on the exactitude of maths in detriment of the 
unpredictability of human nature. 
 The reason why I highlight this case is to serve as a word of caution about 
the reach of the theories expounded in this work. While it is true that it is 
assumed that mathematics and physics do have something to tell us about 
social systems, one should never lose sight of the fact that it is possible to go 
too far in this approach. It is not my wish to replace Internet regulation 
theories with mechanistic network analysis that is only interested in charting 
nodes and links into logarithmic tables and pretty visualisations of networks. 
The data tells us a part of the story; what we decide to make of the 
information is decidedly our own responsibility.  
 The application of complexity theory research described throughout this 
work may generate unease amongst some readers. This may be because the 
use of physical formula to understand human behaviour has had a mixed 
history, as was explained in the Introduction. The implication of such a 
deterministic outlook of the world has had negative implications, so it is 
usually suspected by default. But despite its dubious history, modern physics 
                                                          
23. Even back in 2003, financier Warren Buffet had called derivatives “financial weapons of 
mass destruction”. See: “Buffett Warns on Investment ‘Time Bomb’” BBC News (4 March, 
2003), http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2817995.stm.  
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has been demonstrating that there could be an application of physical models 
to social interactions.24 Formulas used to describe how magnets achieve their 
orientation, or how gases condense, can also be used to chart how businesses 
grow, how crime rates fluctuate, or how crowds flow.25  
 It would be easy to dismiss the trends cited, and particular the emerging 
science of networks, as another doomed attempt to explain social complexity 
with mathematics, or a way of deleting free will to convert the human 
experience into a set of equations. However, to view power laws as 
deterministic does not really address the fact that this is not an exact science; 
it is a descriptive tool of how networks operate.26 Humans still retain free 
agency, while the network itself could be deterministic and react in 
predicable ways.  
 The best way to understand the potential deterministic nature of networks 
is to conduct simple thought experiments about how people actually interact 
with one another in a social gathering. We would generally like to think that 
we are free agents, and therefore social networks should respond to the very 
random nature of human experience. Yet, we are constantly responding and 
acting according to physical and social constraints. Imagine that you are at a 
busy conference coffee break. If you are observant, you will probably notice 
that people have gathered in small groups, some people will work the room 
while others will remain with the same group, and perhaps there may be a 
person standing by the coffee table on their own. You will rarely see a person 
shouting across the room, or an extremely large group where nobody can 
interact. If you map the number of links made during such breaks, you will 
start to see certain patterns emerging. These patterns are not deterministic in 
the sense that they completely erase agency from those present; you can still 
choose to move around the room, or not to talk to anyone else, but the pattern 
made by the collection of conducts provides a good example of the 
apparently deterministic nature of social networks. People will act freely, but 
the constraints of social norms and the laws of physics will mean that social 
networks will produce certain results. Smaller groups will have less 
deterministic value because the action of one individual will have a larger 
effect, while the larger group will tend to absorb the random individual 
behaviour.  
 This same phenomenon is precisely what has been mapped by the research 
conducted so far on all sorts of networks. Large scale-free networks seem to 
                                                          
24. Ball P, “The Physical Modeling of Human Social Systems”, 1 ComPlexUs 190 (2003). 
25. Ibid, pp.198–200.  
26. It must be stressed that the term “deterministic nature” has other implications in the 
research. It is another mathematical model to describe network growth. See: Barabási A-L, 
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follow certain rules that respond to those same physical constrains. 
Meaningful links, nodes and hubs serve to explain the larger picture, but not 
the individual choices.  
 It is only natural that grand theories of everything should be met with 
scepticism. Attempting to explain complex systems with a few theories may 
seem like unforgivable reductionism; an attempt to apply materialistic ideals 
to social relations where they do not fit. However, if there is sound evidence 
that certain network environments like the Internet act in predictable ways, 
then all the research into this behaviour should be taken into consideration 
when attempting to analyse the underlying trends that govern such patterns, 
even if it is an analysis that belongs to the physical sciences and not to the 
social ones.  
 It can be argued that we are on the threshold of better understanding 
complex systems like the Web thanks to the predictable nature of the science 
of networks, but it is important to make sure that such enthusiasm is 
tempered by the scale of the task of mapping such large structures. All 
predictive models of cyberspace should take into consideration that it is a 
changing environment. As Barabási argues: 
 
It is far from us to suggest that the scale-free model introduced above describes 
faithfully the topology of the www. Naturally, the www has a much richer 
structure that cannot be captured by such simple ingredients. For example, the 
links are not invariant in time, they constantly change, being either eliminated or 
rewired to other documents. Similarly, the www documents are not stable, they are 
often removed, and change address. Furthermore, the web pages are structured in 
domains, that by themselves have a rather complex hierarchical structure.27 
 
 Research into networks should then be released with the caveat that the 
descriptive and predictive features given to power laws are to be taken as 
tools, not as absolute predictions. This has to be stressed because it would be 
plausible to read the extensive research presented so far and complain that we 
are talking about a form of technological determinism.28 The reader can rest 
assured that such a goal is not intended, and that the tools put forward should 
not be construed as deterministic in any way, just like gravity is not 
deterministic.  
 This work originated from one paper presented in various stages to diverse 
audiences.29 The last slide of the presentation features a wonderful picture of 
                                                          
27. Barabási A-L, Albert R and Jeong H, “Scale-Free Characteristics of Random Networks: The 
Topology of the World Wide Web”, 281 Physica A 69–77 (2000), p.75. 
28. For more about the topic of technological determinism, see: Smith MR and Marx L, Does 
Technology Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism, Cambridge, MA: 
London: MIT Press (1994).  
29. To mixed results, ranging from outraged to enthusiastic.  
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the footpaths in a public park in Stuttgart University that was shown at the 
end of Chapter 3. The picture shows the designed path by whoever built the 
space, a stylish crossing X through the roughly square lawn. However, one 
can clearly see another path in the picture, one that was not designed. This 
path has been made by people walking from one building to another in a 
direct line, which does not follow the official pathway. This exemplifies 
nicely what the present work is trying to achieve. We may plot paths through 
cyberspace; we may attempt to regulate the space in various ways. But is this 
regulation really considering the paths that will be chosen almost inevitably 
by the inhabitants of the new space? Network science provides a descriptive 
tool to make better decisions when building the paths. 
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